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应用实物期权博弈论和一般均衡理论,推导出了负债企业在信息不完美条件下控制权转移最优时机和均衡价格的解析解,并对最优时机和均衡价格的主要影响因素进行敏感性分析。研究结果表明:在其他条件不变的前提下,目标企业的规模越大、兼并双方购买沉没成本越小、控股比例越高、购买者期望协同效应越大、息票率越高,税率越高,则均会导致控制权转移越快,转移的均衡价格越低。目标企业所处的产业增长率和波动率越高,则控制权转移越快,转移的均衡价格越低,并具有双重效应。控制权转移的时机和转移均衡价格不是控制因子的单调函数。
Using the real option game theory and the general equilibrium theory, the analytic solution of the optimal timing and the equilibrium price of the transfer of control under the condition of imperfect information is deduced, and the sensitivity analysis of the optimal timing and the main influencing factors of the equilibrium price . The results show that under the condition of other conditions remain unchanged, the larger the size of the target enterprise, the smaller the purchase cost of sunk mergers and acquisitions, the higher the holding proportion, the greater the expected synergies of purchasers, the higher the coupon rate and the higher tax rate , It will lead to the transfer of control faster, the lower the equilibrium price of transfer. The higher the industrial growth rate and volatility of the target enterprises are, the faster the transfer of control rights, the lower the equilibrium price of transfer and the double effect. The timing of transfer of control and transfer of equilibrium prices are not monotonic functions of the control factor.