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为弥补传统研究忽略高管激励影响审计定价的不足,本文通过选取2011年至2015年深沪两市A股上市公司7370个研究样本,实证检验了高管薪酬激励与股权激励对审计定价的影响。研究发现:高管薪酬激励增加会显著提升审计定价;高管股权激励会显著降低审计定价;与国有企业相比,高管薪酬激励与股权激励对审计定价的影响在非国有上市公司中更加显著。
In order to make up for the shortcomings of traditional research neglecting senior executive incentives to influence audit pricing, this paper tests 7370 research samples of A-share listed companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai from 2011 to 2015 and tests empirically the impact of executive compensation incentive and equity incentive on audit pricing . The results show that: the increase of executive compensation incentives will significantly improve the audit pricing; executive incentive stock will significantly reduce the audit pricing; compared with state-owned enterprises, the impact of executive compensation incentives and equity incentives on audit pricing is more significant in non-state-owned listed companies .