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当前我国储户存贷业务的竞争可近似看成是互联网金融模式和传统银行业模式的双寡头垄断市场格局,而对此进行定量系统性学术探讨的既有研究并不多见。本文构建了一个差异性的Hotelling模型,分三阶段博弈过程定量剖析了这两种模式的差异性及其主要影响因素。研究结果表明:在互联网金融模式初始进入阶段,其通过制定足够的低价以规避传统银行业模式高服务成本的软肋抢占市场份额;在互联网金融模式崛起后的竞争阶段,其致力于用户电子支付粘性的培育以稳固市场份额,传统银行业模式则通过设置高转移成本障碍以应对;在互联网金融模式和传统银行业模式的共赢阶段,其分别选择成本导向型和质量导向型的服务创新战略进行差异化竞争。这对进一步深化和革新金融市场秩序,提出具体建设性的监管举措具有与时俱进的实践指导价值。
At present, the competition of depositors’ depositors in our country can be regarded as the duopoly market pattern of Internet finance model and traditional banking model. However, there are few studies on quantitative and systematic academic discussion on this issue. In this paper, a different Hotelling model is constructed, and the three-stage game process is used to quantitatively analyze the differences between the two models and their main influencing factors. The results show that: in the initial stage of the Internet financial mode, it establishes the low enough price to avoid the high service cost of the traditional banking model, and seizes the market share. At the competitive stage after the rise of the Internet financial model, it devotes itself to the electronic payment Sticky to stabilize the market share of the market, the traditional banking model by setting high barriers to transfer costs to deal with; in the Internet finance model and the traditional banking model win-win phase, respectively, cost-oriented and quality-oriented service innovation strategy Differentiate competition. This is of practical guiding value for further advancing and innovating the order of the financial market and putting forward concrete and constructive regulatory measures with keeping pace with the times.