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以基准日为2014年第三季度的定向增发新股公司为研究对象,利用季度数据研究大股东操控下的应计盈余管理与真实盈余管理权衡选择。为了克服定向增发类型的自选择和样本偏误问题,采用了倾向得分与双倍差分法构造反事实,从而在拟实验环境下分析大股东操控下盈余管理行为。研究发现:基准日前上市公司同时使用应计与真实盈余管理操纵盈余,向大股东增发实现向下操纵,向机构投资者增发实现向上操纵;在基准日之后上市公司通过真实的盈余管理方式向上操纵盈余。研究结果有助于提高证券监管部门、中介机构对盈余管理行为的认识,加强公司治理、完善投资者保护制度。
With the benchmark date of the third quarter of 2014 for the private placement of new shares as the research object, the use of quarterly data research under the control of major shareholders accruals and real earnings management trade-off choice. In order to overcome the problem of self-selection and sample bias of the type of private placement, the propensity score and double difference method are used to construct the counterfactual, so as to analyze the earnings management behavior under the control of big shareholders in the experimental environment. The study found that: listed companies use both accruals and real earnings management to manipulate surpluses, increase the issuance of major shareholders to achieve downward manipulation, and the issuance of institutional investors to achieve upward control; the listed companies manipulate upward through real earnings management after the base day surplus. The results of the study will help to raise the awareness of securities regulatory authorities and intermediaries on earnings management practices, strengthen corporate governance and improve the investor protection system.