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基于双寡头博弈模型,研究政府不同的环境税政策、企业污染类型、环保R&D溢出对企业最优环境税率、污染控制率及社会福利的影响。得出以下主要结论:当企业为重污染或者企业为轻污染、政府实行承诺的环境税政策时最优环境税率随着边际损害程度增加而增加并逐渐收敛;而当企业为轻污染、政府实行不承诺的环境税政策时,政府有必要对企业从事环保采取补贴的措施。在企业为重污染、R&D存在溢出的情况下,承诺的环境税政策及鼓励企业R&D合作是政府最优选择;在其他情况下,无论企业是R&D竞争还是R&D合作方式,承诺的环境税政策可以实现企业污染控制率最大。
Based on the duopoly game model, this paper studies the effects of different government environmental tax policies, pollution types, and environmental R & D spillovers on the optimal corporate environmental tax rates, pollution control rates and social welfare. The main conclusions are as follows: When the enterprise is heavily polluted or the enterprise is lightly polluted and the government implements the promised environmental tax policy, the optimal environmental tax rate increases and gradually converges with the increase of marginal damage degree; while when the enterprise is lightly polluted, the government implements Not promised environmental tax policy, the government necessary for enterprises to engage in environmental protection measures to subsidize. Commitment to environmental tax policies and encouragement of corporate R & D cooperation are the government’s best choices when enterprises are heavily polluting and R & D spills. In other cases, the promised environmental tax policies can be applied regardless of whether the enterprises are R & D competition or R & D cooperation Achieve the highest rate of corporate pollution control.