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本文通过一个Stackelberg模型分析得出,在纵向一体化的自由化结构下,不管主导企业的下游附属企业相对于新进入企业处于成本优势还是劣势,其都具有很强的动机通过实施非价格歧视手段提高新进入企业的运营成本,达到排斥下游市场竞争的目的。因此,规制机构在制定接入规制政策时,应选择合理的接入规制方法以促进下游市场的竞争。在对电信网络接入进行直接规制的同时,还可运用反垄断法进行间接规制。
Based on a Stackelberg model analysis, we conclude that under the vertically integrated liberalization structure, there is a strong incentive to motivate downstream subsidiaries of leading enterprises to take advantage of non-price discrimination measures regardless of their cost advantages or disadvantages relative to new entrants. Improve the operating costs of new entrants to the enterprise, to exclude the purpose of competition in the downstream market. Therefore, when formulating the access regulation policy, the regulatory agency should choose a reasonable access regulation method to promote the competition in the downstream market. While direct regulation of telecommunications network access, it can also use the anti-monopoly law to regulate indirectly.