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大型项目通常由几个分阶段的任务组成,比如修建公路时,需要前期的建设和后期的运营维护。委托人可以将任务捆绑在一起招标,也可以分开招标。本文首先刻画了在捆绑和非捆绑两种情况下的最优拍卖机制,证明了两种情况下最优的拍卖机制都可以通过简单的线性合约和参与费用来执行;并且如果任务之间呈现出足够大的正外部性,那么委托人会偏好捆绑拍卖,反之,则会偏好非捆绑拍卖;最后证明了当竞拍者的进入是内生时,捆绑会削弱竞争。
Large-scale projects are usually composed of several phases of tasks, such as the construction of roads, the need for the early construction and operation and maintenance of the latter. The client can bundle the tasks together to tender, you can also bid separately. In this paper, we first describe the optimal auction mechanism in both the bundled and unbundled cases, and prove that the optimal auction mechanism in both cases can be implemented through a simple linear contract and participation costs. And if the task presents a Large enough positive externality, then the client will prefer bundled auctions, otherwise, it will prefer non-bundled auctions; finally proved that when the entry of bidders is endogenous, the binding will weaken the competition.