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本文以15家上市银行为研究对象,通过多方程模型对2008-2014年银行高管薪酬激励、高管薪酬差异对银行风险的影响进行实证分析。该实证结果支持了管理层权力理论和公平理论,认为银行高管的薪酬激励与银行风险正相关,外部薪酬差异能够显著增强薪酬激励与银行风险之间的正相关性,内部薪酬差异对正相关性的影响并不显著。上述理论和实证结果可以为银行高管薪酬激励政策的改革和效率的提升提供思路和建议,增强银行抗逆力。
In this paper, 15 listed banks as the research object, through the multi-equation model of the 2008-2014 bank executive compensation incentives, executive pay differences on bank risk empirical analysis. The empirical results support the theory of management power and fairness theory. It is believed that the executive compensation incentive of banks is positively correlated with the bank risk. The difference of external compensation can significantly enhance the positive correlation between salary incentive and bank risk. The internal compensation difference is positively correlated Sexual effects are not significant. The above theoretical and empirical results can provide ideas and suggestions for the reform of bank executive compensation and incentive policies and efficiency, and enhance the bank’s resilience.