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基于投资项目代理人的立场,将环境不确定性和代理问题结合起来,研究它们对资本预算方法和资本预算方案选择的影响。根据实验数据统计分析发现:不确定性和代理问题对资本预算有显著影响,对于资本预算方法,在不确定性较强的情况下,选择实物期权与其他方法相结合的方式所占比例明显较高;在代理问题较为严重的情况下,项目代理人更多地会选择折现的现金流量法而不是经济增加值的方法;对于资本预算方案,代理人会从自身利益出发产生卸责行为。
Based on the investment project agent’s position, we combine environmental uncertainty with agency issues to study their impact on the choice of capital and capital budgeting options. According to the statistical analysis of experimental data, it is found that uncertainty and agency problems have a significant impact on capital budgeting. For the capital budgeting method, the ratio of choosing real options to other methods is significantly higher when the uncertainty is stronger In the case of more serious agency problems, project agents will choose discounted cash flow method instead of economic value added method. For the capital budget proposal, the agent will create a responsibility for its own interests.