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IN November 2014， the 22nd APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting will be held in Beijing. Since the fi rst APEC summit in Seattle in 1993， the annual Economic Leaders’ Meeting has been an important platform for members to promote political communication and deepen regional cooperation as it gathers leaders from almost all important economies in the Asia-Pacifi c region. Therefore， the meeting not only polarizes regional attention， but also weighs heavily on the entire world. The 2014 summit seems to be attracting even more interest since it is expected to ease tensions between China and the U.S. and between China and Japan， and significantly impact the future of the Asia-Pacifi c constellation.
China-U.S. Presidential Meetings
In June 2013， Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama held an informal meeting in Sunnyland， California. The two state leaders had in-depth and candid exchanges on bilateral relations as well as major global and regional issues， and reached consensus on enhancing cooperation， deepening mutual understanding， and strengthening policy communication and coordination. During the meeting， President Xi proposed to construct a new type of relationship between the two great powers， featuring non-confl ict， non-confrontation， mutual respect and win-win results. In response， President Obama stressed that the U.S. would be willing to build a new type of bilateral cooperation mode together with China.
After the presidential meeting， although the bilateral relations made headway to a certain degree， on the North Korea nuclear issue， for example， the two countries encountered huge challenges in advancing their overall relationship. On November 23， 2013， China demarcated the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone， an important move to reinforce territorial defense and national security precautions in light of international conventions. Among the major countries in East Asia， China is the latest to establish an air defense identifi cation zone （ADIZ）， and has been prudent in doing so. However， as a country that has enjoyed air and maritime supremacy in the west Pacifi c since the end of WWII and been used to free navigation， the U.S. overreacted to China’s ADIZ， believing China to be intentionally challenging its dominant role in the west Pacifi c. The Pentagon even claimed it as China’s “destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region.” On November 26， the U.S. deployed two B-52 bombers over China’s de- fense zone， in protest against China’s move. Meanwhile， the U.S. joined hands with Japan， refusing to recognize the East China Sea ADIZ. This year has seen an escalation of tension between China and the U.S. Daniel R. Russel， U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacifi c Affairs， in his congressional testimony on February 5， blatantly censured China’s policy on the South China Sea， cast doubt on the “ninedash line，” and blamed the turbulent situation on China’s so-called unilateral move. The U.S. thus changed its policy of non-involvement and non-committal attitude to a position of entire involvement and intervention. By supporting certain Southeast Asian countries that have territorial disputes with China， the U.S. intends to curb China’s legitimate and justifi ed right-safeguarding action， and bar China from seeking its sovereign right to the islands in the related sea areas in light of the customary international practice on historical rights and International Maritime Law. Thus， disputes around the South China Sea have become a new factor putting the two countries in opposition.
Concerning the East China Sea issue， the Obama administration has firmly supported Japan， ignoring historical facts. During his visit to Japan in April， President Obama publicly committed to help Japan defend the Diaoyu Islands， further fortifying the U.S.-Japan military alliance. On April 28， in advance of President Obama’s arrival in the Philippines， the U.S. and the Philippines agreed on a new 10-year defense pact that would allow establishment of a new U.S. military base and increased presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines. Through Obama’s April East Asia four-country tour， while advancing its strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific with new military moves and defense accords， the U.S. attempted to signal to China its determination and fl aunt its strength， as its strategic warning conveyed clearly.
At the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue， a multilateral forum mainly focusing on security issues in Asia， which opened on May 30 in Singapore， U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel blatantly denounced China at length in his speech， abandoning diplomatic protocol and echoing the Japanese Prime Minister’s keynote speech. For that， Wang Guanzhong， deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army （PLA）， who led the Chinese delegation to the dialogue， rose up to present a potent retort in his speech. The 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue， which was supposed to be a platform for candid exchanges on issues of Asia-Pacific maritime security， regional defense cooperation and coping with rampant terrorist forces， finally descended into a war of words between China， the U.S. and Japan. While containing China on a range of regional security issues， the U.S. also stuck its nose into China’s internal affairs， such as issues regarding Xinjiang， Tibet， and Hong Kong. As for economy and trade， the U.S. attacked China’s economic regulation policy， accusing China of intentionally weakening its domestic investment environment. Although during the 2014 China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue the two sides reached consensus on more than 30 topics， the dialogue atmosphere and degree of harmony degenerated to the lowest level. While meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry， President Xi Jinping indicated his sincere hope that America would be able to put the future in perspective while dealing with bilateral relations.
Behind Strained Ties
The Sino-U.S. relationship has remained strained since November 2013， and the reasons are multiple. First and foremost， the Obama administration， vexed by a number of simmering international security issues， is wary about appearing soft in its China policy. It has， therefore， hewed to the rebalancing strategy， first revealed in 2011， and pins China as its top target in the transformation of its global strategies. Recalibration of the U.S. policies for the AsiaPacific region is the top irritant in its relationship with China.
The rebalancing strategy of the Obama administration was meant to readjust the U.S. global strategic deployment and priorities in light of the growing strength of China， making countering China a more pressing issue in U.S. policies towards Asia. The purpose is to steer its global strategies away from the mess of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan， and to ensure the U.S. can effectively and promptly guard against and contain China. The core of the rebalancing strategy is not only to consolidate the U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific and expand defense cooperation and strategic partnerships， but also to support the countries in the region that contend with China over territorial or security issues. The U.S. exploits the complex impact of a rising China on regional security， and plays on the mentality of smaller countries in the Asia-Pacific of seeking aegis from bigger brothers， forcefully accelerating the intensity of its diplomatic and military endeavors to suppress China. Its goal is to build military capacity to deter China， and meanwhile win support from regional countries， so undermining China’s diplomatic and political clout. All in all， the rebalancing strategy is designed to entrench the U.S. as the world’s sole superpower. There are three notable differences between the U.S.’current China policy and that prior to 2011. The first concerns psychology. The U.S. is afraid that China will see it as in decline and seize on this opportunity to conduct strategic expansion. The U.S.， therefore， interprets China’s normal， justified actions to defend its legitimate rights as attempts to seek strategic expansion in the face of receding U.S. strength. In the eyes of certain American politicians， China’s maritime moves to defend its sovereign rights are the country’s endeavors to change the status quo.
The second is about mentality. The U.S. thinks that China is becoming more and more aggressive and defiant of it， and that it has to press China into accepting its leading position in the Asia-Pacific by strutting its will， resolve and strength， preventing the prospect of China’s strategic influence from escalating to a level that threatens U.S. economic， political and strategic interests in the region. As a result， the pitch of discussions of China policy within the U.S. has shifted to greater vigilance and less friendliness.
The third lies in the increasing sensitivity of both sides. A rising China has indeed inflicted changes to a certain degree on the balance of strength between it and the U.S.， about which both countries seem over-sensitive. They need to readjust their bilateral ties to the new power balance and carefully gauge either party’s capabilities， intentions and policy goals.
For instance， the U.S.’ close-range reconnaissance on China in the sea and air typically reflects its angst over the increasing level of modernization of China’s military force. In the past years the U.S. has carried out on average more than 500 close-range reconnaissance missions to China every year， blatantly spying on China’s military secrets and so signifying growing hostility towards China. The Chinese military， of course， feels strong repulsion toward such deeds of stark disrespect of Chinese dignity， and is justified in blocking U.S. surveillance off China’s coast. These spying efforts by the U.S. and mid-air interception by China predictably add to the stress in bilateral ties， and increase the odds of military clashes.
APEC Summit， Another Occasion for Talks
Whatever discord exists between China and the U.S.， their relationship remains the most important for global politics in the 21st century， and is understandably complex. Historical experience has testified that the two governments must keep in contact， and their leaders must sustain frank， practical and constructive dialogues before they can manage and control their disparities and foster a stable situation. The annual APEC summit is a key mechanism for direct dialogues between the heads of state of the two countries. The first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 1993， attended by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Bill Clinton， was critical for the two countries in moving out of a political deadlock after 1989. But the nations’ top leaders missed the chance of dialogue at the 21st Economic Leaders’ Meeting of APEC in Indonesia last year， when the U.S. President was forced to stay at home amid the government shutdown due to federal budget deficit.
This year’s Beijing Summit will bring together President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama， who are expected to discuss the thorny issue of Sino-Japanese ties， among others. We sincerely hope that dialogues between the leaders of the two major countries will continue. As Chinese President Xi Jinping has pointed out， “the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States.”
China-U.S. Presidential Meetings
In June 2013， Chinese President Xi Jinping and his U.S. counterpart Barack Obama held an informal meeting in Sunnyland， California. The two state leaders had in-depth and candid exchanges on bilateral relations as well as major global and regional issues， and reached consensus on enhancing cooperation， deepening mutual understanding， and strengthening policy communication and coordination. During the meeting， President Xi proposed to construct a new type of relationship between the two great powers， featuring non-confl ict， non-confrontation， mutual respect and win-win results. In response， President Obama stressed that the U.S. would be willing to build a new type of bilateral cooperation mode together with China.
After the presidential meeting， although the bilateral relations made headway to a certain degree， on the North Korea nuclear issue， for example， the two countries encountered huge challenges in advancing their overall relationship. On November 23， 2013， China demarcated the East China Sea Air Defense Identifi cation Zone， an important move to reinforce territorial defense and national security precautions in light of international conventions. Among the major countries in East Asia， China is the latest to establish an air defense identifi cation zone （ADIZ）， and has been prudent in doing so. However， as a country that has enjoyed air and maritime supremacy in the west Pacifi c since the end of WWII and been used to free navigation， the U.S. overreacted to China’s ADIZ， believing China to be intentionally challenging its dominant role in the west Pacifi c. The Pentagon even claimed it as China’s “destabilizing attempt to alter the status quo in the region.” On November 26， the U.S. deployed two B-52 bombers over China’s de- fense zone， in protest against China’s move. Meanwhile， the U.S. joined hands with Japan， refusing to recognize the East China Sea ADIZ. This year has seen an escalation of tension between China and the U.S. Daniel R. Russel， U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacifi c Affairs， in his congressional testimony on February 5， blatantly censured China’s policy on the South China Sea， cast doubt on the “ninedash line，” and blamed the turbulent situation on China’s so-called unilateral move. The U.S. thus changed its policy of non-involvement and non-committal attitude to a position of entire involvement and intervention. By supporting certain Southeast Asian countries that have territorial disputes with China， the U.S. intends to curb China’s legitimate and justifi ed right-safeguarding action， and bar China from seeking its sovereign right to the islands in the related sea areas in light of the customary international practice on historical rights and International Maritime Law. Thus， disputes around the South China Sea have become a new factor putting the two countries in opposition.
Concerning the East China Sea issue， the Obama administration has firmly supported Japan， ignoring historical facts. During his visit to Japan in April， President Obama publicly committed to help Japan defend the Diaoyu Islands， further fortifying the U.S.-Japan military alliance. On April 28， in advance of President Obama’s arrival in the Philippines， the U.S. and the Philippines agreed on a new 10-year defense pact that would allow establishment of a new U.S. military base and increased presence of U.S. troops in the Philippines. Through Obama’s April East Asia four-country tour， while advancing its strategy of rebalance to the Asia-Pacific with new military moves and defense accords， the U.S. attempted to signal to China its determination and fl aunt its strength， as its strategic warning conveyed clearly.
At the 13th Shangri-La Dialogue， a multilateral forum mainly focusing on security issues in Asia， which opened on May 30 in Singapore， U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel blatantly denounced China at length in his speech， abandoning diplomatic protocol and echoing the Japanese Prime Minister’s keynote speech. For that， Wang Guanzhong， deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army （PLA）， who led the Chinese delegation to the dialogue， rose up to present a potent retort in his speech. The 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue， which was supposed to be a platform for candid exchanges on issues of Asia-Pacific maritime security， regional defense cooperation and coping with rampant terrorist forces， finally descended into a war of words between China， the U.S. and Japan. While containing China on a range of regional security issues， the U.S. also stuck its nose into China’s internal affairs， such as issues regarding Xinjiang， Tibet， and Hong Kong. As for economy and trade， the U.S. attacked China’s economic regulation policy， accusing China of intentionally weakening its domestic investment environment. Although during the 2014 China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue the two sides reached consensus on more than 30 topics， the dialogue atmosphere and degree of harmony degenerated to the lowest level. While meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry， President Xi Jinping indicated his sincere hope that America would be able to put the future in perspective while dealing with bilateral relations.
Behind Strained Ties
The Sino-U.S. relationship has remained strained since November 2013， and the reasons are multiple. First and foremost， the Obama administration， vexed by a number of simmering international security issues， is wary about appearing soft in its China policy. It has， therefore， hewed to the rebalancing strategy， first revealed in 2011， and pins China as its top target in the transformation of its global strategies. Recalibration of the U.S. policies for the AsiaPacific region is the top irritant in its relationship with China.
The rebalancing strategy of the Obama administration was meant to readjust the U.S. global strategic deployment and priorities in light of the growing strength of China， making countering China a more pressing issue in U.S. policies towards Asia. The purpose is to steer its global strategies away from the mess of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan， and to ensure the U.S. can effectively and promptly guard against and contain China. The core of the rebalancing strategy is not only to consolidate the U.S. alliances in the Asia-Pacific and expand defense cooperation and strategic partnerships， but also to support the countries in the region that contend with China over territorial or security issues. The U.S. exploits the complex impact of a rising China on regional security， and plays on the mentality of smaller countries in the Asia-Pacific of seeking aegis from bigger brothers， forcefully accelerating the intensity of its diplomatic and military endeavors to suppress China. Its goal is to build military capacity to deter China， and meanwhile win support from regional countries， so undermining China’s diplomatic and political clout. All in all， the rebalancing strategy is designed to entrench the U.S. as the world’s sole superpower. There are three notable differences between the U.S.’current China policy and that prior to 2011. The first concerns psychology. The U.S. is afraid that China will see it as in decline and seize on this opportunity to conduct strategic expansion. The U.S.， therefore， interprets China’s normal， justified actions to defend its legitimate rights as attempts to seek strategic expansion in the face of receding U.S. strength. In the eyes of certain American politicians， China’s maritime moves to defend its sovereign rights are the country’s endeavors to change the status quo.
The second is about mentality. The U.S. thinks that China is becoming more and more aggressive and defiant of it， and that it has to press China into accepting its leading position in the Asia-Pacific by strutting its will， resolve and strength， preventing the prospect of China’s strategic influence from escalating to a level that threatens U.S. economic， political and strategic interests in the region. As a result， the pitch of discussions of China policy within the U.S. has shifted to greater vigilance and less friendliness.
The third lies in the increasing sensitivity of both sides. A rising China has indeed inflicted changes to a certain degree on the balance of strength between it and the U.S.， about which both countries seem over-sensitive. They need to readjust their bilateral ties to the new power balance and carefully gauge either party’s capabilities， intentions and policy goals.
For instance， the U.S.’ close-range reconnaissance on China in the sea and air typically reflects its angst over the increasing level of modernization of China’s military force. In the past years the U.S. has carried out on average more than 500 close-range reconnaissance missions to China every year， blatantly spying on China’s military secrets and so signifying growing hostility towards China. The Chinese military， of course， feels strong repulsion toward such deeds of stark disrespect of Chinese dignity， and is justified in blocking U.S. surveillance off China’s coast. These spying efforts by the U.S. and mid-air interception by China predictably add to the stress in bilateral ties， and increase the odds of military clashes.
APEC Summit， Another Occasion for Talks
Whatever discord exists between China and the U.S.， their relationship remains the most important for global politics in the 21st century， and is understandably complex. Historical experience has testified that the two governments must keep in contact， and their leaders must sustain frank， practical and constructive dialogues before they can manage and control their disparities and foster a stable situation. The annual APEC summit is a key mechanism for direct dialogues between the heads of state of the two countries. The first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 1993， attended by Chinese President Jiang Zemin and U.S. President Bill Clinton， was critical for the two countries in moving out of a political deadlock after 1989. But the nations’ top leaders missed the chance of dialogue at the 21st Economic Leaders’ Meeting of APEC in Indonesia last year， when the U.S. President was forced to stay at home amid the government shutdown due to federal budget deficit.
This year’s Beijing Summit will bring together President Xi Jinping and President Barack Obama， who are expected to discuss the thorny issue of Sino-Japanese ties， among others. We sincerely hope that dialogues between the leaders of the two major countries will continue. As Chinese President Xi Jinping has pointed out， “the Pacific Ocean is big enough to accommodate both China and the United States.”