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由于当前信访工作的主导模式是内部协商、一事一议,信访制度的有效性受到了部分专家和民众的质疑。作为对信访改革的探索,一些地方突破既有的信访工作模式,用公开议事的议事会作为解决信访的模式,得到涉访各方的认可。议事会是政府和各利益相关方,包括信访人本人在内,针对信访诉求,进行公开协商议事,解决民众诉求的一种工作方式。其核心在于各利益相关方参与、公开协商、平等议事。这种方式符合当代公共治理的趋势,是突破当前中国信访瓶颈的一种探索与尝试。本文试图用博弈论的工具对信访议事会进行解构,分析其静态博弈和代际更替下的博弈进化,并对信访议事会是否具有持续的有效性进行了证明。
As the dominant pattern of the current letters and visits is internal consultation and discussion of one issue, the validity of the letters and visits system has been questioned by some experts and the general public. As an exploration of the reform of letters and visits, some places have broken through the existing work pattern of petitions and letters of complaint and some have used the assembly of public meetings as the mode of settling letters and visits and been recognized by all parties involved in the talks. The council is a way of working for the government and various stakeholders, including the petitioners themselves, to solicit petitions and petitions, conduct public consultations and settle public complaints. Its core lies in the participation of all stakeholders, public consultation and equality. This approach accords with the trend of contemporary public governance and is an exploration and attempt to break through the current bottleneck of petition in China. This paper tries to use the game theory tools to deconstruct the letter and visit council, analyzes its static game and the evolution of the game under the change of generations, and testifies whether there is a continuous validity of the letter and visit council.