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针对供应商管理库存(VMI)模式下考虑损失规避型供应商与零售商促销行为的二级供应链协调问题,分别分析了分散VMI供应链情形下损失规避型供应商与零售商的最优策略和集中VMI供应链情形下供应链的最优策略,并构建了批发价格-促销成本分担契约下的VMI供应链协调契约模型,并且证明了该供应链协调契约模型的有效性。通过博弈分析得到的结论是:零售商的促销努力水平的提高能够促使损失规避型供应商增加其产品生产量,而损失规避型供应商的产品生产量的增加会促使零售商提高其促销努力水平以便保持市场竞争优势;批发价格契约不能协调此二级VMI供应链;一定条件下批发价格-促销成本分担契约能够协调此二级VMI供应链。
Aiming at the problem of two-level supply chain coordination considering the loss-avoiding supplier and retailer’s promotional behavior in VMI mode, this paper analyzes the optimal strategy of loss-avoiding supplier and retailer in the case of decentralized VMI supply chain And the optimal strategy of the supply chain under the condition of concentrating the VMI supply chain. The VMI supply chain coordination contract model under the wholesale price-promotion cost sharing contract is constructed, and the effectiveness of the supply chain coordination contract model is proved. The conclusion from the game analysis is that retailers ’promotion efforts can push loss-avoidance suppliers to increase their product production, and the increase of loss-avoiding suppliers’ product production will encourage retailers to increase their promotion efforts In order to maintain the market competitive advantage; wholesale price contract can not coordinate the two VMI supply chain; under certain conditions, the wholesale price - promotion cost sharing contract can coordinate the two VMI supply chain.