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1935年1月召开的遵义会议,纠正了博古、李德在军事战略上的错误。此后,毛泽东实际上开始领导和指挥中央红军。这时的中央红军,实力只剩下3万余人,士气严重低落。而这时的敌情,则远比此前的长征初期严重得多。一是蒋介石亲自坐镇重庆和贵阳督战。二是蒋介石调动中央军和湖南、四川、贵州、云南地方军,组成40万重兵,企图将中央红军聚歼于贵州境内。三是蒋介石拥有国家战争资源,可以保障他的“追剿”军以逸待劳。这种严重的不对称形势,容不得中央红军走错一步。四渡赤水是典型的运动战,情报对敌我双方尤为重要。这时,国民党军的情报获取手段,主要的是
The Zunyi Meeting held in January 1935 corrected Bogut and Li De’s mistakes in military strategy. Since then, Mao actually started to lead and direct the Central Red Army. At this time, the Central Red Army left with only a mere strength of more than 30,000 and a very low morale. At this time, the enemy’s situation is far more serious than the earlier Long March. First, Chiang Kai-shek personally ruled in charge of Chongqing and Guiyang. Second, Chiang Kai-shek mobilized the Central Military Army and the local armed forces of Hunan, Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan to form 400,000 heavy armies and attempted to gather the Central Red Army in Guizhou. Third, Chiang Kai-shek has the resources of the national war and can guarantee his “chase ” army to wait for labor. Such a serious asymmetry can not allow the Central Red Army to go a wrong way. Siduchishui is a typical battlefield, intelligence is particularly important to both the enemy and ourselves. At this time, the KMT’s means of intelligence acquisition, mainly