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本文以我国上市公司为研究样本,考察了因金字塔控股结构所造成的控制权与现金流量权之间的分离以及最终控制者性质对我国上市公司盈余操纵程度及其方向的影响。研究结果表明,由金字塔股权结构引发的两权分离加剧了上市公司盈余操纵行为,并且这种现象在非国有上市公司中表现得更为突出。进一步的研究还表明,在棘轮效应和预算软约束作用下,两权分离程度及其最终控制者性质对上市公司盈余操纵的方向也具有显著的影响。
This paper takes the listed companies in our country as the research sample and examines the influence of the control and cash flow rights caused by the pyramid holding structure and the nature of the ultimate controller on the degree of earnings manipulation and the direction of the listed companies in our country. The result of the research shows that the separation of the two rights triggered by the pyramid ownership structure aggravates the behavior of earnings manipulation of listed companies, and this phenomenon is more prominent in non-state-owned listed companies. Further research also shows that under the effect of ratcheting effect and budget soft constraint, the degree of separation of ownership and the nature of ultimate controller also have a significant effect on the direction of earnings manipulation of listed companies.