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文章考察了在电信业“全业务竞争”的背景下,规制机构采取限制强势厂商实施捆绑策略这种非对称规制措施的效果。结果发现,当宽带(固话)市场为垄断结构时,不仅能够扶持弱势厂商,而且消费者剩余与社会福利都增加;当宽带(固话)市场为双寡头竞争时,虽然能够扶持弱势厂商,并且提高社会福利,但是消费者剩余下降,并且在短期内,弱势厂商在移动通信市场的份额甚至会下降。
The article examines the effect of regulatory agencies adopting asymmetric regulatory measures that limit the implementation of bundling strategies by strong firms in the context of telecom industry “full business competition.” The results show that when the broadband (fixed-line) market is a monopoly, it can not only support disadvantaged firms but also increase consumer surplus and social welfare. When the broadband (fixed-line) market is dominated by duopoly competition, Increase social welfare, but consumer surplus drops, and in the short term, the share of the weaker vendors in the mobile communications market will even decline.