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在《道德形而上学》中,康德将一种对于土地的源始获得作为自然状态下私人法权的起点,并认为源始获得的法权根据在于实践理性先天公设的演绎,但是先天公设仅仅保证了对外在之物的源始占有的可能性。所以我们必须再考察源始获得何以可能,以及这种来自单方面意志的暂时性的获得是否足够作为私人法权的起始点。源始获得有三个因素:经验性的占有;标明;意志上的归己。占有不需赘言。标明的可能性则在康德关于“通过时效的获得”一节中被否定了。归己需要我的自由与他人自由的共存,于是似乎成为了公共法权状态的获得,而康德在进入法权状态这点给予了他人反对的权力,因而归己不仅不能完成从可感占有到理知占有的跨越,反而仅仅具有暂时性,只能维持到另外一个任性的反对出现。由此看来,尽管康德反复强调源始获得不是经验意义上的初始获得,也无法清楚明晰地分清源始获得和初始获得的差别,更有可能的是,一种源始获得仅仅是经验性的源始占有,也就不足以成为自然状态的法权起点。
In “Moral Metaphysics,” Kant will be a starting point for the source of the land as a starting point for private law in the natural state, and that the legal basis for obtaining the original rationale lies in the deduction of the inherent rationality of practical reason, but the inherent justice merely guarantees The possibility of possessing the source of the external things. That is why we must examine again the possible origins of that source and whether this temporary acquisition from a unilateral will suffices as a starting point for private law. There are three sources for the source: the empirical possession; the indication; the will of the self. Needless to say possession. The possibility of being denied was rejected by Kant in the section on “Obtaining Aging.” The need for my freedom to coexist with one another freely seems to be the acquisition of the status of public legal rights, and Kant has the power to oppose others as it enters the status of legal status. Thus, Leap of knowledge possession, on the contrary, is only temporary, and can only be maintained until another willful opposition appears. From this, it seems that although Kant repeatedly emphasizes that the initial acquisition of a source is not empirically acquired in the first place, the distinction between initial acquisition and initial acquisition can not be clearly and clearly distinguished. More likely, a source is only empirical Of the original possession, it is not enough to become a natural starting point of law.