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经理领导权是经理报酬租金的重要解释变量。本文引入败德行为成本约束机制,认为经理领导权运用过程包含了隐藏行为和公开行为。本文集中探讨了不同败德行为成本水平下,经理隐藏行为对各类领导权变量和治理因素与经理报酬之间关系的影响。基于中国上市公司数据,本文对1652个上市公司样本进行了回归分析。结果显示,两职合一并没有使经理获得较多的报酬租金;盈余管理令经理获得较多的报酬租金;独立董事在董事会中的比例在低败德行为成本下可以令经理获得较多的报酬租金。另外,作为获得报酬租金的不同途径,经理会因情境在独立董事在董事会中的比例以及盈余管理之间进行策略选择。
Managerial leadership is an important explanatory variable for manager’s compensation rent. This paper introduces the restraining mechanism of behavior costs of failure, and believes that the process of managerial leadership includes hidden behavior and public behavior. This article focuses on the impact of managerial concealment on the relationship between various types of leadership variables and governance factors and managerial compensation under different levels of behavioral costs of failure. Based on the data of China’s listed companies, this paper carries out a regression analysis of 1652 samples of listed companies. The results show that the combination of the two positions does not allow managers to obtain more compensation rents; earnings management allows managers to obtain more compensation rents; the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors can make managers get more at low cost of failure. Remuneration for rent. In addition, as different ways of obtaining remuneration, the manager will choose strategically because of the situation in the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors and the earnings management.