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分析了PM/PMC方属于业主委托的项目管理服务企业而不是承包商,维护业主的利益。针对国内外学者对业主和承包商的成本加酬金激励合同中的承包商的分享系数研究较多,但对业主和PM/PMC方在CPIF管理服务合同中的PM/PMC方的分享系数研究很少,基于PM/PMC与承包商的合谋的博弈模型分析,对PM/PMC模式下CPIF管理服务合同的分享系数的取值进行了研究。研究结论表明PM/PMC方的分享系数的取值应防止PM/PMC方与承包商的合谋,分享系数应采用累进方式;当CPIF管理服务合同中的固定酬金取费率较高时,分享系数应相应减小,为健立完善我国建设工程管理服务合同提供了有益的价值。
Analyzed that PM / PMC belongs to the project management service enterprise entrusted by the owner rather than the contractor, to protect the interests of the owners. For domestic and foreign scholars on the cost of the owners and contractors plus incentives incentive contract contractor’s share of more research, but the owners and the PM / PMC in CPIF management service contract PM / PMC side of the sharing coefficient is very Based on the game model analysis of collusion between PM / PMC and contractor, this paper studies the value of the sharing coefficient of CPIF management service contract in PM / PMC mode. The conclusion of the research shows that the sharing coefficient of PM / PMC party should prevent collusion between PM / PMC party and contractor, and the sharing factor should be in a progressive way. When the fixed payout rate in CPIF management service contract is high, the sharing coefficient Should be correspondingly reduced, which provides beneficial value for establishing and perfecting China’s construction project management service contract.