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INTRODUCTION
The year of 1792 was a tumultuous one—with the revolutionary liberation of human mind， societies are provoked by the ardor of revolution. However， with progresses and debates， even been through the immense discussion of rationalism for belief and personal liberty， the right of women is still excluded from most of the discussion—in the grand defense of Rights of Man by one of the most admirable liberal soldier Thomas Paine， women were obviously out of most of the debate; Dr. John Gregory taught his daughter that “Your whole life is often a life of suffering…You must bear your sorrows in silence， unknown and unpitied”1 ; more explicitly， the great and notorious French politician Talleyrand-Périgord published a pamphlet， in which still appears tremendous contrast regarding the form of the education attended by two sexes; while asking “Is it not apparent， that their delicate constitutions… set them apart from… and summon them to gentle occupations and the cares of the home？” he argues that “it will never be in women’s interest to change the assignment they have received.”2
However， the voice defending women has never disappeared in the great Enlightenment， which was led by philosophers like Condorcet， Helvetius and Voltaire; they either dismiss the justification of current restraint on women， satirizing it， or argue for refinement in development of this gender. Though in paucity， this concise discussion of the former decades still acts as fateful ammunition for the feminists in the 1790s， instilling them with more impulses when they witness men fighting for their fates and rights with heroic sentiments， while women are mostly left aside in the rotten roles drafted for them centuries ago. The contrast startles them to start their own revolution.
In this defense of women’s rights， there appears a particularly prominent work， A Vindication of the Rights of Women; its author， Mary Wollstonecraft， decided to craft the words immediately when seeing Tallelyrand’s discriminating plan. The work does not simply defense the legitimacy of women’s rights in social treatment， education， and domestic life， underscore the necessity of certain development and exertion for the formation of admirable virtues， but connects this sole topic with one of the cores in Enlightenment—the essence of human nature—and lays a stark contest for different systems of opinions regarding men’s nature， as well as the requirement of later nurture in civilization. A French philosopher， Jean Jacques Rousseau， stands out as the biggest thorn in flesh in Mary’s work. His world-astonishing work on education， Emile， was not only the target frequently aimed at by other philosophers during Enlightenment， but the main one taken by Mary. The work， drafting Rousseau’s own belief in human nature and civilization， presents the author’s ideal plan to nurture his male student Emile in the category of “natural person.” Then， he gives another plan on development to Emile’s future wife Sophia， based on Rousseau’s perception of women’s nature， thus completely differentiated from the one of Emile’s. Defending women’s worth of respect and their esteem， however， his work still focuses on many traditional roles of women， thus regarded by Mary as the chain limiting women’s mind.
While justifying women’s status， Mary’s aim in this work is to restore the strength to future nurture of her sex， in which more concrete spirit would take the place as principle. “So many are the imperfections that attend the loss of virtue in women， and so greatly are their minds depraved when this principal guard is removed，”3 such is the theory of Montesquieu on female continency. And for Mary， the “principle guard” of human race ought to be the state of reason and understanding， which is only possible to be exercised if nurtured with independence， also regarded as the foremost precondition for real virtue. With this as the backbone， based on other theories from the Enlightenment， she starts own defense in this century-long debate， against the one launched by philosophers led by Rousseau.
I. Development of Reason， from Different Theory regarding Nature and Civilization， Social Interaction
One major difference between systems represented by Mary and Rousseau appears in their different attitude towards development of 4reason. For Rousseau， he presents in Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar， Emile， that reason can fraud us easily， but conscience is the true guidance of souls5; he frequently takes man’s nature as the foundation of all the future development of reason. This is more legitimately justified when he dwells on the ill-effect， such as overflowing desires and prejudices that civilization set on men’s faculties in the journey of nurturing reason—also a central theme to many others of his works. Therefore， in Emile， he suggests that in children education， education on reason should be properly subdued in order to prevent the prejudices implanted on it. Everything， argued Rousseau， should be arranged in correct order in advance， thus preventing them from getting attached to the vices that may distort their mind， as living in countryside than the urban， therefore comes the doctrine that not to acquire is better than acquire the bad.6 The point is made more radical concerning women education. Rousseau warns against women launching “certain questions”—the questions inquiring into reason; and he even explicitly suggests the submission to men ought to be women’s reason， while he argues women’s capricious nature would prevent them from combining reason with their belief， thus not suited for further inquiry; this is further espoused by saying that women should neither choose their religion nor inquire into the reason of doctrines， but simply following the guidance of their mothers and future husbands. Thus he gives the source from which women discern the right from wrong—the opinions from others. Then， it would be more essential for women to choose credible authority as their dependence than themselves， on which they could make wiser discernment in the future.7
Mary， on opposite， argues reason as the central core debunking the true nature of women. As to Rousseau’s resistance to the personal acquaintance of knowledge connected with vice and prejudice， Mary values certain experiences， entangled with pain， as the only way to acquire the final， with experience drawn from them.8 Such distinction between the two， Rousseau’s precaution and Mary’s favor in experience， is further embodied at large. While Rousseau later argues the concept of sin would be better conveyed to children through mere dictation before entering into society， Mary again rebutted such excessive precaution， as though prevent the formation of vices， but developing indifference in a mere spectator of vices of others， as the prevention for truly acquiring any valuable virtue themselves.9
Such embodies two different theories regarding social civilization and interaction. Mary actually coincides with Rousseau’s view that potential prejudices might be easily taken on with interaction in society， as recorded in her Letters， “Mixing with mankind， we are obliged to examine our prejudices， and often imperceptibly lose， as we analyze.”10Rousseau’s theory also sounds concrete enough when we consider that kids at such young ages， would not have enough “intellect” to personally understand the reason being taught， as well as the idea of social morality， as Rousseau said， they would be “monkeys” imitating such behaviors merely “because of others”; on the other hand， solitude， at some extent， would “provide more time for the development and maturity” of children.11Still， Mary argues for “a degree of exertion” “more or less painful” as only way of acquiring correlated knowledge. Thus she promotes physically interact with others in society， thus resonating with their feelings， as herself does in “making my feelings take an orderly course.”12 For she insists that when children be kept in Rousseau’s advocating “solitude” with acquaintance of vices through merely dictation， the “selfish prudence and reason just rising above instinct” would be rendered， as she also asserts the scant possibility left of developing “any permanent character.”13 Then， the fears Rousseau holds in partly repudiating women’s inquiry into reason is actually the direct consequence of his methods of development on reason. Another consequence as such defect， particular for girls， is recognized by Mary. Girls “pigging together，” idle with scant reason developed， have seldom enough fortitude to truly confront with the society. Attending to jealousy and little intrigue， they would fail to learn true knowledge and acquire great virtues. More else， lack of steady character， educated with and by their own sex， ，they are easily subjected to fop and their fake chivalry， rather than follower of the chastity and respectable love wished by Rousseau.14
This lack of permanence and reason contributes also to their preferment in others’ ideas. Since truth would always be proved right despite some misconstrue or slander of others， a person of steadiness and reason would be unmoved by comments， says Mary.15 And it is still the restriction of understanding and soft reason promoted in Rousseau’s education that renders this miscomprehension of women. Moreover， with such character depending on others， Mary points again at their inevitable future scenario of “attachment to rakes” without “exercise their understanding”， which overlaps with Rousseau’s worries. For women would not be able to follow their reason anymore， while being asked to follow others’ behaviors， whether their mothers’ or future husbands’， there would be few chance for them to acquire true “morals”， says Mary.16 Thus implanted on women’s original nature， future rational judgment by themselves would also be nearly impossible to acquire， which directly violates Rousseau’s true intention.17
Rousseau seems to have a double-faced attitude towards the concept “experience” and “practice”. On the one hand， he argues devotedly that experience and practice should be the sole media through which children satiates their curiosity and meet all the scientific fact about the world; without physically practicing it， children would grow up to be “toys controlled by others.”18 And even in recognizing social distinction， he uses a delicate way to let his ideal male student Emile understand the concept of “property” deeply through a disastrous ruin of Emile’s own planting beans.19 But the contradiction appears in education on society， as well as the reasons and morals concerning it; he puts off such part， and advocates for “negative education.” Essentially， all of these could be attributed to his philosophy regarding civilization and society.
“Turning men to barbarity，” this is a description widely used by the critics of Rousseau. The French philosopher， indeed， might well realize the crude of original state of human race， but still praising its natural and innocence as outweighing today’s meretricious civilization. He holds human nature as the most inviolable principle in his system. This is a point overlapping the original skeptic theory in Montaigne’s Of Cannibals， when questioning whether the all the conspiracy and dirty trick later developed are no more barbarous than the cannibalism.20 Though the founding father of this specific skeptic left his essays an open ending， Rousseau pants to confirm that civilization has engendered most of contemporary vices. There is a whole chain of reasoning held by Rousseau and his disciples： men were living a sufficiently satisfying life at the very beginning， as satiating living desires through unadorned manual labor; but while， people started to add certain moral value to certain physical trait， thus some fraudster funded the first institution based on the power of some claimed property. There appears hierarchy， and the society with a social contract， in which the powerful admit protection for the poor in exchange for the latter’s liberty and wealth， was getting established， as well as the accompanying social oppression. It is during the foundation of civilization that people are generating the desire of getting interests without physical labor， but through certain intangible knowledge， thus numerous excessive desires to learn beyond one’s abilities and certain conspiracy are formed; it is during process of social interaction that numerous pejorative sentiments as envy and greed are elicited， polluting the formerly-innocent nature of men. Thus comes the degradation of human morals. Rousseau aids Emile to learn subjects as physics and chemistry， because he regards the urging desire to get more civilized as the culprit， rather than the achievement produced by civilization; he teaches Emile the concept of property， because he grants that once the social order is established it would never get back to the natural state， and property is the pivotal pointing shouldering this order. But， as for the social interaction with the reason later drawn from it， and certain morality and understanding in need of the study of civilization， Rousseau’s favor in them is too much overridden by his precaution against all the underlying vices and distorted nature in the practice of those developments， which could be no more strongly proved by the whole evolution and current situation of human race. In terms of civilization and nature， Mary represents another view， not completely opposite. But to get a deeper probe， though embodied in Mary’s Vindication， that theory’s most direct confrontment with Rousseau is in some correspondence between him and Voltaire. On the famous issue， the disaster of Lisbon， Rousseau radically chastises human civilization， stating that had people not that densely populated， with the houses jostling one another， the consequence of the disaster would be immensely lightened. Voltaire， in his response to Rousseau， admits that science and arts “have sometimes done a great deal of harm，” not only in its nurturing various controversial confronting theories thus leading imprisonment of some well-literate authors and philosophers， but also enriching “brokers of literature， live on our works， steal our manuscripts.” But， the blessings contained in civilization easily take advance over its evils， as “The thorns inseparable from literature and a modest degree of fame are flowers in comparison with the other evils which from all time have flooded the world，” arguing that Augustus became a assassin only when he’s connection with civilized men was cut.21 Mary as well values the purity of original human nature. As she remarks heart “without sentiment” and “on truth of sympathy”， which is argued as original human nature by Rousseau， as “depends on the rectitude of the feelings…have more tenderness than passion.” Bur she obviously regards these feelings as far from enough. Furthering her defense， she records several examples of European villages， none of which is adequately civilized， regarding the hospitality of the dwellers here as mere consequence of “ignorance.” Though people there are easily satisfied， she comments that “if contentment be all we can attain， it is， perhaps， best secured by ignorance.” “Without mechanical and silver knowledge，” added Mary， “silver mine is rendered unproductive.” She therefore considers civilization as the mechanical and silver knowledge， and human nature the “mine” needing enlightening， or wholly sinking in bore and ignorance.22
II. Specific Restraints on Women—Elaboration
1） formal knowledge， activities ， and social roles
Not limited to religion and doctrines， women are also isolated from probing into higher knowledge. “Things as inquire into abstract and theoretical truth， discover definition and principle of natural science， related generalization and summarization， none of them is the thing women ought to do.” Thus， Rousseau naturally isolates them from pursuit of formal knowledge as philosophy and politics， and recommends to them the study of “men” themselves and “interesting things” that can “nurture their tastes.”23 He regards the observation and understanding of men’s habits as women’s obligation， which correspond with women’s weak and delicate nature， and ability in further inquiry s “men’s advantage，” which should not be “usurped” by women.”24 Mary， denying this directly， considers spirit of inquiry into these great sciences as valuable production of the evolving civilization， and “this spirit of inquiry is the characteristic of the present century，”25 so is the case in study of formal knowledge. There is no proof that this spirit never generates an impulse in women’s minds， but simply getting killed when the seeds are just sowed in minds， when girls are taught to learn the only book of observation and subordination from that young. Girls are born isolated from knowledge as history; getting acquainted with concocted fiction at best， the interest in the former is diluted before being fostered. Therefore， they find words in historical documents insipid and have no resonation with the admirable characters expressing in them. Such slaughtered interest is regarded as natural essence of the sex by the group of Rousseau. As argued by Condorcet， physical inferiority is wilily used to justify certain other exclusion; but women should “not be excluded from any curriculum，” though sometimes this is wrongly justified by some entrenched presumption of female “sex-specific attributes.”26
Moreover， as the want of formal study as premise， another vice is recognized—idleness. Though Rousseau largely argues that time of women should be spent in learning to be attractive， taking up domestic duties， learning views of others， and observing likes and dislikes of their guests， Mary still holds that， with no understanding fostered by higher pursuits， “Idleness， rather than ill-nature， gives birth to scandal， and to the observation of little incidents which narrows the mind.”27 Then， little place is left for the formation of true morality.
Different pursuit of knowledge is followed by direct contrast in part-time activities. Rousseau says that women are more inclined to needle-works and dolls than reading and riding， which is determined by the god-given bodily traits and natural inclinations. Thus， he set dolls and art of decorations in the play-time of girls， as also a part of their instruction for future role of pleasing.28 Apparently， following Mary’s theory， those amusements are only poor substitute for higher knowledge after the latter’s artificial extinction， and their consequences would be no good than vanity， and cunningness for pleasing and cheating others.
Moreover， though both discussed in terms of development and observation， as a representative of an adequate man of nature， Emile is guided to the glaring natural world with field research， while girls are suggested to remain in domestic life or close society. Concerning development of “aesthetic taste，” Emile is led to Paris， while Sophia is given a doll to play with. Such embodies an intuitively entrenched tradition at that time. While young adventurer as Tom Sawyer is regarded with heroic emotions， and even Sophia， under the pen of Rousseau， is an admirer of great hero Telemachus， there seldom appears depiction on adventures of women. Novels as Moll Flanders are regarded as strange. However， still in the great age of Enlightenment， there are philosophers as Voltaire depicting female protagonist as Formosante in his contes travelling across the world， creating equal opportunities for women by opening new spaces to them.29 Argumentation for equality in this aspect also presents in Mary’s Letters from Sweden and Norway， when she records her quick temper and independence in managing travelling， implicitly proving women’s ability in outside society. The traditional social roles of women—staying in domestic and completely isolated from laborious work outside—are considered by Rousseau as the best exertion of women’s inhered nature. He denounced Plato’s turning women in to men’s roles in The Republic， arguing that the more women are assimilated to men， the more their status are set below men; the destined differences in such regarded nature naturally provide different roles for the two sexes， and certain traits of weakness and gentility would be rather merits when existing in women.30 Dr. Gregory， in regards of women resembling men and enjoying as much freedom， comments that， “But a little time and experience will show the folly of this expectation and conduct.”31 Even Voltaire， writing the interchange of the roles of two sexes， once said ” a great man， whose only defect， was being a woman，” implicitly suggesting woman’s sexual identity more or less impeded them from acting certain male virtues. Mary， at this point， does not trouble herself much with the question that whether women’s function to the society would be undermined by the certain “male roles” acted by them; she recognizes that， educating women in the same means as men， the intention is not to let them ride over men， but to have the ability to control women’s own fate.32 She does not regard this as a competition between two sexes， which overlap with Rousseau’s theory that the two sexes ought to keep in harmony and assisting each other， but seeks to find the true virtue that let the women consider themselves as deserving respect. So did the innovative defender for women’s rights Condorcet said， “I have discussed their right to equality and not their influence，” which means that blessings enjoyed by women themselves， rather than others， are their true focusing point.33
2） subordination and cunningness
Subordination of women， both to their parents and husbands， has been a major theme backed up by concrete tradition for centuries. In Rousseau’s theory， women are born to be subordinated to parental instruction， whether in study of religion， formal knowledge， or daily behaviors. As he said， since women “have less freedom，” they are inclined to overuse the freedom; born fickle， capricious and indulgent， they should be taught to get used to restraint set by others， such as “be interrupted in the middle of play time without complaint.”34 And such female trait are also recognized by a great public， as Diderot use “terrible as the devils of？Milton” “relentless in love and ruthless in hate” to describe their temper.35， and Montesquieu depicts them with “quarrels， indiscretions， repugnance， jealousies， piques.”36; even when “their virtue is secure，” argued Dr. Gregory， freedom for women “is both grossly indelicate and dangerous， and has proved fatal to many of your sex.”37 After marriage， women should take husbands as their metric， “making themselves lovely and not to irritate their husbands.”38 Thus， through numerous bonds set by others， they receive their principle of manners and obligation to fulfill their duties. In this sense， women are depicted as a creature so delicate， weak， and unstable that needs a whole set of thoughts instilled by others to support their lives. And along this line of development， Rousseau’s ideal that women ought to be reasonable and obliging wife in the future who earns others’ respect seems dubious and hard to reach. Argumentation to dismiss this theory has early appeared. In Voltaire’s contes， purportedly written in satire， women are dominated by wills of men， thus being tremendously undermined personal liberty. And for women， the role acted by family is despotic.39 Though Rousseau drafts an ideal man Emile as Sophia’s husband， who has courage， honesty， thoughtfulness， and ability to make a good living， these are still rare qualities in the society， argued by Mary. Most of the men， abusing their regarded rights of invading women’s mind and will， are fops with debauchery， vanity， indulgence， or hypocrites with evilness and indolence; with them， women are still pushed to follow the traditional role of being subjected. With regard to family life， not every parent has the spirit of Condorcet， who gives his daughter enough freedom and insight; rather， thought Mary， most of them are either too arbitrary and fastidious， preferring obsequious pets than children with dignity and reason， or pampering their children to a disastrous extent.40 Mary argues that， gentleness， recommended for women， is still “submissive charms” for pleasing， while assuming “characteristics of grandeur，” but is actually “demeanor of dependence” and “want of protection.”41 As she said， “When a country arrives at a certain state of perfection， it looks as if it were made so; and curiosity is not excited.”42 So is the case of women’s instruction. When girls are subjected to certain restraints， with liberty extinguished with curiosity， they believe in others’ reason， not understanding it， but merely because it “appear to be reason，”43， thus loose the best chance of forming own understanding; this is comparable to her description of some people’s edge in mere language learning， which “prevents the cultivation of their own， and any considerable advance in literary pursuits.44 Also， she dismisses subordination as real morality， but merely a kind of prudence. Moreover， with so many confinements， women would have little incentives to do meet their duties.
Actually， Rousseau’s restraint and subordination set to girls might have a much deeper cause， which himself might not admit or did not recognized at all. He fears the fickleness， impulses， and indiscretions of women would be formed if they acquire overflowing knowledge， thus compromising their loyalty towards their husbands and domestic relationship. As Montesquieu goes， “In despotic governments…they are afraid lest the liberty of women should expose them to danger.”45 This is the entrenched theory—“despotic society.” The despot backing up Rousseau’s theory is patriarchy which dwells in the society for thousands of years. To protect this pattern， people hastily set numerous rules restraining women’s behaviors; however， it is the restraints riveted on this sex that foster a group who resort to wiliness， even lewdness to fulfill desires， which should be originally satiated by not just a sop in study of formal knowledge. As Thomas Paine arguing for the right of people， “The boldness to do wrong at first， changes after into cowardly traits， and at last into fear.”46 Patriarchy， reasonable on some extent at first， later wrongly usurp most of the rights from the other sex; it then utilizes numerous artfully concocted social manners， such as the one argued by Rousseau （though himself wrongly perceived it as human nature）， to remain this century-misconduct; now， it is scared by certain vices formed by those decayed social manners， which would let loose the underpinning of the overreaching patriarchy. Philosophers as Rousseau would not be so innocent and ignorant that they failed to recognize this tradition as the root of such fear; but as they still hold belief in it， they had better grant the unavoidable vices of women， rather than blindly defend such restraints which would worsen the situation. Though Rousseau seems to justify women’s identity as he argues for “esteem” to them， the principle backing his theory is unchanged from precedents， and certain esteem is barely possible under such case.47 Moreover， in the state of subordination， cunningness is recommended to women as their major weapon and subject to learn. With the general rule of the interaction between the two genders， Rousseau argues， that men be the “offence”， women the “defense”; the power of women is at their attraction， and “modesty” should be their arms to reign over men.48 “Wiliness is women’s talent， as long as they do not abuse it，” and Rousseau does not seem to contempt this trait as it exists in men—her rather praises it as the present from nature， which aids women to achieve the grand goal of theirs—love from husband. Treating men， it is women’s merits to use skills and wiliness to show the opposite of her actual feelings， being mysterious， thus to entice men’s love; even when Sophia is married to Emile， to be an ideal wife， Rousseau still advises her to keep her modesty at some extent， to secure and maintain the love between the couple.49
Such attitude perceiving women is not exclusive for Rousseau. Montesquieu， when drawing women’s state in different type of government， bonds them with words like “charms and passions” of which men avail themselves， to describe their passionate side in attraction;50 Diderot depicts the double sides of them， when connecting women with “that of the？Apocalypse， on the forehead of which is written： Mystery."51 Moreover， far from mere assumption， numerous historical fact proving certain Machiavellianism specific to women， whose object sometimes does not limit in men’s love but material advantage， act as strong backbone of the trait of women. However， this also conversely proves the ill-effect of the cunningness argued by Rousseau—it is so easy to be abused. And even he grants the difficulty in his ideal model of education more than one time， no plan is addressed to settle it.
With cunningness of women as a prevalent social phenomenon， which get women an edge at some extent， Mary relentlessly expresses her disdains towards them. She defends modesty as not a sexual means merely to acquire love， but an admirable virtue， “the child of reason，” which is naturally acquired on the base of reflection and knowledge; it could never be essentially taken on with Rousseau’s and traditional methods of women education.52 Actually， with all these delicate means， said her， women’s true virtue is never acquired—since “Virtue must be the same in quality…or virtue is a relative idea，” and respect for virtue should be paid to those “which are not merely the virtues of convention，”53 such cunningness and gentility would never become the essence of real morality. With simply there traits as their goals of instruction， girls would not even realize the need of real virtue， for they are like the un-acclaimed earth who never witnesses the brightness of sun， “the want of it never being felt.”54 Besides， with mere cunningness and intrigue， the grand object argued by Rousseau—love—would eventually melt in to vanity， subjecting women to the unchaste.55 With virtues in no means being nurtured， women would never win their husband’s respect， which is too ideal an intention by Rousseau; for women displaying craftiness， are always “duped by their lovers， as princes by their ministers， while dreaming they reigned over them.”56 Thus Mary concluded， without adequate goals given to chase， with no real virtues， women themselves indeed do not deserve respect as that paid for men.57 But， such as when Mary scolds the prince who refused to tear down houses to stop a big fire because of mere prudence， with regard to such evilness of women， we may also ask that “but then， who could blame them？？ And， to avoid censure， what sacrifices are not made by weak minds？”58 Though the ill traits of women would be essentially some stereotype built by tradition， women thus formed to fit in that stereotype， indeed， take on those traits themselves.
Moreover， as for the real meaning and implication of Love， Rousseau’s view and Mary’s interestingly correspond at some point. Mary always believes that， part of which coming from her own sentimentality in marriage-life， perceives love as transient， but friendship as the true proof of personal resonance and interacted respect， when she quotes “that rare as true love is， true friendship is still rarer.”59 And Rousseau， though recommending so many means for girls to grab it， suggests to Sophia “a relationship sweeter than love.”60 Such may be his good faith of using respect paid to each other to last this valuable relationship， when women also earns her esteem by her reign over her lover through gentleness and subordination. But in Mary’s theory， since the respect would be hardly acquired， such relationship has little chance to be formed.
To change all these situations to which society subject women， reformation in education system and removal of the restraint on formal knowledge are in need. “Strengthen women’s minds by enlarging it， and there will be an end to blind obedience.”61 Mary argues that， girls should not only study with boys， acting under the same principle， which hold admire only to independence， virtue， and knowledge， but also have the option of studying medicine， politics， and business; thus， they achieve own fulfillments， exercise own understanding， and have more opportunity to truly serve the society， more propriety in fulfilling their duties.62 As Condorcet says， “All other differences between men and women are simply the result of education.”63 Then it is believed， with such proper nurturing method， all that regarded caprice， weakness， and fickleness， which is used to justify their sub ordination， would melt into pieces.
III. Short Conclusion of Views on Manners and Prejudices
The word “manners”， some of which are invented by social life and regulating people’s behaviors to take an orderly course， is always inevitably mixed with social prejudice. Rousseau regards this invention as something “our mind would more or less destroy…since it is from our inside nature”; having to take on these manners as a man in society， but still to prevent the formation of prejudice， he argues for “using less word to express point of views…in case some false views would never be removed in the future.” He describe two kinds of peoples as “farmers and brutes”--farmer merely follow instructions like robot， but brutes exercise their own mind and stay precautious—in which he prefers the latter and disdains the latter.64 He also hangs up the development of children’s reason， to reach this purpose.65 Generally， some of the methods of traditional education， which is the object he intend to reverse in Emile， is regarded as a whole sum of prejudice-directing manners that he despises. On this ground， Mary largely resonates with Rousseau， which might be also the reason that some scholars call her the latter’s “disciple”. （See L. Introduction） She values the kindness and sympathy among some people， while despising those moved so quickly by views on society; at some extent， she prefers the lower class to the middling， because of the latter’s “apish good breeding and prejudices，”66 However， Rousseau may intuitively take on many prejudices himself. With regard to women， though Rousseau argues against traditional views of keeping in pure domestic life and being mere servants of men， the missions he puts on women badly weaken those defense. Such as when he dismisses the subordination of farmers， what recommends it to girls as a completely different approach to men’s education; he sets up so many manners limiting women’s behaviors， and argues that they are due to their nature， rather than some more-entrenched prejudice on gender.
This is also embodied by Montesquieu， who connects women with the dubious word “manner” even when arguing his advocating government of republic; no one knows whether this also represents numerous “manners” of limitation and confinement.67
In Mary’s system， most of these perceived natures inhered in women may be well proved to be prejudice in manners if women’s development is get cleared of these prejudice， with true nature debunked. We may also think of， while Rousseau is underscoring his belief in human nature， how does he know that the “nature” he believes is a natural one？ While Montesquieu argues against female rulers in family and cites their natural “weakness” as support， how then could he again justify female rulers of the whole country？ “Moderation” given by “weakness” in the latter scenario， would be too weak a solution to disentangle such contradiction.68
IV. Short Comment on Rousseau’s View
From Mary’s argumentation， Rousseau’s view on women seems to be more and more notorious， and he would be perceived as having misogyny. Actually， this may be a wrong attitude regarding Rousseau， partly due to Mary’s own standpoint as an arduous female author defending the right of her gender， and Rousseau’s expression on this question seems explicit and bold.
Essentially， Rousseau’s ideal work of a woman is easily conceived—virtuous， chaste， reasonable， moderate， while most of which are accompanied by， or acquired from， the subordination to parents and husbands and female tenderness. But still， his image conceived for women is still far from the entrenched men’s view of a purely submissive servant. The main characters， obviously， coincide with such argued by Mary. Thus we may conclude that， Rousseau’s eventual aims on female education would be regarded by modern scholars still with good faith， though， miserably， his suggested methods on achieving them would turn his intention upside down; meanwhile， those methods probably also divert disastrously from the starting point of “human nature.” No one would deny that there are women docile enough， while also being suggestive and helpful to their husbands; but it would not be denied also， that they either acquire adequate education compared to others， or their husbands are true virtuous people in the tumultuous society. Most of the race， drowned by arbitrary assumption by others， are still the piano keys tagged to an immobilized state and die. Such are his mistakes in applying the wrong scheme to achieve the goals. Rousseau’s next mistake is， to stand still at a sole point and hold this prejudice to judge the others. No one would deny that ignorant peasants may have much fewer concerns， because they barely know the happiness pursued by people like Mary. Rousseau completely sticks to human nature while denying the necessity of civilization. Such is the case when he prevent Emile from early development of social reason and personal experience of social morals thus become listless， and the case is worsened to the peak when he address women to stick to their nature of subordination and weakness thus become a race of idleness and misery. Social connection with civilization formed unwillingly would be vulnerable and improper， let alone when it is almost completely chopped by arbitrary violence.
V. Possible Questions Remained
Though certain mistakes are obvious， there still remain a few questions regarding the general theme of this essay. The first is that， at the time of Mary and Rousseau， argumentation for feminism is still much more moderate compared to modern views. Women were always considered only fitted for jobs with little labor and strength. And with the evolving feminism， however radical they argue for women’s liberty and rights， hardly anyone， even Mary is not excluded， does not grant their obligation of giving birth to child and being an obliging wife. The two kinds of knowledge， especially the latter， was once， for centuries， regarded as a common knowledge without dispute. But as women are emancipated to a much greater extent in the 20th century， and the formation of Radical Feminism， even the indisputable second role of women is dissolved in some theorists’ knowledge system. Now， no one knows for certain that， whether such physical traits as wombs of women are given with inevitable obligation of bearing children， and whether women ought to be treated with more gentility because of their weaker bodies. And even in modern society， there are still people instinctively repulsing women doing those traditional-men’s jobs， and questioning some of their female traits infecting the good faith kept in official tasks. Sometimes such attacks launched to women are not completely unreasonable， when thinking of some of their domestic duties or bodily distinctions getting in the way of public duties. The answers would remain equivocal， as some people hold prejudice to those deviating from the original common sense， and others are criticized of being unreasonable and indiscreet when they argue for complete extirpation of sexual differences. The second question is even more dubious. While Mary dismiss the motionlessness in human nature and repugnance against civilization in terms of subsequent ignorance， she avoids from touching another cornerstone of this belief of Rousseau—removal of unequal distribution of public esteem.69 In this knowledge system， original human state is the original and complete equality， and civilization is only an evil excuse for the disruption of the equality and achieving more pieces of personal esteem through the compromise of others. The question is that， is certain inequality reasonable？ Does certain achievements concerning civilization worth the more esteem given to the owner？ The flabbergasting question appears， when we reflect upon the question that， is the mathematician， who solves a century-puzzle and reasons out mathematical truths， really worthy of the admiration paid to them， or their “achievements” could be regarded as merely meretricious tricks in exchange for reputation and wealth， when one rewinds back to the innocent and beautiful equality before the start of civilization. Is our civilization a giant trick invented by ourselves？ Even the greatest philosopher would be reflection to give the concrete answer.
References：
[1] Montesquieu， The Spirit of Law， p103
[2] The attitude below towards reason-development is launched to both sexes， but Rousseau later steps further in this theory regarding women education. Mary dismisses both this general method and the one specific to women.
[3] ibid， p112， p113[1] Emile， p640， p648， p649.
[4] Vindication.chapV.p83[1] ibid.p104.
[5] Vindication.chapVIII.p83.
[6] Michel de Montaigne， Of Cannibals， c.1580， p7，p9.
[7] Voltaire， On the Advantages of Civilization and Literature，？To J. J. Rousseau， 30 August 1755.
[8] Letters.LetterVI.
[9] Condorcet 1791 web resource; Kintzler 1984[1] DEBORAH J. BATES，PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， B.A， April 1995.
[10] Dr. Gregory.A Father’s Legacy.p42.
[11] McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299.
[12] Emile.p628.
[13] Diderot.Otis Fellows （1977）. Twayne. pp.？112.
[14] Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p103.
[15] Dr.Gregory， A Father’s Legacy，p44.
[16] Emile.p610.
[17] PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， DEBORAH J. BATES， B.A， April 1995
[18] Vindication.chapIX.chapX.chapXI[1] ibid.p31.
[19] Letters.LetterV.
[20] Vindication.p82. [21] Letters.LetterIII.
[22] Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p104
[23] Thomas Paine，Letter Addressed to the Addressers，p43.
[24] Emile.p649.
[25] ibid.p610[1] Emile.p629.p653.p654.p827.
[26] Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103.
[27] Diderot.Oxford University Press. p.？615[1] Letters.LetterXVIII.
[28] By Francois La Rochefoucauld.
[29] Emile.p828.
[30] Vindication.p17.
[31] ibid.chapXII.
[32] McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299.
[33] Emile.p158.p159.
[34] Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103.
[35] from Rousseau， A Very Short Introduction， Oxford University Press， p36， see Discourses and Other Early Political Writings， ， ？uvres completes.
注：
3 Montesquieu， The Spirit of Law， p103
4 The attitude below towards reason-development is launched to both sexes， but Rousseau later steps further in this theory regarding women education. Mary dismisses both this general method and the one specific to women.
5 Emile， p480
6 ibid， p112， p113
7 Emile， p640， p648， p649
8 ibid. chapV. p83. p114
9 ibid. chapV. p83）
10 Letters， Letter III
11 Emile.p129.p131.p141
12 Letters.Letter VIII
13 Vindication.chapV.p83
14 ibid.p104
15 Vindication.chapVIII.p83
16 ibid.chapVI.p83
17 Emile.p648
18 ibid.p256
19 ibid.p119
20 Michel de Montaigne， Of Cannibals， c.1580， p7，p9
21 Voltaire， On the Advantages of Civilization and Literature，？To J. J. Rousseau， 30 August 1755
22 Letters.LetterVII
23 Emile.p655.p656
24 ibid.p649
25 Letters.LetterV
26 Condorcet 1791 web resource; Kintzler 1984
27 Letters.LetterIII
28 Emile.p622.p624
29 DEBORAH J. BATES，PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， B.A， April 1995
30 Emile.p616.p617.p618
31 Dr. Gregory.A Father’s Legacy.p42
32 Vindication.p69
33 McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299
34 Emile.p628
35 Diderot.Otis Fellows （1977）. Twayne. pp.？112
36 Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p103
37 Dr.Gregory， A Father’s Legacy，p44
38 Emile.p610
39 PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， DEBORAH J. BATES， B.A， April 1995
40 Vindication.chapIX.chapX.chapXI
41 ibid.p31
42 Letters.LetterV
43 Vindication.p82
44 Letters.LetterIII
45 Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p104
46 Thomas Paine，Letter Addressed to the Addressers，p43
47 Emile.p649
48 ibid.p610
49 Emile.p629.p653.p654.p827
50 Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103
51 Diderot.Oxford University Press. p.？615
52 Vindication.chapVII
53 ibid.p18.L.LIII
54 Letters.LetterV
55 Vindication.p21
56 ibid.p17
57 ibid.p104
58 Letters.LetterXVIII
59 By Francois La Rochefoucauld
60 Emile.p828
61 Vindication.p17
62 ibid.chapXII
63 McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299
64 Emile.p158.p159
65 ibid.p9.p101
66 Letters.LetterIV
67 Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103
68 ibid，p111
69 from Rousseau， A Very Short Introduction， Oxford University Press， p36， see Discourses and Other Early Political Writings， ， ？uvres complètes
The year of 1792 was a tumultuous one—with the revolutionary liberation of human mind， societies are provoked by the ardor of revolution. However， with progresses and debates， even been through the immense discussion of rationalism for belief and personal liberty， the right of women is still excluded from most of the discussion—in the grand defense of Rights of Man by one of the most admirable liberal soldier Thomas Paine， women were obviously out of most of the debate; Dr. John Gregory taught his daughter that “Your whole life is often a life of suffering…You must bear your sorrows in silence， unknown and unpitied”1 ; more explicitly， the great and notorious French politician Talleyrand-Périgord published a pamphlet， in which still appears tremendous contrast regarding the form of the education attended by two sexes; while asking “Is it not apparent， that their delicate constitutions… set them apart from… and summon them to gentle occupations and the cares of the home？” he argues that “it will never be in women’s interest to change the assignment they have received.”2
However， the voice defending women has never disappeared in the great Enlightenment， which was led by philosophers like Condorcet， Helvetius and Voltaire; they either dismiss the justification of current restraint on women， satirizing it， or argue for refinement in development of this gender. Though in paucity， this concise discussion of the former decades still acts as fateful ammunition for the feminists in the 1790s， instilling them with more impulses when they witness men fighting for their fates and rights with heroic sentiments， while women are mostly left aside in the rotten roles drafted for them centuries ago. The contrast startles them to start their own revolution.
In this defense of women’s rights， there appears a particularly prominent work， A Vindication of the Rights of Women; its author， Mary Wollstonecraft， decided to craft the words immediately when seeing Tallelyrand’s discriminating plan. The work does not simply defense the legitimacy of women’s rights in social treatment， education， and domestic life， underscore the necessity of certain development and exertion for the formation of admirable virtues， but connects this sole topic with one of the cores in Enlightenment—the essence of human nature—and lays a stark contest for different systems of opinions regarding men’s nature， as well as the requirement of later nurture in civilization. A French philosopher， Jean Jacques Rousseau， stands out as the biggest thorn in flesh in Mary’s work. His world-astonishing work on education， Emile， was not only the target frequently aimed at by other philosophers during Enlightenment， but the main one taken by Mary. The work， drafting Rousseau’s own belief in human nature and civilization， presents the author’s ideal plan to nurture his male student Emile in the category of “natural person.” Then， he gives another plan on development to Emile’s future wife Sophia， based on Rousseau’s perception of women’s nature， thus completely differentiated from the one of Emile’s. Defending women’s worth of respect and their esteem， however， his work still focuses on many traditional roles of women， thus regarded by Mary as the chain limiting women’s mind.
While justifying women’s status， Mary’s aim in this work is to restore the strength to future nurture of her sex， in which more concrete spirit would take the place as principle. “So many are the imperfections that attend the loss of virtue in women， and so greatly are their minds depraved when this principal guard is removed，”3 such is the theory of Montesquieu on female continency. And for Mary， the “principle guard” of human race ought to be the state of reason and understanding， which is only possible to be exercised if nurtured with independence， also regarded as the foremost precondition for real virtue. With this as the backbone， based on other theories from the Enlightenment， she starts own defense in this century-long debate， against the one launched by philosophers led by Rousseau.
I. Development of Reason， from Different Theory regarding Nature and Civilization， Social Interaction
One major difference between systems represented by Mary and Rousseau appears in their different attitude towards development of 4reason. For Rousseau， he presents in Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar， Emile， that reason can fraud us easily， but conscience is the true guidance of souls5; he frequently takes man’s nature as the foundation of all the future development of reason. This is more legitimately justified when he dwells on the ill-effect， such as overflowing desires and prejudices that civilization set on men’s faculties in the journey of nurturing reason—also a central theme to many others of his works. Therefore， in Emile， he suggests that in children education， education on reason should be properly subdued in order to prevent the prejudices implanted on it. Everything， argued Rousseau， should be arranged in correct order in advance， thus preventing them from getting attached to the vices that may distort their mind， as living in countryside than the urban， therefore comes the doctrine that not to acquire is better than acquire the bad.6 The point is made more radical concerning women education. Rousseau warns against women launching “certain questions”—the questions inquiring into reason; and he even explicitly suggests the submission to men ought to be women’s reason， while he argues women’s capricious nature would prevent them from combining reason with their belief， thus not suited for further inquiry; this is further espoused by saying that women should neither choose their religion nor inquire into the reason of doctrines， but simply following the guidance of their mothers and future husbands. Thus he gives the source from which women discern the right from wrong—the opinions from others. Then， it would be more essential for women to choose credible authority as their dependence than themselves， on which they could make wiser discernment in the future.7
Mary， on opposite， argues reason as the central core debunking the true nature of women. As to Rousseau’s resistance to the personal acquaintance of knowledge connected with vice and prejudice， Mary values certain experiences， entangled with pain， as the only way to acquire the final， with experience drawn from them.8 Such distinction between the two， Rousseau’s precaution and Mary’s favor in experience， is further embodied at large. While Rousseau later argues the concept of sin would be better conveyed to children through mere dictation before entering into society， Mary again rebutted such excessive precaution， as though prevent the formation of vices， but developing indifference in a mere spectator of vices of others， as the prevention for truly acquiring any valuable virtue themselves.9
Such embodies two different theories regarding social civilization and interaction. Mary actually coincides with Rousseau’s view that potential prejudices might be easily taken on with interaction in society， as recorded in her Letters， “Mixing with mankind， we are obliged to examine our prejudices， and often imperceptibly lose， as we analyze.”10Rousseau’s theory also sounds concrete enough when we consider that kids at such young ages， would not have enough “intellect” to personally understand the reason being taught， as well as the idea of social morality， as Rousseau said， they would be “monkeys” imitating such behaviors merely “because of others”; on the other hand， solitude， at some extent， would “provide more time for the development and maturity” of children.11Still， Mary argues for “a degree of exertion” “more or less painful” as only way of acquiring correlated knowledge. Thus she promotes physically interact with others in society， thus resonating with their feelings， as herself does in “making my feelings take an orderly course.”12 For she insists that when children be kept in Rousseau’s advocating “solitude” with acquaintance of vices through merely dictation， the “selfish prudence and reason just rising above instinct” would be rendered， as she also asserts the scant possibility left of developing “any permanent character.”13 Then， the fears Rousseau holds in partly repudiating women’s inquiry into reason is actually the direct consequence of his methods of development on reason. Another consequence as such defect， particular for girls， is recognized by Mary. Girls “pigging together，” idle with scant reason developed， have seldom enough fortitude to truly confront with the society. Attending to jealousy and little intrigue， they would fail to learn true knowledge and acquire great virtues. More else， lack of steady character， educated with and by their own sex， ，they are easily subjected to fop and their fake chivalry， rather than follower of the chastity and respectable love wished by Rousseau.14
This lack of permanence and reason contributes also to their preferment in others’ ideas. Since truth would always be proved right despite some misconstrue or slander of others， a person of steadiness and reason would be unmoved by comments， says Mary.15 And it is still the restriction of understanding and soft reason promoted in Rousseau’s education that renders this miscomprehension of women. Moreover， with such character depending on others， Mary points again at their inevitable future scenario of “attachment to rakes” without “exercise their understanding”， which overlaps with Rousseau’s worries. For women would not be able to follow their reason anymore， while being asked to follow others’ behaviors， whether their mothers’ or future husbands’， there would be few chance for them to acquire true “morals”， says Mary.16 Thus implanted on women’s original nature， future rational judgment by themselves would also be nearly impossible to acquire， which directly violates Rousseau’s true intention.17
Rousseau seems to have a double-faced attitude towards the concept “experience” and “practice”. On the one hand， he argues devotedly that experience and practice should be the sole media through which children satiates their curiosity and meet all the scientific fact about the world; without physically practicing it， children would grow up to be “toys controlled by others.”18 And even in recognizing social distinction， he uses a delicate way to let his ideal male student Emile understand the concept of “property” deeply through a disastrous ruin of Emile’s own planting beans.19 But the contradiction appears in education on society， as well as the reasons and morals concerning it; he puts off such part， and advocates for “negative education.” Essentially， all of these could be attributed to his philosophy regarding civilization and society.
“Turning men to barbarity，” this is a description widely used by the critics of Rousseau. The French philosopher， indeed， might well realize the crude of original state of human race， but still praising its natural and innocence as outweighing today’s meretricious civilization. He holds human nature as the most inviolable principle in his system. This is a point overlapping the original skeptic theory in Montaigne’s Of Cannibals， when questioning whether the all the conspiracy and dirty trick later developed are no more barbarous than the cannibalism.20 Though the founding father of this specific skeptic left his essays an open ending， Rousseau pants to confirm that civilization has engendered most of contemporary vices. There is a whole chain of reasoning held by Rousseau and his disciples： men were living a sufficiently satisfying life at the very beginning， as satiating living desires through unadorned manual labor; but while， people started to add certain moral value to certain physical trait， thus some fraudster funded the first institution based on the power of some claimed property. There appears hierarchy， and the society with a social contract， in which the powerful admit protection for the poor in exchange for the latter’s liberty and wealth， was getting established， as well as the accompanying social oppression. It is during the foundation of civilization that people are generating the desire of getting interests without physical labor， but through certain intangible knowledge， thus numerous excessive desires to learn beyond one’s abilities and certain conspiracy are formed; it is during process of social interaction that numerous pejorative sentiments as envy and greed are elicited， polluting the formerly-innocent nature of men. Thus comes the degradation of human morals. Rousseau aids Emile to learn subjects as physics and chemistry， because he regards the urging desire to get more civilized as the culprit， rather than the achievement produced by civilization; he teaches Emile the concept of property， because he grants that once the social order is established it would never get back to the natural state， and property is the pivotal pointing shouldering this order. But， as for the social interaction with the reason later drawn from it， and certain morality and understanding in need of the study of civilization， Rousseau’s favor in them is too much overridden by his precaution against all the underlying vices and distorted nature in the practice of those developments， which could be no more strongly proved by the whole evolution and current situation of human race. In terms of civilization and nature， Mary represents another view， not completely opposite. But to get a deeper probe， though embodied in Mary’s Vindication， that theory’s most direct confrontment with Rousseau is in some correspondence between him and Voltaire. On the famous issue， the disaster of Lisbon， Rousseau radically chastises human civilization， stating that had people not that densely populated， with the houses jostling one another， the consequence of the disaster would be immensely lightened. Voltaire， in his response to Rousseau， admits that science and arts “have sometimes done a great deal of harm，” not only in its nurturing various controversial confronting theories thus leading imprisonment of some well-literate authors and philosophers， but also enriching “brokers of literature， live on our works， steal our manuscripts.” But， the blessings contained in civilization easily take advance over its evils， as “The thorns inseparable from literature and a modest degree of fame are flowers in comparison with the other evils which from all time have flooded the world，” arguing that Augustus became a assassin only when he’s connection with civilized men was cut.21 Mary as well values the purity of original human nature. As she remarks heart “without sentiment” and “on truth of sympathy”， which is argued as original human nature by Rousseau， as “depends on the rectitude of the feelings…have more tenderness than passion.” Bur she obviously regards these feelings as far from enough. Furthering her defense， she records several examples of European villages， none of which is adequately civilized， regarding the hospitality of the dwellers here as mere consequence of “ignorance.” Though people there are easily satisfied， she comments that “if contentment be all we can attain， it is， perhaps， best secured by ignorance.” “Without mechanical and silver knowledge，” added Mary， “silver mine is rendered unproductive.” She therefore considers civilization as the mechanical and silver knowledge， and human nature the “mine” needing enlightening， or wholly sinking in bore and ignorance.22
II. Specific Restraints on Women—Elaboration
1） formal knowledge， activities ， and social roles
Not limited to religion and doctrines， women are also isolated from probing into higher knowledge. “Things as inquire into abstract and theoretical truth， discover definition and principle of natural science， related generalization and summarization， none of them is the thing women ought to do.” Thus， Rousseau naturally isolates them from pursuit of formal knowledge as philosophy and politics， and recommends to them the study of “men” themselves and “interesting things” that can “nurture their tastes.”23 He regards the observation and understanding of men’s habits as women’s obligation， which correspond with women’s weak and delicate nature， and ability in further inquiry s “men’s advantage，” which should not be “usurped” by women.”24 Mary， denying this directly， considers spirit of inquiry into these great sciences as valuable production of the evolving civilization， and “this spirit of inquiry is the characteristic of the present century，”25 so is the case in study of formal knowledge. There is no proof that this spirit never generates an impulse in women’s minds， but simply getting killed when the seeds are just sowed in minds， when girls are taught to learn the only book of observation and subordination from that young. Girls are born isolated from knowledge as history; getting acquainted with concocted fiction at best， the interest in the former is diluted before being fostered. Therefore， they find words in historical documents insipid and have no resonation with the admirable characters expressing in them. Such slaughtered interest is regarded as natural essence of the sex by the group of Rousseau. As argued by Condorcet， physical inferiority is wilily used to justify certain other exclusion; but women should “not be excluded from any curriculum，” though sometimes this is wrongly justified by some entrenched presumption of female “sex-specific attributes.”26
Moreover， as the want of formal study as premise， another vice is recognized—idleness. Though Rousseau largely argues that time of women should be spent in learning to be attractive， taking up domestic duties， learning views of others， and observing likes and dislikes of their guests， Mary still holds that， with no understanding fostered by higher pursuits， “Idleness， rather than ill-nature， gives birth to scandal， and to the observation of little incidents which narrows the mind.”27 Then， little place is left for the formation of true morality.
Different pursuit of knowledge is followed by direct contrast in part-time activities. Rousseau says that women are more inclined to needle-works and dolls than reading and riding， which is determined by the god-given bodily traits and natural inclinations. Thus， he set dolls and art of decorations in the play-time of girls， as also a part of their instruction for future role of pleasing.28 Apparently， following Mary’s theory， those amusements are only poor substitute for higher knowledge after the latter’s artificial extinction， and their consequences would be no good than vanity， and cunningness for pleasing and cheating others.
Moreover， though both discussed in terms of development and observation， as a representative of an adequate man of nature， Emile is guided to the glaring natural world with field research， while girls are suggested to remain in domestic life or close society. Concerning development of “aesthetic taste，” Emile is led to Paris， while Sophia is given a doll to play with. Such embodies an intuitively entrenched tradition at that time. While young adventurer as Tom Sawyer is regarded with heroic emotions， and even Sophia， under the pen of Rousseau， is an admirer of great hero Telemachus， there seldom appears depiction on adventures of women. Novels as Moll Flanders are regarded as strange. However， still in the great age of Enlightenment， there are philosophers as Voltaire depicting female protagonist as Formosante in his contes travelling across the world， creating equal opportunities for women by opening new spaces to them.29 Argumentation for equality in this aspect also presents in Mary’s Letters from Sweden and Norway， when she records her quick temper and independence in managing travelling， implicitly proving women’s ability in outside society. The traditional social roles of women—staying in domestic and completely isolated from laborious work outside—are considered by Rousseau as the best exertion of women’s inhered nature. He denounced Plato’s turning women in to men’s roles in The Republic， arguing that the more women are assimilated to men， the more their status are set below men; the destined differences in such regarded nature naturally provide different roles for the two sexes， and certain traits of weakness and gentility would be rather merits when existing in women.30 Dr. Gregory， in regards of women resembling men and enjoying as much freedom， comments that， “But a little time and experience will show the folly of this expectation and conduct.”31 Even Voltaire， writing the interchange of the roles of two sexes， once said ” a great man， whose only defect， was being a woman，” implicitly suggesting woman’s sexual identity more or less impeded them from acting certain male virtues. Mary， at this point， does not trouble herself much with the question that whether women’s function to the society would be undermined by the certain “male roles” acted by them; she recognizes that， educating women in the same means as men， the intention is not to let them ride over men， but to have the ability to control women’s own fate.32 She does not regard this as a competition between two sexes， which overlap with Rousseau’s theory that the two sexes ought to keep in harmony and assisting each other， but seeks to find the true virtue that let the women consider themselves as deserving respect. So did the innovative defender for women’s rights Condorcet said， “I have discussed their right to equality and not their influence，” which means that blessings enjoyed by women themselves， rather than others， are their true focusing point.33
2） subordination and cunningness
Subordination of women， both to their parents and husbands， has been a major theme backed up by concrete tradition for centuries. In Rousseau’s theory， women are born to be subordinated to parental instruction， whether in study of religion， formal knowledge， or daily behaviors. As he said， since women “have less freedom，” they are inclined to overuse the freedom; born fickle， capricious and indulgent， they should be taught to get used to restraint set by others， such as “be interrupted in the middle of play time without complaint.”34 And such female trait are also recognized by a great public， as Diderot use “terrible as the devils of？Milton” “relentless in love and ruthless in hate” to describe their temper.35， and Montesquieu depicts them with “quarrels， indiscretions， repugnance， jealousies， piques.”36; even when “their virtue is secure，” argued Dr. Gregory， freedom for women “is both grossly indelicate and dangerous， and has proved fatal to many of your sex.”37 After marriage， women should take husbands as their metric， “making themselves lovely and not to irritate their husbands.”38 Thus， through numerous bonds set by others， they receive their principle of manners and obligation to fulfill their duties. In this sense， women are depicted as a creature so delicate， weak， and unstable that needs a whole set of thoughts instilled by others to support their lives. And along this line of development， Rousseau’s ideal that women ought to be reasonable and obliging wife in the future who earns others’ respect seems dubious and hard to reach. Argumentation to dismiss this theory has early appeared. In Voltaire’s contes， purportedly written in satire， women are dominated by wills of men， thus being tremendously undermined personal liberty. And for women， the role acted by family is despotic.39 Though Rousseau drafts an ideal man Emile as Sophia’s husband， who has courage， honesty， thoughtfulness， and ability to make a good living， these are still rare qualities in the society， argued by Mary. Most of the men， abusing their regarded rights of invading women’s mind and will， are fops with debauchery， vanity， indulgence， or hypocrites with evilness and indolence; with them， women are still pushed to follow the traditional role of being subjected. With regard to family life， not every parent has the spirit of Condorcet， who gives his daughter enough freedom and insight; rather， thought Mary， most of them are either too arbitrary and fastidious， preferring obsequious pets than children with dignity and reason， or pampering their children to a disastrous extent.40 Mary argues that， gentleness， recommended for women， is still “submissive charms” for pleasing， while assuming “characteristics of grandeur，” but is actually “demeanor of dependence” and “want of protection.”41 As she said， “When a country arrives at a certain state of perfection， it looks as if it were made so; and curiosity is not excited.”42 So is the case of women’s instruction. When girls are subjected to certain restraints， with liberty extinguished with curiosity， they believe in others’ reason， not understanding it， but merely because it “appear to be reason，”43， thus loose the best chance of forming own understanding; this is comparable to her description of some people’s edge in mere language learning， which “prevents the cultivation of their own， and any considerable advance in literary pursuits.44 Also， she dismisses subordination as real morality， but merely a kind of prudence. Moreover， with so many confinements， women would have little incentives to do meet their duties.
Actually， Rousseau’s restraint and subordination set to girls might have a much deeper cause， which himself might not admit or did not recognized at all. He fears the fickleness， impulses， and indiscretions of women would be formed if they acquire overflowing knowledge， thus compromising their loyalty towards their husbands and domestic relationship. As Montesquieu goes， “In despotic governments…they are afraid lest the liberty of women should expose them to danger.”45 This is the entrenched theory—“despotic society.” The despot backing up Rousseau’s theory is patriarchy which dwells in the society for thousands of years. To protect this pattern， people hastily set numerous rules restraining women’s behaviors; however， it is the restraints riveted on this sex that foster a group who resort to wiliness， even lewdness to fulfill desires， which should be originally satiated by not just a sop in study of formal knowledge. As Thomas Paine arguing for the right of people， “The boldness to do wrong at first， changes after into cowardly traits， and at last into fear.”46 Patriarchy， reasonable on some extent at first， later wrongly usurp most of the rights from the other sex; it then utilizes numerous artfully concocted social manners， such as the one argued by Rousseau （though himself wrongly perceived it as human nature）， to remain this century-misconduct; now， it is scared by certain vices formed by those decayed social manners， which would let loose the underpinning of the overreaching patriarchy. Philosophers as Rousseau would not be so innocent and ignorant that they failed to recognize this tradition as the root of such fear; but as they still hold belief in it， they had better grant the unavoidable vices of women， rather than blindly defend such restraints which would worsen the situation. Though Rousseau seems to justify women’s identity as he argues for “esteem” to them， the principle backing his theory is unchanged from precedents， and certain esteem is barely possible under such case.47 Moreover， in the state of subordination， cunningness is recommended to women as their major weapon and subject to learn. With the general rule of the interaction between the two genders， Rousseau argues， that men be the “offence”， women the “defense”; the power of women is at their attraction， and “modesty” should be their arms to reign over men.48 “Wiliness is women’s talent， as long as they do not abuse it，” and Rousseau does not seem to contempt this trait as it exists in men—her rather praises it as the present from nature， which aids women to achieve the grand goal of theirs—love from husband. Treating men， it is women’s merits to use skills and wiliness to show the opposite of her actual feelings， being mysterious， thus to entice men’s love; even when Sophia is married to Emile， to be an ideal wife， Rousseau still advises her to keep her modesty at some extent， to secure and maintain the love between the couple.49
Such attitude perceiving women is not exclusive for Rousseau. Montesquieu， when drawing women’s state in different type of government， bonds them with words like “charms and passions” of which men avail themselves， to describe their passionate side in attraction;50 Diderot depicts the double sides of them， when connecting women with “that of the？Apocalypse， on the forehead of which is written： Mystery."51 Moreover， far from mere assumption， numerous historical fact proving certain Machiavellianism specific to women， whose object sometimes does not limit in men’s love but material advantage， act as strong backbone of the trait of women. However， this also conversely proves the ill-effect of the cunningness argued by Rousseau—it is so easy to be abused. And even he grants the difficulty in his ideal model of education more than one time， no plan is addressed to settle it.
With cunningness of women as a prevalent social phenomenon， which get women an edge at some extent， Mary relentlessly expresses her disdains towards them. She defends modesty as not a sexual means merely to acquire love， but an admirable virtue， “the child of reason，” which is naturally acquired on the base of reflection and knowledge; it could never be essentially taken on with Rousseau’s and traditional methods of women education.52 Actually， with all these delicate means， said her， women’s true virtue is never acquired—since “Virtue must be the same in quality…or virtue is a relative idea，” and respect for virtue should be paid to those “which are not merely the virtues of convention，”53 such cunningness and gentility would never become the essence of real morality. With simply there traits as their goals of instruction， girls would not even realize the need of real virtue， for they are like the un-acclaimed earth who never witnesses the brightness of sun， “the want of it never being felt.”54 Besides， with mere cunningness and intrigue， the grand object argued by Rousseau—love—would eventually melt in to vanity， subjecting women to the unchaste.55 With virtues in no means being nurtured， women would never win their husband’s respect， which is too ideal an intention by Rousseau; for women displaying craftiness， are always “duped by their lovers， as princes by their ministers， while dreaming they reigned over them.”56 Thus Mary concluded， without adequate goals given to chase， with no real virtues， women themselves indeed do not deserve respect as that paid for men.57 But， such as when Mary scolds the prince who refused to tear down houses to stop a big fire because of mere prudence， with regard to such evilness of women， we may also ask that “but then， who could blame them？？ And， to avoid censure， what sacrifices are not made by weak minds？”58 Though the ill traits of women would be essentially some stereotype built by tradition， women thus formed to fit in that stereotype， indeed， take on those traits themselves.
Moreover， as for the real meaning and implication of Love， Rousseau’s view and Mary’s interestingly correspond at some point. Mary always believes that， part of which coming from her own sentimentality in marriage-life， perceives love as transient， but friendship as the true proof of personal resonance and interacted respect， when she quotes “that rare as true love is， true friendship is still rarer.”59 And Rousseau， though recommending so many means for girls to grab it， suggests to Sophia “a relationship sweeter than love.”60 Such may be his good faith of using respect paid to each other to last this valuable relationship， when women also earns her esteem by her reign over her lover through gentleness and subordination. But in Mary’s theory， since the respect would be hardly acquired， such relationship has little chance to be formed.
To change all these situations to which society subject women， reformation in education system and removal of the restraint on formal knowledge are in need. “Strengthen women’s minds by enlarging it， and there will be an end to blind obedience.”61 Mary argues that， girls should not only study with boys， acting under the same principle， which hold admire only to independence， virtue， and knowledge， but also have the option of studying medicine， politics， and business; thus， they achieve own fulfillments， exercise own understanding， and have more opportunity to truly serve the society， more propriety in fulfilling their duties.62 As Condorcet says， “All other differences between men and women are simply the result of education.”63 Then it is believed， with such proper nurturing method， all that regarded caprice， weakness， and fickleness， which is used to justify their sub ordination， would melt into pieces.
III. Short Conclusion of Views on Manners and Prejudices
The word “manners”， some of which are invented by social life and regulating people’s behaviors to take an orderly course， is always inevitably mixed with social prejudice. Rousseau regards this invention as something “our mind would more or less destroy…since it is from our inside nature”; having to take on these manners as a man in society， but still to prevent the formation of prejudice， he argues for “using less word to express point of views…in case some false views would never be removed in the future.” He describe two kinds of peoples as “farmers and brutes”--farmer merely follow instructions like robot， but brutes exercise their own mind and stay precautious—in which he prefers the latter and disdains the latter.64 He also hangs up the development of children’s reason， to reach this purpose.65 Generally， some of the methods of traditional education， which is the object he intend to reverse in Emile， is regarded as a whole sum of prejudice-directing manners that he despises. On this ground， Mary largely resonates with Rousseau， which might be also the reason that some scholars call her the latter’s “disciple”. （See L. Introduction） She values the kindness and sympathy among some people， while despising those moved so quickly by views on society; at some extent， she prefers the lower class to the middling， because of the latter’s “apish good breeding and prejudices，”66 However， Rousseau may intuitively take on many prejudices himself. With regard to women， though Rousseau argues against traditional views of keeping in pure domestic life and being mere servants of men， the missions he puts on women badly weaken those defense. Such as when he dismisses the subordination of farmers， what recommends it to girls as a completely different approach to men’s education; he sets up so many manners limiting women’s behaviors， and argues that they are due to their nature， rather than some more-entrenched prejudice on gender.
This is also embodied by Montesquieu， who connects women with the dubious word “manner” even when arguing his advocating government of republic; no one knows whether this also represents numerous “manners” of limitation and confinement.67
In Mary’s system， most of these perceived natures inhered in women may be well proved to be prejudice in manners if women’s development is get cleared of these prejudice， with true nature debunked. We may also think of， while Rousseau is underscoring his belief in human nature， how does he know that the “nature” he believes is a natural one？ While Montesquieu argues against female rulers in family and cites their natural “weakness” as support， how then could he again justify female rulers of the whole country？ “Moderation” given by “weakness” in the latter scenario， would be too weak a solution to disentangle such contradiction.68
IV. Short Comment on Rousseau’s View
From Mary’s argumentation， Rousseau’s view on women seems to be more and more notorious， and he would be perceived as having misogyny. Actually， this may be a wrong attitude regarding Rousseau， partly due to Mary’s own standpoint as an arduous female author defending the right of her gender， and Rousseau’s expression on this question seems explicit and bold.
Essentially， Rousseau’s ideal work of a woman is easily conceived—virtuous， chaste， reasonable， moderate， while most of which are accompanied by， or acquired from， the subordination to parents and husbands and female tenderness. But still， his image conceived for women is still far from the entrenched men’s view of a purely submissive servant. The main characters， obviously， coincide with such argued by Mary. Thus we may conclude that， Rousseau’s eventual aims on female education would be regarded by modern scholars still with good faith， though， miserably， his suggested methods on achieving them would turn his intention upside down; meanwhile， those methods probably also divert disastrously from the starting point of “human nature.” No one would deny that there are women docile enough， while also being suggestive and helpful to their husbands; but it would not be denied also， that they either acquire adequate education compared to others， or their husbands are true virtuous people in the tumultuous society. Most of the race， drowned by arbitrary assumption by others， are still the piano keys tagged to an immobilized state and die. Such are his mistakes in applying the wrong scheme to achieve the goals. Rousseau’s next mistake is， to stand still at a sole point and hold this prejudice to judge the others. No one would deny that ignorant peasants may have much fewer concerns， because they barely know the happiness pursued by people like Mary. Rousseau completely sticks to human nature while denying the necessity of civilization. Such is the case when he prevent Emile from early development of social reason and personal experience of social morals thus become listless， and the case is worsened to the peak when he address women to stick to their nature of subordination and weakness thus become a race of idleness and misery. Social connection with civilization formed unwillingly would be vulnerable and improper， let alone when it is almost completely chopped by arbitrary violence.
V. Possible Questions Remained
Though certain mistakes are obvious， there still remain a few questions regarding the general theme of this essay. The first is that， at the time of Mary and Rousseau， argumentation for feminism is still much more moderate compared to modern views. Women were always considered only fitted for jobs with little labor and strength. And with the evolving feminism， however radical they argue for women’s liberty and rights， hardly anyone， even Mary is not excluded， does not grant their obligation of giving birth to child and being an obliging wife. The two kinds of knowledge， especially the latter， was once， for centuries， regarded as a common knowledge without dispute. But as women are emancipated to a much greater extent in the 20th century， and the formation of Radical Feminism， even the indisputable second role of women is dissolved in some theorists’ knowledge system. Now， no one knows for certain that， whether such physical traits as wombs of women are given with inevitable obligation of bearing children， and whether women ought to be treated with more gentility because of their weaker bodies. And even in modern society， there are still people instinctively repulsing women doing those traditional-men’s jobs， and questioning some of their female traits infecting the good faith kept in official tasks. Sometimes such attacks launched to women are not completely unreasonable， when thinking of some of their domestic duties or bodily distinctions getting in the way of public duties. The answers would remain equivocal， as some people hold prejudice to those deviating from the original common sense， and others are criticized of being unreasonable and indiscreet when they argue for complete extirpation of sexual differences. The second question is even more dubious. While Mary dismiss the motionlessness in human nature and repugnance against civilization in terms of subsequent ignorance， she avoids from touching another cornerstone of this belief of Rousseau—removal of unequal distribution of public esteem.69 In this knowledge system， original human state is the original and complete equality， and civilization is only an evil excuse for the disruption of the equality and achieving more pieces of personal esteem through the compromise of others. The question is that， is certain inequality reasonable？ Does certain achievements concerning civilization worth the more esteem given to the owner？ The flabbergasting question appears， when we reflect upon the question that， is the mathematician， who solves a century-puzzle and reasons out mathematical truths， really worthy of the admiration paid to them， or their “achievements” could be regarded as merely meretricious tricks in exchange for reputation and wealth， when one rewinds back to the innocent and beautiful equality before the start of civilization. Is our civilization a giant trick invented by ourselves？ Even the greatest philosopher would be reflection to give the concrete answer.
References：
[1] Montesquieu， The Spirit of Law， p103
[2] The attitude below towards reason-development is launched to both sexes， but Rousseau later steps further in this theory regarding women education. Mary dismisses both this general method and the one specific to women.
[3] ibid， p112， p113[1] Emile， p640， p648， p649.
[4] Vindication.chapV.p83[1] ibid.p104.
[5] Vindication.chapVIII.p83.
[6] Michel de Montaigne， Of Cannibals， c.1580， p7，p9.
[7] Voltaire， On the Advantages of Civilization and Literature，？To J. J. Rousseau， 30 August 1755.
[8] Letters.LetterVI.
[9] Condorcet 1791 web resource; Kintzler 1984[1] DEBORAH J. BATES，PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， B.A， April 1995.
[10] Dr. Gregory.A Father’s Legacy.p42.
[11] McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299.
[12] Emile.p628.
[13] Diderot.Otis Fellows （1977）. Twayne. pp.？112.
[14] Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p103.
[15] Dr.Gregory， A Father’s Legacy，p44.
[16] Emile.p610.
[17] PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， DEBORAH J. BATES， B.A， April 1995
[18] Vindication.chapIX.chapX.chapXI[1] ibid.p31.
[19] Letters.LetterV.
[20] Vindication.p82. [21] Letters.LetterIII.
[22] Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p104
[23] Thomas Paine，Letter Addressed to the Addressers，p43.
[24] Emile.p649.
[25] ibid.p610[1] Emile.p629.p653.p654.p827.
[26] Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103.
[27] Diderot.Oxford University Press. p.？615[1] Letters.LetterXVIII.
[28] By Francois La Rochefoucauld.
[29] Emile.p828.
[30] Vindication.p17.
[31] ibid.chapXII.
[32] McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299.
[33] Emile.p158.p159.
[34] Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103.
[35] from Rousseau， A Very Short Introduction， Oxford University Press， p36， see Discourses and Other Early Political Writings， ， ？uvres completes.
注：
3 Montesquieu， The Spirit of Law， p103
4 The attitude below towards reason-development is launched to both sexes， but Rousseau later steps further in this theory regarding women education. Mary dismisses both this general method and the one specific to women.
5 Emile， p480
6 ibid， p112， p113
7 Emile， p640， p648， p649
8 ibid. chapV. p83. p114
9 ibid. chapV. p83）
10 Letters， Letter III
11 Emile.p129.p131.p141
12 Letters.Letter VIII
13 Vindication.chapV.p83
14 ibid.p104
15 Vindication.chapVIII.p83
16 ibid.chapVI.p83
17 Emile.p648
18 ibid.p256
19 ibid.p119
20 Michel de Montaigne， Of Cannibals， c.1580， p7，p9
21 Voltaire， On the Advantages of Civilization and Literature，？To J. J. Rousseau， 30 August 1755
22 Letters.LetterVII
23 Emile.p655.p656
24 ibid.p649
25 Letters.LetterV
26 Condorcet 1791 web resource; Kintzler 1984
27 Letters.LetterIII
28 Emile.p622.p624
29 DEBORAH J. BATES，PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， B.A， April 1995
30 Emile.p616.p617.p618
31 Dr. Gregory.A Father’s Legacy.p42
32 Vindication.p69
33 McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299
34 Emile.p628
35 Diderot.Otis Fellows （1977）. Twayne. pp.？112
36 Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p103
37 Dr.Gregory， A Father’s Legacy，p44
38 Emile.p610
39 PORTRAYAL OF WOMEN IN CONTES OF VOLTAIRE， DEBORAH J. BATES， B.A， April 1995
40 Vindication.chapIX.chapX.chapXI
41 ibid.p31
42 Letters.LetterV
43 Vindication.p82
44 Letters.LetterIII
45 Montesquieu.The Spirit of Law.p104
46 Thomas Paine，Letter Addressed to the Addressers，p43
47 Emile.p649
48 ibid.p610
49 Emile.p629.p653.p654.p827
50 Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103
51 Diderot.Oxford University Press. p.？615
52 Vindication.chapVII
53 ibid.p18.L.LIII
54 Letters.LetterV
55 Vindication.p21
56 ibid.p17
57 ibid.p104
58 Letters.LetterXVIII
59 By Francois La Rochefoucauld
60 Emile.p828
61 Vindication.p17
62 ibid.chapXII
63 McLean and Hewitt 1994， 299
64 Emile.p158.p159
65 ibid.p9.p101
66 Letters.LetterIV
67 Montesquieu，The Spirit of Law，p103
68 ibid，p111
69 from Rousseau， A Very Short Introduction， Oxford University Press， p36， see Discourses and Other Early Political Writings， ， ？uvres complètes