论文部分内容阅读
针对中药材供给中的信息不对称性,建立了三个中药材供给方与政府稽查部门之间的三个不完全信息动态博弈模型,得到了相应的子博弈精炼贝叶斯均衡解的五个结论.这五个结论合理刻画了中药材供给方与政府稽查部门的博弈行为并揭示了非法采挖野生中药材现象难以杜绝的原因.结果表明,政府对稽查行为的条件激励措施并不能有效杜绝非法采挖野生中药材现象,只有政府对所有的稽查行为实施普遍的强激励机制才可从根本上消除非法采挖野生中药材的现象.
According to the information asymmetry in the supply of Chinese herbal medicines, three incomplete information dynamic game models are established between the three Chinese herbal medicine suppliers and the government inspection department, and the corresponding five sub-game Bayesian equilibrium solutions are obtained Conclusions.These five conclusions reasonably depict the game behavior between the supplier of Chinese herbal medicine and the government inspection department and reveal the reasons why the phenomenon of illegal excavation of wild Chinese herbal medicines can not be eliminated.The results show that the government’s conditional incentives for the audit can not be effectively put an end to Illegal excavation of wild Chinese herbal medicine phenomenon, only the government for all the audits to implement a universal and strong incentive mechanism can fundamentally eliminate the phenomenon of illegal excavation of wild Chinese herbal medicines.