论文部分内容阅读
通过求解私人资本投资于创业投资基金的最优投资策略,对公共资本对私人资本的四种补偿机制的激励强度进行了比较.主要结论包括:只有当创业投资基金的期望收益/风险特征不足以吸引足够的私人资本投入时,公共资本对私人资本的补偿才是必然的;承诺对私人资本的亏损进行补偿可以激励更多的私人资本投入,但承诺对私人资本的收益进行补偿则极易产生相反的效果;让私人资本独自承担创业投资基金的亏损和收益会减少其对基金的投入;当预期激励成本相同时,若创业投资基金的预期风险较高(低),则亏损补偿机制的激励强度要高(低)于亏损保底.
By comparing the optimal investment strategies of private capital investment in venture capital funds, we compare the incentive intensity of four kinds of compensation mechanisms of public capital to private capital.The main conclusions include: Only when the expected return / risk characteristics of venture capital funds are not enough Public capital’s compensation for private capital is only necessary when it attracts enough private capital investment. Commitment to compensate for the loss of private capital can stimulate more private capital investment, but promises to make it easy to compensate for private capital’s return The opposite effect; let private capital loss and return of venture capital fund alone will reduce its investment in the fund; when the expected incentive costs are the same, if venture capital fund’s expected risk is higher (low), then the incentive mechanism of the loss compensation Strength to be high (low) at the end of the loss protection.