我国代表人诉讼在司法实践中遭遇了诸多难题。而作为微观经济学的理论工具,博弈论因其分析的行为假设与法律行为具有较高的一致性,可能会有助于解决这些难题。奥尔森的“集体行动的逻辑”理论认为集体行动如要成功,须具备集团足够小、出现“非对称”的大集团和对集团中的个体进行选择性激励三个可能条件,而这三个条件对完善代表人诉讼制度具有重要启示。 Our country’s representative litigation has encountered many difficulties in judicial practice. As a theoretical tool of microeconomics, game theory may be helpful to solve these problems due to the high consistency of its analytical behavioral assumptions and legal behaviors. Olson’s “logic of collective action” theory holds that if collective action is to succeed, there must be three possible conditions for large group with small group and “asymmetry ” and selective incentive for individuals in the group , And these three conditions have important implications for improving the representative litigation system.