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本文在随机市场需求的一般情形下,同时引入零售商和供应商的公平偏好,以Nash讨价还价为博弈框架,研究公平偏好对收益共享契约协调性的影响,并进行数值模拟分析,结果表明:只有公平偏好强度满足相应条件时,公平偏好才能使收益共享契约实现供应链的协调;当收益共享契约协调供应链时,公平偏好虽然不会改变契约参数以及节点企业最优决策和利润,但是会改变供应链中各主体的预期和效用,因而改变了供应商和零售商协调供应链的心理意愿。
In the general case of stochastic market demand, we introduce the fair preference of retailers and suppliers, and use Nash bargaining as the game framework to study the impact of fair preference on the contractual harmony of revenue-sharing contract. The results show that: When the fair preference intensity satisfies the corresponding conditions, the fair preference can make the revenue sharing contract realize the supply chain coordination. While the revenue sharing contract coordinates the supply chain, although the fair preference does not change the contract parameters and the optimal decision and profit of the node enterprise, it will change The expectation and utility of various actors in the supply chain has changed the psychological willingness of suppliers and retailers to coordinate their supply chains.