论文部分内容阅读
本文运用信息经济学理论来解释和分析在公务员考录过程中存在的信息不对称问题,如逆向选择、道德风险和“学历高消费”等。针对这些信息不对称问题,本文提出:保证政府部门能经济、有效地吸收录用广大社会优秀人才,一方面,要在职位分类的基础上,建立分类分级考试制度和实行专业技术岗位聘任制以克服逆向选择问题;另一方面,设计合理有效的考试录用机制,大力加强政府部门的信息化工作,扩大考任制实施范围等以减少道德风险和“学历高消费”的问题。
In this paper, we use the theory of information economics to explain and analyze the information asymmetry existing in civil servant examination process, such as adverse selection, moral hazard and “high education”. In view of the problem of asymmetric information, this paper puts forward: to ensure that government departments can economically and effectively absorb and employ talented people in the society. On the one hand, based on the classification of posts, the system of classification and grading examination should be established and the appointment system of professional and technical posts should be established to overcome On the other hand, we should design a reasonable and effective exam recruitment mechanism, vigorously strengthen the informatization of government departments, and expand the scope of examination system to reduce the moral hazard and the problem of “higher education qualifications”.