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本文尝试以博弈论作为分析工具,在有限理性的假设下构建电力企业内部购买部门、设备供应商和监管部门的三方博弈模型,采用演化博弈方法分析电力企业在采购中监管部门、购买部门以及设备供应商的行为选择,找出影响博弈双方行为策略选择的变量。分析结果表明,当监管部门稽查成功比例p较大,经过多次博弈,监管部门会选择稽查行为,购买部门和设备供应商会选择寻租行为。当监管部门稽查成功比例p较小,多次博弈后,监管部门会放弃稽查,购买部门和设备供应商仍会选择寻租行为。最后,本文对一个具体的电力企业进行了算例分析。
This paper attempts to use game theory as an analytical tool to build a three-way game model within the purchasing department, equipment suppliers and regulatory authorities of electric power enterprises under the assumption of bounded rationality. Using evolutionary game method to analyze the power companies in the procurement regulatory agencies, purchasing departments and equipment Supplier’s choice of behavior to find variables that affect the choice of behavior strategy for both players in the game. The result of the analysis shows that when the percentage of successful audit of supervision department is large, after many games, the supervision department will choose the audit behavior, and the purchasing department and equipment supplier will choose rent-seeking behavior. When the regulatory success rate of inspection p small, many games, the regulators will give up the inspection, the purchasing department and equipment suppliers will still choose to rent-seeking behavior. Finally, this paper carries out an example analysis of a specific power company.