对于中国国有企业的高层管理者多由政府直接任命而难以成为职业企业家的现象,学术界一般从干部人事制度等制度因素予以解释。本文构造了一个简单的委托-代理模型,证明由于信息不对称的原因,内部任命国有企业管理人员有可能给政府带来更高的净收益,这是个信息不对称导致的市场失灵问题。本文的政策含义是,国有企业高层管理者的市场化和职业化,必须以国有企业经营行为的真正市场化为前提。 For the phenomenon that top management of Chinese state-owned enterprises is more directly appointed by the government and difficult to become a professional entrepreneur, academics generally explain the institutional factors such as cadre and personnel system. In this paper, we construct a simple principal-agent model to prove that due to the asymmetric information, internally appointed SOE managers may bring higher net benefits to the government. This is a market failure caused by information asymmetry. The policy implication of this article is that the marketization and professionalization of top-level SOE managers must be premised on the real marketization of SOE management.