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考虑由制造商和销售人员组成的供应链,其中市场需求依赖于制造商的货物质量,销售人员的努力以及市场的随机因素,建立由制造商起主导作用的数学模型.制造商通过制定产品质量,工资契约,销售价格来最大化自己的利润.销售人员针对不同质量的货物决定相应努力水平以最大化自己的利润.关于销售人员的努力水平在对称信息及不对称信息情形下,制造商运用激励相容原理设计最优契约,得到销售价格,产品质量及销售提成之间的关系.结果表明,信息对称情形下,销售人员的努力水平与产品的质量成正比.信息不对称情形下,类型为H(很努力)的销售人员的固定收入随类型为L(一般努力)的销售人员的销售提成增大而增加.
Consider a supply chain consisting of manufacturers and salespeople, in which the market demand depends on the quality of the goods delivered by the manufacturer, the efforts of the sales force, and the random factors in the market to establish a mathematical model that is dominated by the manufacturer. , Salary contracts, sales prices to maximize their profits. Sales staff for different quality of goods to determine the appropriate level of effort to maximize their profits. The level of efforts of sales staff In the case of symmetric information and asymmetric information, manufacturers use Incentive compatibility principle to design the optimal contract, the relationship between sales price, product quality and sales commission is obtained.The results show that the level of salesman’s efforts is proportional to the quality of the product under the condition of information symmetry.In information asymmetry situation, the type The fixed income of salespeople who are H (very hard) increases with the increase of sales commission for salespeople of type L (usually hard).