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引入消费者对可追溯食品的支付意愿,利用博弈论分析不同决策情形下二级可追溯食品供应链中销售商和食品加工企业的最优策略。研究结果表明:在分散决策情形下,销售商在静态博弈均衡时不分担食品加工企业实施可追溯的成本,而是通过加大补贴力度激励食品加工企业提高食品的可追溯水平;在斯坦克尔伯格均衡时,销售商将选择对自己有利的成本分担比例和价格补贴系数的组合策略;基于Rubinstein讨价还价模型的收益共享契约则有助于激励各方实施食品安全可追溯机制。
By introducing consumers’ willingness to pay for traceable food, this paper uses game theory to analyze the optimal strategies of sellers and food processing enterprises in the second-level traceability food supply chain under different decision-making situations. The results show that in the case of decentralized decision-making, sellers do not share the traceability cost of food processing enterprises in the static game equilibrium, but rather encourage the food processing enterprises to increase the traceability level of food by increasing subsidies. In the case of Starker In the case of Berg equilibrium, sellers will choose a combination strategy of their own cost-sharing ratio and price subsidy coefficient. Revenue-sharing contracts based on the Rubinstein bargaining model will help encourage all parties to implement food safety traceability mechanisms.