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Barely two years ago a severe financial crisis unfolding in Europe saw many Chinese commentators predict the end of the union and its continued decline in the global order. But internal divisions have been exaggerated， says Nicholas Veron， a senior fellow at Bruegel， the EU’s eminent economic think tank. The Chinese should not underestimate the political and economic unity that still exists on the continent.
Retaliatory tariffs continue to be a problem between the two regions. Will it continue to be a viable policy tool even when the China is making overtures to a possible bilateral free trade deal with the EU？
There are disputes all the time at the WTO. The rules are clear， and the dispute resolution mechanisms are clear. That shouldn’t prevent China and other jurisdictions including the EU from negotiating free trade agreements， but if one of the parties doesn’t play by the rules， it’s perfectly normal that the other party should enter into a dispute process. I know that not everybody in China is happy about the rulings of the dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO， but the[fact that] China has decided to submit itself into the WTO， therefore I think it is now part of the established framework， and it certainly shouldn’t prevent China from negotiating other， deeper trade negotiations with other jurisdictions and not only the EU.
What is the likelihood of a ChinaEU free trade agreement， considering that the EU has a chronic trade deficit with China？
I don’t think that’s a problem. Obviously， some member states of the EU are more enthusiastic about the China-EU free trade agreement than others. I don’t think that’s primarily linked to the question of the deficit； I think it’s more about general attitudes to globalization. It’s a well-known fact that some countries are more comfortable with globalization than others. To be specific， France and Italy have misgivings about globalization that other member states of the EU don’t necessarily share.
So you have a political process inside the EU that is going to affect the prospect for China-EU trade negotiations. And， of course， it will be affected to a large extent by components in the international landscape， including， not least， whether or not there is the prospect of China participating in agreements such as the TPP [TransPacific Partnership] or not. At this point， there isn’t much chance of such a prospect， but I can imagine scenarios where that would change. Obviously a China-EU free trade agreement is not a completely straightforward proposition from a political standpoint. It’s a trade agreement more difficult to achieve than Iceland or Switzerland， both of which are outside the EU. As we know， the EU has signed an agreement with[South] Korea. If China is willing to enter the same sort of discipline that its smaller neighbor in the east did， you could imagine， in principle， there would be openness on the side of the EU. The politics is complicated， because the EU is complicated， since there are different member states with different sensitivities.
China appears to play European nations off against each other to prevent collective EU action in trade disputes？
Well， I think you’re right. It’s simple. When they’re divided， they’re weak； when they’re united， they’re strong. So it’s not a very good idea to play divided in this game， and there is no question， as you said， that China has on a number of issues， not just economic issues but also more diplomatic issues， typically looked at Europe as a collection of countries and felt more comfortable dealing with individual countries， at the risk of sometimes creating the feeling at EU institutions that China was a attempting to undermine the authority of EU institutions. I think that’s a correct description of what we’ve seen in recent years.
What does it mean for the EU that China will become the world’s largest economy， and how should the continent position itself for this eventuality？
China is a very large economy； the US is a very large economy. The fact that China is a bit smaller or a bit bigger than the US in my view is not a big factor. I think what is a big factor is China becoming such a big part of the world economy. But that’s not particularly new.
In fairness， there are people in the EU who haven’t adapted to this reality， who continue to have this very old thinking， looking a bit down at China and feeling a sense that Europe， being part of the West， has a form of economic superiority. I think this is completely outdated， misguided and counterproductive. But it is true that you have that mindset in some corners， I hope backwater corners， in EU institutions. To the extent it still exists is deteriorating rapidly. In a word， China gets a lot of respect from Europe， and properly so.
As China stakes out its own place in the world it sometimes clashes with the international rules established by western nations post-World War II. How can Europe get China to be a more engaged and responsible player in the global system？ My observation is that in the economic area， not talking about the rocks in the South China Sea， China has generally adapted itself to the international framework. It is a member of the WTO and the IMF； it is compliant with Basel III and all these interna- tional financial standards. Well， they’re not perfectly compliant， in accounting there’s a difference between international reporting and Chinese accounting standards. But if you compare this with the US， China is more compliant with the ISRS. In general， it seems to me China， in economic norms and standards， has been willing to adopt a framework that was largely shaped by Western nations. Now it’s changing， of course. Emerging countries and China first among them are having a bigger impact on these global institutions.
There is a widespread feeling， however， that it’s a fairly different logic in the minds of these Chinese leaders. So they are basically separating economic integration from geopolitical， or at least， regional thinking. Now obviously if you play through certain escalation or even conflicts， that would establish a link between all these different barriers. And we see that， for example， in the case of Russia and Ukraine， geopolitical confrontation can lead to reversals in the economic area， but fortunately， China has not so far come near the point where you would have this sort of overlap.
The Eurozone crisis has deeply diminished many normal Chinese people’s views about Europe as a global economic and political actor. Is it possible to reverse this decline in perception of the continent， or is it doomed to second-tier status？
The euro crisis has been very difficult for Europe， and Europe has lost wealth and influence in this crisis. So there is no denying this. Having said that， I think my impression when I’m in Asia， and its not just in China， is that perhaps the number of observers in Asia have overreacted and perceive Europe as even weaker than it really is. So I think it’s important to really monitor what is happening in Europe， even if it’s very complicated， and often very boring. To be blunt， two years ago， the overwhelming consensus in Asia was that Greece would leave the Eurozone， and possibly the Eurozone would break up， and this hasn’t happened. So there is often an underestimation of those strengths that still exist
both from an economic and political perspective. So maybe there is a bias perceiving Europe as less cohesive and decisive， and less able to make joint decisions than the reality.
London， Frankfurt and Luxembourg are all establishing renminbiclearing hubs in Europe. How does this play into the internationalization of the renminbi？
Financial centers， which deal with the renminbi transactions， will perhaps have a big influence on the pace of the yuan’s liberalization. But the most important factor remains the thinking within the Chinese government； at this point I think we’re still far from a true internationalization of the renminbi for financial transactions. Of course there’s a lot that has been already completed for trade transactions， but that’s a different thing.
Retaliatory tariffs continue to be a problem between the two regions. Will it continue to be a viable policy tool even when the China is making overtures to a possible bilateral free trade deal with the EU？
There are disputes all the time at the WTO. The rules are clear， and the dispute resolution mechanisms are clear. That shouldn’t prevent China and other jurisdictions including the EU from negotiating free trade agreements， but if one of the parties doesn’t play by the rules， it’s perfectly normal that the other party should enter into a dispute process. I know that not everybody in China is happy about the rulings of the dispute settlement mechanism within the WTO， but the[fact that] China has decided to submit itself into the WTO， therefore I think it is now part of the established framework， and it certainly shouldn’t prevent China from negotiating other， deeper trade negotiations with other jurisdictions and not only the EU.
What is the likelihood of a ChinaEU free trade agreement， considering that the EU has a chronic trade deficit with China？
I don’t think that’s a problem. Obviously， some member states of the EU are more enthusiastic about the China-EU free trade agreement than others. I don’t think that’s primarily linked to the question of the deficit； I think it’s more about general attitudes to globalization. It’s a well-known fact that some countries are more comfortable with globalization than others. To be specific， France and Italy have misgivings about globalization that other member states of the EU don’t necessarily share.
So you have a political process inside the EU that is going to affect the prospect for China-EU trade negotiations. And， of course， it will be affected to a large extent by components in the international landscape， including， not least， whether or not there is the prospect of China participating in agreements such as the TPP [TransPacific Partnership] or not. At this point， there isn’t much chance of such a prospect， but I can imagine scenarios where that would change. Obviously a China-EU free trade agreement is not a completely straightforward proposition from a political standpoint. It’s a trade agreement more difficult to achieve than Iceland or Switzerland， both of which are outside the EU. As we know， the EU has signed an agreement with[South] Korea. If China is willing to enter the same sort of discipline that its smaller neighbor in the east did， you could imagine， in principle， there would be openness on the side of the EU. The politics is complicated， because the EU is complicated， since there are different member states with different sensitivities.
China appears to play European nations off against each other to prevent collective EU action in trade disputes？
Well， I think you’re right. It’s simple. When they’re divided， they’re weak； when they’re united， they’re strong. So it’s not a very good idea to play divided in this game， and there is no question， as you said， that China has on a number of issues， not just economic issues but also more diplomatic issues， typically looked at Europe as a collection of countries and felt more comfortable dealing with individual countries， at the risk of sometimes creating the feeling at EU institutions that China was a attempting to undermine the authority of EU institutions. I think that’s a correct description of what we’ve seen in recent years.
What does it mean for the EU that China will become the world’s largest economy， and how should the continent position itself for this eventuality？
China is a very large economy； the US is a very large economy. The fact that China is a bit smaller or a bit bigger than the US in my view is not a big factor. I think what is a big factor is China becoming such a big part of the world economy. But that’s not particularly new.
In fairness， there are people in the EU who haven’t adapted to this reality， who continue to have this very old thinking， looking a bit down at China and feeling a sense that Europe， being part of the West， has a form of economic superiority. I think this is completely outdated， misguided and counterproductive. But it is true that you have that mindset in some corners， I hope backwater corners， in EU institutions. To the extent it still exists is deteriorating rapidly. In a word， China gets a lot of respect from Europe， and properly so.
As China stakes out its own place in the world it sometimes clashes with the international rules established by western nations post-World War II. How can Europe get China to be a more engaged and responsible player in the global system？ My observation is that in the economic area， not talking about the rocks in the South China Sea， China has generally adapted itself to the international framework. It is a member of the WTO and the IMF； it is compliant with Basel III and all these interna- tional financial standards. Well， they’re not perfectly compliant， in accounting there’s a difference between international reporting and Chinese accounting standards. But if you compare this with the US， China is more compliant with the ISRS. In general， it seems to me China， in economic norms and standards， has been willing to adopt a framework that was largely shaped by Western nations. Now it’s changing， of course. Emerging countries and China first among them are having a bigger impact on these global institutions.
There is a widespread feeling， however， that it’s a fairly different logic in the minds of these Chinese leaders. So they are basically separating economic integration from geopolitical， or at least， regional thinking. Now obviously if you play through certain escalation or even conflicts， that would establish a link between all these different barriers. And we see that， for example， in the case of Russia and Ukraine， geopolitical confrontation can lead to reversals in the economic area， but fortunately， China has not so far come near the point where you would have this sort of overlap.
The Eurozone crisis has deeply diminished many normal Chinese people’s views about Europe as a global economic and political actor. Is it possible to reverse this decline in perception of the continent， or is it doomed to second-tier status？
The euro crisis has been very difficult for Europe， and Europe has lost wealth and influence in this crisis. So there is no denying this. Having said that， I think my impression when I’m in Asia， and its not just in China， is that perhaps the number of observers in Asia have overreacted and perceive Europe as even weaker than it really is. So I think it’s important to really monitor what is happening in Europe， even if it’s very complicated， and often very boring. To be blunt， two years ago， the overwhelming consensus in Asia was that Greece would leave the Eurozone， and possibly the Eurozone would break up， and this hasn’t happened. So there is often an underestimation of those strengths that still exist
both from an economic and political perspective. So maybe there is a bias perceiving Europe as less cohesive and decisive， and less able to make joint decisions than the reality.
London， Frankfurt and Luxembourg are all establishing renminbiclearing hubs in Europe. How does this play into the internationalization of the renminbi？
Financial centers， which deal with the renminbi transactions， will perhaps have a big influence on the pace of the yuan’s liberalization. But the most important factor remains the thinking within the Chinese government； at this point I think we’re still far from a true internationalization of the renminbi for financial transactions. Of course there’s a lot that has been already completed for trade transactions， but that’s a different thing.