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从异端舆论、公众选择以及政府行为三者的关系入手,厘清了异端舆论对政府行为影响的作用机制,即异端舆论在导致多数公众选择接受时政府才会采取干预措施,一旦政府放松监管,异端舆论会再次兴起。通过建立三阶段序贯博弈模型,演绎了三者的行动步骤,提出了包括建立多种利益集团舆情分析管理系统,完善政府与社会公众沟通平台的建设,提高主流媒体的公信力,政府应持续有效地监管的政策建议。
Starting from the relationship between heresy public opinion, public choice and government behavior, this paper clarifies the mechanism of heresy public opinion’s influence on government behavior, that is, when heresy public opinion leads most public to accept it, the government will take the intervention measures. Once government relax regulation, heresy Public opinion rises again. Through the establishment of a three-stage sequential game model, the steps of the three actions are deduced, including the establishment of a variety of interest groups, public opinion analysis and management system, improve the construction of government and public communication platform, improve the credibility of the mainstream media, the government should continue to be effective Regulatory policy recommendations.