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为提高供应链的运作绩效,针对一个制造商、一个批发商和一个零售商构成的供—产—销供应链,分析了成员企业间的委托代理关系,建立了收益控制权意义下的委托代理激励契约模型。基于该模型,获得了不同信息属性(对称和非对称)状态下的最优激励契约。收益控制权是委托人和代理人之间利益协调的一个重要因素,通过最优激励契约确定了委托人和代理人的最优收益控制权范围。供应链成员企业通过最优激励和最优收益控制权,实现了自身期望利润效用的最大化,提高了产—供—销供应链的运作能力和绩效。
In order to improve the operational performance of the supply chain, this paper analyzes the principal-agent relationship among member companies and establishes the principal-agent in the sense of revenue control for the supply-supply chain consisting of one manufacturer, one wholesaler and one retailer. Incentive contract model. Based on this model, we obtain the optimal incentive contract with different information attributes (symmetric and asymmetric). Benefit control is an important factor for coordinating the interests between principal and agent, and the scope of optimal return control of principal and agent is determined through the optimal incentive contract. Through the optimal incentive and optimal return control, the members of the supply chain have realized their own expected profits and maximized the profit, and improved the operational capability and performance of the production-supply-supply chain.