在团队生产中,要测量个人的贡献是非常困难的,团队中的不同成员提供要素和监控的动力都取决于如何分配团队产出的剩余索取权。在最优的雇佣合约中,那些边际产量相对较低的人将成为雇员,因为当他们偷懒时,效率损失相对较小。在分成合约中,每个成员都享有部分剩余索取权,从而降低了所需的监控数量。在分成合约中,那些边际产量比较低的人获得的产出较少,这一点与雇佣合约一样,但没有后者那么极端。 In team production it is very difficult to measure the contribution of individuals, and the motivation for different members of the team to provide elements and monitoring depends on how to allocate residual claims on team outputs. In the optimal contract of employment, those with relatively low marginal outputs will become employees, because efficiency losses are relatively small when they are lazy. In the split contract, each member has a partial residual claim, reducing the number of controls required. Among the sharing contracts, those with lower marginal yields received less output, the same as the employment contracts, but not the latter.