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反垄断执法的目标是阻止犯罪和补偿受害方,要有效阻止恶性卡特尔犯罪,必须确保企业的违法预期所得低于违法预期成本。通过数值模拟和对美国、欧盟反垄断罚金和法律责任体系实际执法效能的检验,发现基于违法所得或违法伤害的罚金计算依据要比依据企业销售额比例上限更有效,综合法律责任的威慑力度要高于单一法律责任。实证分析发现,中国反垄断法的罚金规则和法律责任体系,既不能有效阻止恶性卡特尔犯罪,也不能有效补偿受害方。
The objective of antitrust enforcement is to deter criminals and compensate victims. To effectively prevent vicious cartel crimes, it is necessary to ensure that the illegal income foreseen by an enterprise is lower than the expected cost of unlawful acts. Through the numerical simulation and the test of the actual law enforcement effectiveness of the antitrust fines and legal liability system of the United States and EU, it is found that the fines calculated based on illegal gains or unlawful injuries are more effective than the upper limit of the proportion of sales, and the comprehensive deterrent of legal liability Higher than a single legal responsibility. Empirical analysis found that the fines rules and legal liability system of China’s antitrust law can neither effectively prevent vicious cartel crime nor compensate victims.