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以集群产业链中上、下游企业创新链接的关键环节“谁负责创新”作为研究的着力点,尝试运用数量生态学中的进化博弈模型,对集群上、下游企业的创新链接机制进行剖析和研究。博弈分析的结果显示:集群企业“创新型进化”具有自我维持的特征,集群群落中已有的“创新型”企业的占有率、下游企业对上游企业的依赖程度以及政府采取的补贴、知识产权保护等因素对集群企业向“创新型”企业“种群”方向演化具有催化作用。
Taking the key link of upstream and downstream enterprise innovation links in cluster industrial chain as the focus of research, this paper attempts to use the evolutionary game model in quantitative ecology to analyze the innovation linkage mechanism of upstream and downstream enterprises in cluster, And research. The results of the game analysis show that the “innovative evolution” of cluster enterprises has the characteristics of self-sustaining, the share of existing “innovative” enterprises in cluster communities, the dependence of downstream enterprises on upstream enterprises, Subsidies and protection of intellectual property rights have a catalytic effect on the evolution of cluster enterprises toward “innovation ” enterprises “population ”.