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基于融资约束理论及企业异质产权结构导致的融资约束差异和代理成本理论,从产权性质视角实证研究中国金融发展对上市公司微观资本配置效率的影响。结果表明:金融发展水平的提高并没有减轻非国有控制企业的融资约束,反而强化了不同产权性质下的融资约束差异,政府对国有控制企业的“父爱情结”拖累了民营企业的投资效率。国有控制企业不断获得扶持性信贷补贴,其投资效率没有明显提高;而非国有控制企业的信贷融资约束日益严重,投资效率持续下降,导致其投资效率低于国有控制企业,形成“双重效率损失”的现象。两种产权性质的企业都没有达到资本配置效率最优化。
Based on the financing constraints theory and the differences in financing constraints and agency costs caused by the heterogeneous property rights structure of enterprises, this paper empirically studies the impact of China’s financial development on the micro-capital allocation efficiency of listed companies from the perspective of property rights. The results show that the improvement of financial development does not reduce the financing constraints of non-state-controlled enterprises, on the contrary, it strengthens the differences in financing constraints under different property rights. The government’s investment in private enterprises is dragging down the “fatherly love knot” of state-controlled enterprises effectiveness. The state-controlled enterprises continue to receive subsidized credit subsidies, and their investment efficiency has not significantly improved. However, non-state-controlled enterprises have increasingly severe credit financing constraints and investment efficiency continues to decline, resulting in lower investment efficiency than state-controlled enterprises, resulting in a double loss of efficiency "The phenomenon. The two types of property ownership did not achieve the optimal allocation of capital efficiency.