Will or Won’t the RMB-Greenback Rate Dip Below 6?

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  THE Renminbi entered 2013 with gusto, the spot Yuan/US$ rate hitting 6.2216 – strongest since China’s 2005 exchange reform and also a 19-year high. This market hotspot might presage a rate lower than the RMB 6 benchmark.
  The exchange rate reflects the external value of China’s currency and hence influences its international trade and investment. It is in effect the country’s financial link with the world. China is presently the world’s largest exporter and second largest importer. It is moreover the main destination for global investment and a foremost capital-exporting country. China’s trade and economic relationship with other countries has had profound impact on both its own and world economic operations. Among many determinants, the RMB exchange rate is a key variable. The 2008 global financial crisis dramatically affected the world economic pattern and financial system. Its hegemony weakened, the U.S. dollar nonetheless remained the major currency for trade settlement and reserves. The RMB-US$ exchange rate is hence of crucial significance.
  On reviewing the metamorphosis of the exchange rate since implementation of reform and opening-up policy, two events stand out. One is the unification of the official RMB exchange rate with market prices in 1994; the other is the reform of the RMB exchange rate in 2005. On January 1, 1994, the dual exchange rate system, first introduced in the early 1980s, was replaced by a managed floating exchange rate system that integrated the official exchange rate with market prices. At the same time, the RMB-US$ exchange rate depreciated from 5.7 to 8.7 – almost 35 percent. This devaluation both enhanced the competitiveness of Chinese commodities and stimulated exports. It also lowered the relative price of domestic factors of production, so promoting the inflow of foreign capital. On July 21, 2005, China de-pegged the RMB from the U.S. dollar and allowed it to float in a narrow margin around a fixed base rate determined with reference to a basket of world currencies. On that day the RMB-dollar exchange rate appreciated two percent to 8.11. The reform hence constituted a watershed in the evolution of the RMB exchange rate, marking establishment of a trend of long-term gradual RMB appreciation. It has since accumulated to 32 percent, the rate against the U.S. dollar having hit a zenith of 6.22 in early 2013.
  RMB exchange rate movements since 2005 can be divided into four stages(Figure 1). During the first stage, July 2005 to July 2008, the RMB appreciated in a unilateral, rapid fashion, breaching the psychological barriers of the eight and seven benchmarks to hit 6.80. During the second stage, July 2008 to July 2010, in response to the impact of the global financial crisis on China’s exports and economic growth, the RMB reverted to its U.S. dollar peg. The rate then fluctuated within a tight 6.82 to 6.85 range. The third stage, July 2010 to the end of 2011, saw China’s halting of the extraordinary reversion to the dollar peg, and the RMB’s slow upward trend over an 18-month period to a rate of 6.30. At the fourth stage, early 2012 till present, owing to the extended international economic downturn, the RMB exchange rate has shown a two-way fluctuation, hovering at around 6.30.


  The market mechanism has played a growingly important role since 2005 in forming the RMB exchange rate, although features of a managed floating rate system are still evident. Over the past seven or so years, the RMB has appreciated against the U.S. dollar in a slight, gradual, controllable and undulating fashion. Undoubtedly, the external economic environment, as well as China’s foreign trade and international balance of payments, have been major factors in the “discretionary choices” of decision makers. But external pressures must also be taken into account. With regards to RMB appreciation, the U.S. government maintained a constant position. There were, however, fluctuations in the political pressure it placed on China, as the U.S. administration sought to shrink its trade deficits through RMB appreciation. Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, RMB appreciation was perceived as advantageous to promoting the U.S. manufacturing industry and creating more jobs stateside. Traditional international trade statistics, however, amplified the U.S. trade deficit with China. But the trade imbalance is in fact a structural one attributable to the U.S. economy itself, and of which the exchange rate is just one factor. In other words, appreciating the RMB is unlikely to solve the U.S.’s economic problems.
  The RMB-U.S. dollar exchange rate in 2012 featured two-way fluctuations that contrasted sharply with the unilateral appreciation of the first and third stages. After 2005 there were strong market expectations of RMB appreciation, and demand in the market as a whole exceeded supply. There was at the same time a constant inflow of “hot” money for arbitrage. The situation changed in 2012. Market expectations of the RMB trend differentiated and supply and demand remained balanced. RMB exchange rates tended to balance and fluctuate within a narrow 6.22 to 6.40 range, with an annual appreciation of just one percent.
  In May 2012, after four months of narrow band fluctuation, the RMB underwent a change of expectation from depreciation to appreciation, and the U.S. dollar, conversely, from one of depreciation to appreciation (Figure 2). The mid-year market appreciation expectation and trend had rarely risen since 2005, but in August 2012 the RMB appreciated at a rate as rapid as that in early 2011. On April 16, 2012, the daily fluctuation of the RMB-U.S dollar transaction price expanded from 0.5 percent to one percent, and in October there were several instances of the RMB hitting the daily limit. The expanding trade surplus and economic turnabout undoubtedly had impact on market sentiment and asset flows.   The QE3, launched in mid-September by the U.S. Federal Reserve Board, influenced the supply and demand relationship between the dollar and international market trend, exerting great pressure for appreciation of the RMB. The same month, the change of funds earmarked for foreign exchange in China’s central bank implied limited government intervention in the market. The demand and supply relationship clearly played a decisive role in this bout of rapid appreciation. Of course, the central bank’s tolerance is limited. After three months of rapid appreciation 6.2 would constitute an obvious level of resistance.
  In 2013, there is no clear-cut possibility in the short term of rapid RMB appreciation; the two-way fluctuation of the exchange rate is expected to continue. At home, the Chinese economy has realized a soft landing, with signs of bottoming out. Abroad, however, the world economy is making a weak recovery, fraught with risks and uncertainties. Notable among these is the implementation by the monetary authorities of major economies of quantitative easing, which heightens the risk of competitive currency devaluations. Under such circumstances, RMB appreciation in the short term could have negative impact on the Chinese economy. From a macro perspective, RMB appreciation affects net exports and hence hampers economic growth, so impeding steady growth and restricting the scope of policy needed for economic restructuring. On the industrial level, as factor prices continue to rise, rapid appreciation is bound to affect China’s international competitiveness, stimulating the outflow of manufacturing capacity to other developing countries, or even a reflux to developed countries. On the enterprise level, rapid RMB appreciation would inevitably erode export companies’ profit margins and intensify survival pressure, thus gener- ating negative impact on the job market. It should be borne in mind that the sharp appreciation of the Japanese Yen is closely connected to the huge losses of the Japanese electronic industry. From the perspective of the Chinese economy, an exchange rate level of below six in the short term would be unacceptable.
  There is no victor in a “monetary war” pursuing devaluation of domestic currency in order to achieve export advantages. Ongoing risks and uncertainties in the world economy make it crucial for various countries to consult and coordinate on macro economic policies. During the Asian financial crisis, China promised not to devalue the RMB, so making a significant contribution to stabilizing the regional economy. Similarly, in the face of the world economic downturn, China will avoid competitive devaluation of the RMB. As a responsible country, China won world respect by virtue of its behavior from 1997 to 1998. It will sustain this respect in the second decade of the 21st century. China will nonetheless give top priority to national interests, resist unreasonable outside pressure and avoid unnecessary RMB appreciation. In the short term, while there are no clear signs of recovery in the world economy, maintaining basic stability of the RMB in relation to major world currencies is a wise choice that will be of common benefit.
  For China, a reasonable RMB exchange rate is contingent upon both the long-term structural features of the Chinese economy and upon the shortterm domestic and external economic situations. In the long run, it is inevitable that the RMB will, along with the upgrading of Chinese economic power and competitiveness and promotion of the opening-up of economy and finance, continue to appreciate. Now, however, is not the time for the RMB to revert to a long-term and gradual appreciation. This can only happen when there are clear signs of world economic recovery.
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