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动态变化的竞争格局为银行债权人从对企业技术创新厌恶到创新包容提供了充分的演化动力。本文在分析银行债权治理对企业技术创新能力影响的基础上,探索了制度效应和资源效应在二者关系中的中介作用,进而辨析了银行债权治理的创新效应的产生机理。实证研究表明:银行债权治理对企业技术创新能力具有显著促进作用,银行债权人已由创新厌恶向创新包容演化;银行债权治理能够通过降低代理成本,优化企业原始制度安排的方式提升企业技术创新能力,即制度效应在二者关系中具有显著中介作用;银行债权治理并不能通过提升创新资源投入的方式促进企业创新,即资源效应的中介作用不显著。因此,“债权治理——制度效应——技术创新”的作用路径对创新包容效应更具理论解释力。研究结论能够从技术创新的角度对融资优序理论和银行代理监督理论进行回应和补充,并为企业创新和银行债权治理实践提供科学依据。
The dynamic pattern of competition provides a sufficient evolutionary impetus for bank creditors to dislike technology innovation and embrace innovation. Based on the analysis of the impact of bank debt governance on the technological innovation capability of enterprises, this paper explores the intermediary role of institutional and resource effects in the relationship between the two, and then analyzes the mechanism of the bankruptcy’s innovation effect. Empirical research shows that bank debt governance can significantly promote the technological innovation capability of enterprises, bank creditors have evolved from innovation aversion to innovation inclusion, and bank debt governance can enhance the technological innovation capability of enterprises by reducing agency costs and optimizing the original institutional arrangements of enterprises, That is, the institutional effect has a significant intermediary role in the relationship between the two; bank creditor’s rights governance can not promote enterprise innovation through enhancing the input of innovative resources, ie, the intermediary role of resource effect is not significant. Therefore, the path of “debt governance - institutional effect - technological innovation” is more theoretical explanation for the effect of innovation containment. The conclusions of the study can respond and supplement the theory of financing priority and bank supervision theory from the perspective of technological innovation, and provide a scientific basis for enterprise innovation and bank debt management practice.