政府机关中的基层公务员是处于一线以及政策执行的末端直接与公民打交道的人员。基层政府公务员的特殊身份、地位和工作性质,决定了他们与众不同的行动逻辑。本研究基于街头官僚理论分析了基层公务员政策执行变通、规则依赖、一线弃权、激励不足的行动逻辑,并得出自由裁量权、政策绩效悖论、街头环境是其行动逻辑背后的根源。最后,本研究提出了控制自由裁量权、加强责任控制、优化街头环境等三种路径规制基层政府公务员。 Grass-roots civil servants in government agencies are those who are directly on the citizens at the front line and at the end of their policy implementation. The special identities, status and work nature of grassroots government civil servants determine their distinctive logic of action. Based on the street bureaucracy theory, this study analyzes the operational logic of grass-roots civil servants policy implementation, rule dependence, abstained from the front line and lack of motivation, and draws the paradox of discretion and policy performance. The street environment is the root of the action logic. Finally, this study proposes three ways to regulate grass-roots government officials: controlling discretion, strengthening responsibility control and optimizing street environment.