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HISTORICAL records indisput- ably prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Chinese territory. The archipelago is first mentioned in the book Voyage with a Tail Wind published in 1403, the first year of the reign of Ming Dynasty Emperor Yongle, which refers to the “Diaoyu Islets.” Chinese historical records and maps thereafter, such as the book The Mission to Ryukyu of 1534 (the 13th year of the reign of Ming Emperor Jiajing), by Chen Kan, an imperial title-conferring envoy, and An Illustrated Compendium on Maritime Security (Chou Hai Tu Bian), compiled by Zheng Ruozeng under the auspices of Hu Zongxian, the supreme commander of the southeast coastal defense of the Ming court, make similar mention of the Diaoyu Islets. The claim that the Diaoyu Islands are “terra nullius,” therefore, is totally untenable, and Japan’s purchase of the Diaoyu Islands is hence illegal.
The Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan as part of Formosa (Taiwan) Island under the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. Japan occupied the Diaoyu Islands until 1945, upon its announcement of unconditional surrender at the end of World War II.
In December of 1943, leaders of the U.S., the U.K. and China co-issued the Cairo Declaration, which stipulated, “All territories Japan stole from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” In 1945, the U.S., the U.K. and China issued the Potsdam Proclamation. Article Eight states: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” On August 15 of 1945, Japan accepted all of the demands contained in the Potsdam Proclamation and announced its unconditional surrender, so signifying unconditional relinquishment of its rule of Taiwan and nearby islands, including the Diaoyu Islands. The Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration are international documents acknowledged and accepted by Japan. China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, therefore, is unquestionable.
On September 8 of 1951, Japan, the U.S. and certain other countries signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. Victorious nations such as China and the USSR, however, were not signatories to the document. The treaty placed Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees North Latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) under the trusteeship of the U.S. On December 25 of 1953, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands issued Proclamation No. 27 defining the geographical boundary lines of the Ryukyu Islands to include the islands, islets, atolls, and rocks in the area bounded by the coordinates of 24 degrees North Latitude and 122 degrees East Longitude. The area stipulated in the proclamation included the Chinese territory of the Diaoyu Islands. On June 17 of 1971, Japan and the U.S. signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, which provided that all powers of administration over the Ryukyu Islands, including the Diaoyu Islands, should revert to Japan. The Japanese government now cites backroom deals as basis for its claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, a move that infringes the Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration. Japan thus not only openly refutes historical facts, jurisprudential evidence and the fruits of the antifascist war, but also directly challenges post-World-War-II order.
Reasons for Japan’s Provocations over the Diaoyu Islands
During negotiations on normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations in 1972 and upon signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, the then leaders of the two countries, acting in the overall interests of ChinaJapan relations, reached an important understanding and consensus with respect to “leaving the issue of the Diaoyu Islands to be resolved later.” This opened the door to normalization of China-Japan relations, resulting in tremendous progress in China-Japan relations as well as stability and tranquility in East Asia over the ensuing 40 years. Although Japan has repeatedly denied this consensus since the second half of the 1990s, for various internal and external reasons, highranking Japanese officials, including Japanese foreign ministers, have stated that restraint should be exercised on the Diaoyu Islands issue for reasons of the overall interests of China-Japan relations. In 1992, then Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi indirectly acknowledged the consensus on shelving these disputes when China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. It is thus clear that the Japanese government also agreed at that time that the Diaoyu Islands disputes should not affect China-Japan relations, and that Japan acknowledged that the disputes should be shelved.
The Chinese government has always emphasized its stance of “grasping sovereignty, shelving disputes and co-exploiting the resources of the Diaoyu Islands.” On the basis that China has sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, China would like to achieve a win-win situation through codevelopment and shelving disputes. The Japanese government, however, in spite of agreeing to shelve the disputes, has nonetheless insisted on various occasions, such as in parliament, that the Diaoyu Islands are inherent territory of Japan and Japan has no plans to talk with other countries since there are no disputes on this issue. Japan has remained inactive in co-exploiting the resources of the islands– an attitude that foreshadowed the status quo.
On September 11 of 2012, the Japanese government signed a purchase contract on the Diaoyu Islands with their so-called“private owners” and officially nationalized them. It claimed that Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s proposed purchase of the Diaoyu Islands would have a destabilizing effect and that nationalizing the islands is in the interests of their peaceful and stable management. The real reason, however, is that the Japanese government has made nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands a national policy.
In 2007, the Japanese government promulgated the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, and meanwhile declared its basic principles on security governance of offshore islands in a bid to strengthen its ocean management. The Japanese government regarded tightening its governance of offshore islands as points of reference for an exclusive economic zone as vital.“Nationalization” of the islands was an important step in its policy. In 2011, Japan nationalized 23 offshore islands that did not include the Diaoyu Islands. The recent “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands was hence triggered not by Shintaro Ishihara’s plan to purchase them, but according to the Japanese government’s guiding policy on the Islands. The farce played out by Shintaro provided the government with an excuse to act on its ulterior motives.
Japan’s aim in nationalizing the Diaoyu Islands, even at the expense of provoking disputes, is to strengthen its control over them. These audacious moves can be analyzed from the following perspectives.
First, when disputes about the Diaoyu Islands arose in the 1970s, Japan’s actual measures were aimed at curbing their escalation. While taking a passive attitude to further negotiations on the Islands, Japan had acquiesced to China’s stand of “shelving disputes” because, having had actual control of the Diaoyu Islands, Japan believed this stance would be beneficial to its continuing control of them. Upon, however, Japan’s ratifying of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea– the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf requiring all member countries to submit data about their territorial waters – Japan’s ambitions to expand its territorial waters grew. Japan’s cabinet subsequently passed the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, delimiting an exclusive economic zone several times its actual territorial area. The Diaoyu Islands have, of course, been taken as a point of reference for its expansion of territorial waters.
Second, Japan’s current political landscape has given it another motive for such provocations. Self-interest clearly played a main role in driving Japan’s senior-generation politicians into reaching consensus on “shelving disputes”with China. They did, however, understand the value of the overall interests of China-Japan relations, and did not display strong nationalistic sentiments. This provided a good environment for the stable development of China-Japan relations and China’s economic development. The collapse of Japan’s bubble economy, however, has exacerbated Japan’s current political tendency. Unable to pinpoint an effective solution to their economic problems and hence to gain the people’s support, Japan’s politicians have become disposed towards a populist stance calculated to win over the public by arousing their nationalism. Their vision on China-Japan relations has consequently narrowed. Seiji Maehara and Noda Yoshihiko are representatives of this political tendency by virtue of their respective behaviors in the 2010 boat collision accident in China’s territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands and the recent “nationalization” farce.
Finally, the U.S. stance also partly accounts for Japan’s radical actions. Japan’s political line on China has always matched the American attitude in this regard. Consequently when the U.S. takes an opposing stand on issues concerning China, Japan often displays a more radical tendency, and at times when the U.S. tries to ameliorate relations with China, Japan inhibits its antagonism. Japan’s tough attitude with respect to the Diaoyu Islands hence has much to do with the U.S. strategy of returning to the AsiaPacific. As the U.S. wades into affairs in the South China Sea, Japan has taken the chance to get closer to the Philippines and Vietnam and also constantly requests the U.S. to put the Diaoyu Islands within the protection area of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States in an attempt to strengthen its control of the Diaoyu Islands through American clout. In spite of its non-committal attitude on jurisdiction of the Islands, the U.S. has confirmed that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States covers the Diaoyu Islands, thus acting as a shield for Japan’s untrammeled behaviors.
Japan’s Actions Crucial to the Future of China-Japan Relations
Both China and Japan are clearly aware that issues concerning Taiwan, history and territory constitute a tinderbox with respect to bilateral relations. Japan’s recent provocations have intensified the sensitive nature of the Diaoyu Islands issue and had immensely negative impact on bilateral ties. Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng remarked at the symposium on Diaoyu Islands on September 14 that Japan’s “purchase” of the islands is a result of the changing political climate in Japan. “There is a sinister tendency inside Japan that is taking Japan and ChinaJapan relations down an extremely dangerous road,” Le said. He clearly analyzed in his comments the negative impact of Japan’s audacious “nationalization” on China-Japan relations.
Last September marked the 40th anniversary of normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations – an apt opportunity for the two sides to celebrate the event with a show of amity. Japan’s unilateral actions, however, have soured this great event and also greatly undermined the fragile foundation of mutual trust between the two sides.
Meanwhile, nationwide anti-Japan protests have erupted. China’s populace cherishes good will within this bilateral relationship. The Chinese people have no innate dislike of Japan, but rather of the unconscionable attitudes and actions of the Japanese government and its rightwing radicals. A 2012 survey of Chinese public opinion on Japan shows that the two main sources of Chinese people’s negative feelings about Japan are Japan’s stand on historical issues and its seizure of China’s Diaoyu Islands. If Japan continues to ignore Chinese people’s rights and fail to make any effort to ameliorate these bilateral ties, it will become very hard for it to win over the Chinese people and repair bilateral relations.
As Premier Wen Jiabao stated in a lecture at the China Foreign Affairs University on September 10, “On issues concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese government will make no concession.” If Japan continues to cling obstinately to its unlawful actions, the inevitable result will be a major reversal in bilateral relations that will also deal a serious blow to Japan’s interests.
The Diaoyu Islands were ceded to Japan as part of Formosa (Taiwan) Island under the unequal Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895. Japan occupied the Diaoyu Islands until 1945, upon its announcement of unconditional surrender at the end of World War II.
In December of 1943, leaders of the U.S., the U.K. and China co-issued the Cairo Declaration, which stipulated, “All territories Japan stole from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” In 1945, the U.S., the U.K. and China issued the Potsdam Proclamation. Article Eight states: “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the Islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.” On August 15 of 1945, Japan accepted all of the demands contained in the Potsdam Proclamation and announced its unconditional surrender, so signifying unconditional relinquishment of its rule of Taiwan and nearby islands, including the Diaoyu Islands. The Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration are international documents acknowledged and accepted by Japan. China’s sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, therefore, is unquestionable.
On September 8 of 1951, Japan, the U.S. and certain other countries signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco. Victorious nations such as China and the USSR, however, were not signatories to the document. The treaty placed Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees North Latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands) under the trusteeship of the U.S. On December 25 of 1953, the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands issued Proclamation No. 27 defining the geographical boundary lines of the Ryukyu Islands to include the islands, islets, atolls, and rocks in the area bounded by the coordinates of 24 degrees North Latitude and 122 degrees East Longitude. The area stipulated in the proclamation included the Chinese territory of the Diaoyu Islands. On June 17 of 1971, Japan and the U.S. signed the Okinawa Reversion Agreement, which provided that all powers of administration over the Ryukyu Islands, including the Diaoyu Islands, should revert to Japan. The Japanese government now cites backroom deals as basis for its claim of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, a move that infringes the Potsdam Proclamation and the Cairo Declaration. Japan thus not only openly refutes historical facts, jurisprudential evidence and the fruits of the antifascist war, but also directly challenges post-World-War-II order.
Reasons for Japan’s Provocations over the Diaoyu Islands
During negotiations on normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations in 1972 and upon signing the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978, the then leaders of the two countries, acting in the overall interests of ChinaJapan relations, reached an important understanding and consensus with respect to “leaving the issue of the Diaoyu Islands to be resolved later.” This opened the door to normalization of China-Japan relations, resulting in tremendous progress in China-Japan relations as well as stability and tranquility in East Asia over the ensuing 40 years. Although Japan has repeatedly denied this consensus since the second half of the 1990s, for various internal and external reasons, highranking Japanese officials, including Japanese foreign ministers, have stated that restraint should be exercised on the Diaoyu Islands issue for reasons of the overall interests of China-Japan relations. In 1992, then Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi indirectly acknowledged the consensus on shelving these disputes when China’s National People’s Congress passed the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. It is thus clear that the Japanese government also agreed at that time that the Diaoyu Islands disputes should not affect China-Japan relations, and that Japan acknowledged that the disputes should be shelved.
The Chinese government has always emphasized its stance of “grasping sovereignty, shelving disputes and co-exploiting the resources of the Diaoyu Islands.” On the basis that China has sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands, China would like to achieve a win-win situation through codevelopment and shelving disputes. The Japanese government, however, in spite of agreeing to shelve the disputes, has nonetheless insisted on various occasions, such as in parliament, that the Diaoyu Islands are inherent territory of Japan and Japan has no plans to talk with other countries since there are no disputes on this issue. Japan has remained inactive in co-exploiting the resources of the islands– an attitude that foreshadowed the status quo.
On September 11 of 2012, the Japanese government signed a purchase contract on the Diaoyu Islands with their so-called“private owners” and officially nationalized them. It claimed that Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara’s proposed purchase of the Diaoyu Islands would have a destabilizing effect and that nationalizing the islands is in the interests of their peaceful and stable management. The real reason, however, is that the Japanese government has made nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands a national policy.
In 2007, the Japanese government promulgated the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, and meanwhile declared its basic principles on security governance of offshore islands in a bid to strengthen its ocean management. The Japanese government regarded tightening its governance of offshore islands as points of reference for an exclusive economic zone as vital.“Nationalization” of the islands was an important step in its policy. In 2011, Japan nationalized 23 offshore islands that did not include the Diaoyu Islands. The recent “nationalization” of the Diaoyu Islands was hence triggered not by Shintaro Ishihara’s plan to purchase them, but according to the Japanese government’s guiding policy on the Islands. The farce played out by Shintaro provided the government with an excuse to act on its ulterior motives.
Japan’s aim in nationalizing the Diaoyu Islands, even at the expense of provoking disputes, is to strengthen its control over them. These audacious moves can be analyzed from the following perspectives.
First, when disputes about the Diaoyu Islands arose in the 1970s, Japan’s actual measures were aimed at curbing their escalation. While taking a passive attitude to further negotiations on the Islands, Japan had acquiesced to China’s stand of “shelving disputes” because, having had actual control of the Diaoyu Islands, Japan believed this stance would be beneficial to its continuing control of them. Upon, however, Japan’s ratifying of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea– the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf requiring all member countries to submit data about their territorial waters – Japan’s ambitions to expand its territorial waters grew. Japan’s cabinet subsequently passed the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, delimiting an exclusive economic zone several times its actual territorial area. The Diaoyu Islands have, of course, been taken as a point of reference for its expansion of territorial waters.
Second, Japan’s current political landscape has given it another motive for such provocations. Self-interest clearly played a main role in driving Japan’s senior-generation politicians into reaching consensus on “shelving disputes”with China. They did, however, understand the value of the overall interests of China-Japan relations, and did not display strong nationalistic sentiments. This provided a good environment for the stable development of China-Japan relations and China’s economic development. The collapse of Japan’s bubble economy, however, has exacerbated Japan’s current political tendency. Unable to pinpoint an effective solution to their economic problems and hence to gain the people’s support, Japan’s politicians have become disposed towards a populist stance calculated to win over the public by arousing their nationalism. Their vision on China-Japan relations has consequently narrowed. Seiji Maehara and Noda Yoshihiko are representatives of this political tendency by virtue of their respective behaviors in the 2010 boat collision accident in China’s territorial waters around the Diaoyu Islands and the recent “nationalization” farce.
Finally, the U.S. stance also partly accounts for Japan’s radical actions. Japan’s political line on China has always matched the American attitude in this regard. Consequently when the U.S. takes an opposing stand on issues concerning China, Japan often displays a more radical tendency, and at times when the U.S. tries to ameliorate relations with China, Japan inhibits its antagonism. Japan’s tough attitude with respect to the Diaoyu Islands hence has much to do with the U.S. strategy of returning to the AsiaPacific. As the U.S. wades into affairs in the South China Sea, Japan has taken the chance to get closer to the Philippines and Vietnam and also constantly requests the U.S. to put the Diaoyu Islands within the protection area of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States in an attempt to strengthen its control of the Diaoyu Islands through American clout. In spite of its non-committal attitude on jurisdiction of the Islands, the U.S. has confirmed that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States covers the Diaoyu Islands, thus acting as a shield for Japan’s untrammeled behaviors.
Japan’s Actions Crucial to the Future of China-Japan Relations
Both China and Japan are clearly aware that issues concerning Taiwan, history and territory constitute a tinderbox with respect to bilateral relations. Japan’s recent provocations have intensified the sensitive nature of the Diaoyu Islands issue and had immensely negative impact on bilateral ties. Assistant Foreign Minister Le Yucheng remarked at the symposium on Diaoyu Islands on September 14 that Japan’s “purchase” of the islands is a result of the changing political climate in Japan. “There is a sinister tendency inside Japan that is taking Japan and ChinaJapan relations down an extremely dangerous road,” Le said. He clearly analyzed in his comments the negative impact of Japan’s audacious “nationalization” on China-Japan relations.
Last September marked the 40th anniversary of normalization of China-Japan diplomatic relations – an apt opportunity for the two sides to celebrate the event with a show of amity. Japan’s unilateral actions, however, have soured this great event and also greatly undermined the fragile foundation of mutual trust between the two sides.
Meanwhile, nationwide anti-Japan protests have erupted. China’s populace cherishes good will within this bilateral relationship. The Chinese people have no innate dislike of Japan, but rather of the unconscionable attitudes and actions of the Japanese government and its rightwing radicals. A 2012 survey of Chinese public opinion on Japan shows that the two main sources of Chinese people’s negative feelings about Japan are Japan’s stand on historical issues and its seizure of China’s Diaoyu Islands. If Japan continues to ignore Chinese people’s rights and fail to make any effort to ameliorate these bilateral ties, it will become very hard for it to win over the Chinese people and repair bilateral relations.
As Premier Wen Jiabao stated in a lecture at the China Foreign Affairs University on September 10, “On issues concerning its sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese government will make no concession.” If Japan continues to cling obstinately to its unlawful actions, the inevitable result will be a major reversal in bilateral relations that will also deal a serious blow to Japan’s interests.