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本文在新古典世代交迭(OLG)模型中引入“外部习惯”和“内部习惯”两种习惯形成的类型,考察最优的资本收入税与“现收现付制”社会保障系统的一次性税收之间的选择。研究发现,资本收入税与外部习惯呈正相关,当不存在外部习惯时资本收入税为0;在存在外部习惯的条件下,资本收入税与内部习惯呈正相关;对年轻一代的一次性税收(补贴)与内部习惯呈正(负)相关;对年轻一代的一次性税收(补贴)与外部习惯呈负(正)相关。考虑到外部习惯与内部习惯形呈的作用,具体的税收结构取决于人口增长、资本效率和经济发展的特定水平。
This paper introduces the types of “habits” and “habits” into the OLG model, examines the optimal capital income tax and the “pay-as-you-go” Social Security System One-time tax choice. The study found that the capital income tax is positively correlated with the external habits, and the capital income tax is 0 when there is no external habits. The capital income tax and the internal habits are positively correlated with the external habits. The one-off tax (subsidy ) Are positively (negative) related to internal habits; one-time taxes (subsidies) for younger generations are negatively (positively) related to external habits. Given the role of external habits and internal habits, the specific tax structure depends on the specific level of population growth, capital efficiency and economic development.