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本文属于一个试图说明现代多元民主制中的好公民是什么的研究项目。文章将考察人格观念在罗尔斯著作中所发挥的作用,然后提出一种有别于罗尔斯的新型人格观念,但它却能够产生类似的分配原则。这一观念为检验如下议题奠定基础,即当道德在一种人格观念中具有权重时,好公民的本质究竟为何。本文结构如下:首先,我将讨论作为证明哲学论题的方法,诉诸一种立场意味着什么。其次,我将简要讲述罗尔斯从1971年《正义论》到1980年“道德理论中的康德构建主义”演讲中的人格观念发展史。然后以之为出发点,证明人们可以通过一种非康德主义的人格观念、一种聚焦于关心的人格观念,达到与罗尔斯正义两原则相似的事物。
This article belongs to a research project that attempts to illustrate what a good citizen in modern pluralism is. The article examines the role that personality concepts play in Rawls’s book, and then proposes a new concept of personality that is different from Rawls’s, but which produces a similar principle of distribution. This notion provides the basis for testing the issue of what constitutes a good citizen when morality has a weight in a personality concept. The paper is organized as follows: First, I will discuss what it means to resort to a position as a way of proving a philosophical thesis. Secondly, I will briefly describe Rawls’s history of the development of the concept of personality in the speech “Justice” from 1971 to “Kant Constructivism in Moral Theory” in 1980. It then serves as a starting point to prove that one can achieve something similar to the two principles of Rawls’ justice through a non-Kantist concept of personality, one focusing on the notion of personality in concern.