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本文设计了一个有不同类型选民、游说团体向参选候选者双方进行政治献金的理论模型,用以考察在企业生产活动对消费者产生负外部性的情况下,政策影响型游说活动所达到的政治均衡的性质以及不同管制政策手段产生的社会福利效果。结论为,在政策影响型游说活动下的政治均衡中,游说团体事实上可以决定候选者的有关环境政策;从社会福利来看,数量管制与价格管制的利弊取决于单位生产所发生的外部性的“边际生产力”。同时,本文还揭示了政治均衡中数量管制与价格管制在四个方面的效果相同。
This paper designs a theoretical model of political contributions of different types of voters and lobbying groups to both candidate candidates to investigate whether policy-induced lobbying activities can be achieved under the circumstances that the production activities of enterprises negatively affect consumers. The nature of political equilibrium and the social welfare effects of different regulatory policies and measures. The conclusion is that in the political equilibrium under the policy-based lobbying activities, lobby groups can in fact decide the candidate’s relevant environmental policies. In terms of social welfare, the advantages and disadvantages of quantitative and price controls depend on the externality of unit production “Marginal productivity ”. At the same time, this article also reveals that the quantitative control and price control in the political equilibrium have the same effect in four aspects.