论文部分内容阅读
本文针对现有文献忽略了授权分销商与灰色市场投机者的市场力量差异的研究现状,考虑由一个制造商和两个处于不同国家市场的分销商组成的跨国供应链(其中一个分销商参与灰色市场投机),构建了以授权分销商为领导者和以灰色市场投机者为跟随者的Stackelberg博弈模型.首先给出了批发价格合同下各节点企业的均衡策略,分析发现:与授权分销商和灰色市场投机者同时决策情形相比,i)授权分销商在其与灰色市场投机者序贯决策时能获得更高的利润;ii)制造商在二者序贯决策情形下能获得较高的利润;iii)授权分销商先决策可以降低灰市产品的销量和灰色市场投机者的投机利润.然后引入两部定价合同,并通过设定合理参数以实现供应链中各节点企业的帕累托改进.
In this paper, we ignore the existing research on the market power difference between authorized distributors and gray market speculators in the existing literature. Consider a multinational supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and two distributors located in different countries (one of the distributors involved in gray Market speculation), a Stackelberg game model with authorized distributor as leader and gray market speculators as followers is constructed.First, the equilibrium strategy of each node under the wholesale price contract is given, the analysis shows that: with the authorized distributors and In contrast to gray market speculators at the same time, i) authorize distributors to obtain higher profits in their sequential decisions with speculators in the gray market; ii) manufacturers can obtain higher Profit iii) Empowering distributors to make first decisions to reduce the sales of gray market products and the speculative profits of speculators in the gray market Then, two pricing contracts are introduced and the Pareto of each node in the supply chain is set by setting reasonable parameters Improve.