鲁宾逊在最近哲学季刊上的一篇文章中认为，在休漠《人性论》一书中关于因果关系的两种定义并不是定义，而是一种根据经验的心理学论述即已经被确定的内容的定义。他的这个命题我不能接受，尽管他的那些次要的论题即（a）详细阐明了休漠所谓的“哲学关系”和“自然关系”，（） In an article in the recent Philosophical Quarterly, Robinson argues that the two definitions of causality in Hume’s book Human Nature are not definitions, but rather that a psychologically based discourse of experience has been established Definition of content. I can not accept his proposition, though his subordinate topics (a) elaborate on Hume’s so-called “philosophical relations” and “natural relations.”