论文部分内容阅读
文章研究了多代理人的道德风险问题,并关注多代理人情境中的两个特征:搭便车和竞争。搭便车问题意味着委托人的一个新作用:执行预算约束非平衡的激励机制。这个新的作用是控制激励的关键,并且表明产权和劳动部分分离的企业比代理人之间分配产出的合伙制企业具有优势。从中可以得到有信息的(因而是有价值的)监督的一个新特点,并且用来解释相对绩效评估的价值。结果表明,代理人之间的竞争(由于相对评估)仅仅作为提取信息的最优工具而有价值,竞争本身无价值。此外,文章还探讨了总体衡量指标在相对绩效评估中的作用,以及对投资规则的影响。
The article studies the problem of moral hazard of multi-agent and focuses on two characteristics of multi-agent situation: free riding and competition. The free-riding problem means a new role for the client: to implement an unbalanced incentive mechanism with a budget constraint. This new role is the key to controlling incentives and shows that firms that separate ownership and labor have an advantage over partnership firms that distribute output among agents. From which a new characteristic of informed (and thus valuable) supervision can be derived and used to explain the value of relative performance measures. The results show that the competition between agents (due to relative evaluation) is only valuable as the best tool for extracting information, and the competition itself is worthless. In addition, the article explores the role of overall measures in relative performance evaluation and their impact on investment rules.