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针对信息不对称下的农村信贷市场,本文基于金融联结机制模型,分析农户信贷资金配置策略问题,认为,在金融联结机制下,贷款违约的惩罚力度将对信贷资金配置策略产生重要影响,实证证实了在高惩罚的配置策略中,贷款人发放贷款时,其可能更加关注借款人未来偿还因素的甄别和监督;在低惩罚的配置策略中,贷款人发放贷款时,其更多注重有关借款人履约特征方面的甄别和监督。政策含义在于设计有效的正规金融机构和非正规金融部门之间合作的激励机制,强化农村信贷合约有效履行的制度设施,以及在既有的农村金融存量基础上,通过类似于金融联结的农村信贷制度创新,来整合与深化农村金融市场。
Aiming at the rural credit market under asymmetric information, this paper analyzes the allocation strategy of household credit funds based on the model of financial linkage mechanism. It is concluded that under the financial linkage mechanism, the punishment of loan default will have an important impact on the allocation strategy of credit funds. In a highly punishing allocation strategy, lenders may pay more attention to the screening and supervision of borrowers’ future repayment factors when they issue loans. In low-cost allocation strategies, when lenders issue loans, they pay more attention to the borrower Screening and supervision of compliance features. The policy implication lies in the design of an effective incentive mechanism for cooperation between the formal financial institutions and the informal financial sector, the strengthening of institutional facilities for the effective performance of rural credit contracts, and the establishment of rural credit facilities through rural credit facilities similar to financial links Institutional innovation, to integrate and deepen the rural financial markets.