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改革开放30多年来,我国各地区的市场化程度不断提高。大量学术研究和社会实践表明,市场化改革在宏观上有助于提高资本配置效率、促进经济增长。那么,市场化改革赖以发挥作用的微观机制是什么?目前这一问题尚未得到系统的解答。鉴于上市公司普遍存在的关联交易及其“掏空”后果一直为社会公众所诟病,本文以此为切入点考察市场化改革的微观作用机制。本文采用更直接的方法衡量关联交易的“掏空”后果,通过对我国2000—2008年11 946个上市公司样本的实证分析发现,市场化改革越彻底的地区,上市公司与控股股东的产品购销和资金往来等关联交易越少。并且,市场化程度的提高明显缓解了控股股东通过关联交易转移利润的“掏空”后果。因此,减少关联交易程度、缓解关联交易的掏空后果是我国市场化改革优化资源配置的一种重要微观机制。
In the more than 30 years since the reform and opening up, the degree of marketization in various regions of our country has been continuously raised. A large number of academic research and social practice show that market-oriented reforms can help to increase the efficiency of capital allocation and promote economic growth at a macro level. So what is the micro-mechanism that the market-oriented reform has to play its role? At present, the issue has not yet been systematically solved. In view of the ubiquitous related party transactions of listed companies and their “hollowing out” consequences have been criticized by the public, this paper uses this as an entry point to examine the micro-mechanism of market-oriented reforms. This paper adopts a more direct method to measure the “hollowing-out” consequences of related party transactions. By empirical analysis of 11 946 listed companies from 2000-2008 in our country, it is found that the more thoroughly the market-oriented reform, the betterment of listed companies and controlling shareholders Related products such as purchase and sale of funds and transactions less. Moreover, the improvement of the degree of marketization has obviously eased the “hollowing out” consequences of controlling shareholders’ transfer of profits through connected transactions. Therefore, reducing the degree of related party transactions and alleviating the tunneling consequences of related party transactions is an important micro-mechanism for optimizing the allocation of resources in China’s market-oriented reforms.