论文部分内容阅读
Israel is struggling between being a Jewish state and having a democracy that gives its non-Jewish citizens an equal sense of belonging. To solve this structural tension Professor Agassi has suggested adapting the American model of liberal nationalism for Israel. However, the majority of Jewish Israelis are not ready to have a serious critical discussion on Agassi’s proposal. The paper proposes to add to the discussion on liberal nationalism for Israel the Israeli-Palestinian struggle. It introduces the idea of establishing a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress. This peacemaking institution can indirectly operate as a state building instrument. It has the potential to provoke a public debate in Israel about the very essence of national identity and provide a different framework for the discussion. The paper includes theoretical background, a critical comparison between the Israeli and the American cases, a suggestion to establish a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress, and lessons from the Minds of Peace Experiment—a simulation of an IsraeliPalestinian public negotiating congress.
C. The Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE) and National Identity
Interestingly, a major part of the experiments started with a demand for mutual recognition. To address the needs of both sides, a basic principle was formulated by the two delegations in various rounds: “Israelis and Palestinians have the right to live in peace, security, dignity and the mutual recognition of both sovereign states.”51Indeed, it is a liberal nationalistic statement. However, controversy began when the two delegations started to negotiate the details. In the Israeli side—the dispute was about the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. In the Palestinian side—the dispute was centered on the political division between the leadership of Gaza and the West Bank (the Hamas-Fatah conflict) which created a split in Palestinian society.
At the first rounds of the MOPE, the Israelis refused to discuss almost any issue that was connected to the Palestinian citizens of Israel (Arab Israelis). Any Palestinian demand which was connected to this topic was answered by the Israelis that it was an internal problem of the democratic state of Israel. However, a major event in the stage of professional politics led this to change. In a speech at Bar-Ilan University in 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, demanded from the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.52 Since then, a similar demand is raised by Israelis in almost every round of the MOPE.
The Israelis started demanding from the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. The usual Palestinian response is that they could not do so because of Israel’s non Jewish citizens. Moreover, the Palestinians frequently responded with a question: “Will you recognize the new Palestinian state as an Islamic state?”
The Israelis tried to explain the Palestinians that Jewish means much more than a mere religion. However, the issue was discovered as controversial among the Israelis and not completely clear to them.53 The result was that the controversial question about the exact meaning of the notion “Jewish state” remained open. And in the end of the day, the Israelis dropped their demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.54
Israel is struggling between maintaining the Jewish character of the country and better integrating its non-Jewish citizens. Although, the nonJewish citizens of Israel enjoy democratic rights, they still live in a Jewish state. The practical meaning is that they cannot feel at home in Israel, at least not like the Jewish citizens of the country. This tension endangers the internal stability of Israel in the short and long run.56
To cope with the problem, Professor Agassi has suggested a modified version of the American model of liberal nationalism for Israel. According to Agassi, Israel should be transformed, in a critical process, from a Jewish state to an Israeli state. However, the Jewish majority of Israel believes that maintaining their particularistic attachment—Israel as a Jewish state—is a matter of survival. Therefore, Agassi’s radical proposal does not have much chance to be accepted by the Israelis in the current situation.
To bypass Agassi’s dead end, the author has suggested to raise the issue indirectly and to examine it in light of the broader picture. The author added to the discussion upon the status of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel, the relationships between Israelis and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank (many of whom are relatives of the Palestinian-Israelis). The author introduced the idea of establishing a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress as a mechanism to involve the community in
peacemaking efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As with the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland and South Africa, the various rounds of the Minds of Peace Experiments have shown that this peacemaking institution has the potential to provoke a public debate on central issues that are considered taboo. However, provoking a public debate on the meaning of a “democratic Jewish state” is only the beginning.
The fate of Israelis and Palestinians in the territories is intertwined. This connection encompasses almost every aspect of both Israeli and Palestinian social life: geographically, economically, politically and, even, emotionally.57 Despite the fact that the “two state solution”—which means political and legal divorce—is the consensus solution, complete separation is impossible. The two societies will need a political mechanism to solve future disputes and coordinate joint activities. The public negotiating congress can be transformed from a peacemaking institution to a peace keeping institution after a peace agreement is achieved. It will demand from both societies to be engaged in some kind of federal (or confederal) arrangement, which will have to determine the status and mandate of the congress.58 This transformation has the potential to change the meaning of one’s national identity and deepen the sense of belonging for all citizens.59
No doubt that this is a long process that looks like a dream at this stage. However, a vision, political program and practical moves in the field are necessary to begin a constructive change making process. This is the philosophy behind the Minds of Peace Experiment.
C. The Minds of Peace Experiment (MOPE) and National Identity
Interestingly, a major part of the experiments started with a demand for mutual recognition. To address the needs of both sides, a basic principle was formulated by the two delegations in various rounds: “Israelis and Palestinians have the right to live in peace, security, dignity and the mutual recognition of both sovereign states.”51Indeed, it is a liberal nationalistic statement. However, controversy began when the two delegations started to negotiate the details. In the Israeli side—the dispute was about the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state. In the Palestinian side—the dispute was centered on the political division between the leadership of Gaza and the West Bank (the Hamas-Fatah conflict) which created a split in Palestinian society.
At the first rounds of the MOPE, the Israelis refused to discuss almost any issue that was connected to the Palestinian citizens of Israel (Arab Israelis). Any Palestinian demand which was connected to this topic was answered by the Israelis that it was an internal problem of the democratic state of Israel. However, a major event in the stage of professional politics led this to change. In a speech at Bar-Ilan University in 2009, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister of Israel, demanded from the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state.52 Since then, a similar demand is raised by Israelis in almost every round of the MOPE.
The Israelis started demanding from the Palestinians to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. The usual Palestinian response is that they could not do so because of Israel’s non Jewish citizens. Moreover, the Palestinians frequently responded with a question: “Will you recognize the new Palestinian state as an Islamic state?”
The Israelis tried to explain the Palestinians that Jewish means much more than a mere religion. However, the issue was discovered as controversial among the Israelis and not completely clear to them.53 The result was that the controversial question about the exact meaning of the notion “Jewish state” remained open. And in the end of the day, the Israelis dropped their demand for recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.54
Israel is struggling between maintaining the Jewish character of the country and better integrating its non-Jewish citizens. Although, the nonJewish citizens of Israel enjoy democratic rights, they still live in a Jewish state. The practical meaning is that they cannot feel at home in Israel, at least not like the Jewish citizens of the country. This tension endangers the internal stability of Israel in the short and long run.56
To cope with the problem, Professor Agassi has suggested a modified version of the American model of liberal nationalism for Israel. According to Agassi, Israel should be transformed, in a critical process, from a Jewish state to an Israeli state. However, the Jewish majority of Israel believes that maintaining their particularistic attachment—Israel as a Jewish state—is a matter of survival. Therefore, Agassi’s radical proposal does not have much chance to be accepted by the Israelis in the current situation.
To bypass Agassi’s dead end, the author has suggested to raise the issue indirectly and to examine it in light of the broader picture. The author added to the discussion upon the status of the non-Jewish citizens of Israel, the relationships between Israelis and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank (many of whom are relatives of the Palestinian-Israelis). The author introduced the idea of establishing a major Israeli-Palestinian public negotiating congress as a mechanism to involve the community in
peacemaking efforts to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As with the multi-party talks in Northern Ireland and South Africa, the various rounds of the Minds of Peace Experiments have shown that this peacemaking institution has the potential to provoke a public debate on central issues that are considered taboo. However, provoking a public debate on the meaning of a “democratic Jewish state” is only the beginning.
The fate of Israelis and Palestinians in the territories is intertwined. This connection encompasses almost every aspect of both Israeli and Palestinian social life: geographically, economically, politically and, even, emotionally.57 Despite the fact that the “two state solution”—which means political and legal divorce—is the consensus solution, complete separation is impossible. The two societies will need a political mechanism to solve future disputes and coordinate joint activities. The public negotiating congress can be transformed from a peacemaking institution to a peace keeping institution after a peace agreement is achieved. It will demand from both societies to be engaged in some kind of federal (or confederal) arrangement, which will have to determine the status and mandate of the congress.58 This transformation has the potential to change the meaning of one’s national identity and deepen the sense of belonging for all citizens.59
No doubt that this is a long process that looks like a dream at this stage. However, a vision, political program and practical moves in the field are necessary to begin a constructive change making process. This is the philosophy behind the Minds of Peace Experiment.