A Reexamination of the Legacy of Lt. General James Longstreet, CSA

来源 :History Research | 被引量 : 0次 | 上传用户:flangxisi888
下载到本地 , 更方便阅读
声明 : 本文档内容版权归属内容提供方 , 如果您对本文有版权争议 , 可与客服联系进行内容授权或下架
论文部分内容阅读
  It is the purpose of this paper to reexamine the systematic process by which James Longstreet became the scapegoat for the defeat of the Battle of Gettysburg and consequently caused the South to lose her chance to become an independent country. James Longstreet played a crucial role in the American Civil War. He was Robert E. Lee’s hand chosen Senior Lt. General, commanding the 1st Corp of the Army of northern Virginia. At the close of the war, he was a highly respected and accomplished general. However, following the death of Robert E. Lee, Longstreet’s military reputation came under severe criticism. Without Lee to dispute the controversial allegations, the public accepted them as true. This organized effort of a small group of Confederate officers to destroy Longstreet’s military accomplishment was also known as The Lost Cause Writers.
  This paper explores five political and personal actions taken by James Longstreet that resulted in the defamation of his character and accomplishments. As stated in his book, James Longstreet: The Man, the Soldier and the Controversy (1998), Albert Nofi firmly states, “The deliberate campaign to turn an authentic hero into a villain is a sobering reminder of what can happen to the historical record when it is manipulated for personal and political reasons.
  Several years ago while horseback riding through the wheat fields and peach orchards on the battlefield of Gettysburg, I was transformed from a mildly, interested student in the Civil War to an intensely, passionate student of study. During my studies, I discovered the South at large had not only blamed Lt. General James Longstreet for the lost of the Battle of Gettysburg; but also held him responsible for the South’s struggle to become an independent nation. Following the War, the South turned her back on James Longstreet, even to the point of refusing to recognize the significant military contributions, which he had made to the Confederate cause. Some historical researchers believe the harsh judgment placed on his shoulders resulted from his actions following the war. These actions included: advocated the South reconcile with the North; criticized Robert E. Lee in print; joined the Republican Party; accepted government jobs and finally for some, became affiliated with the Catholic Church. It is the purpose of this paper to reexamine the systematic process by which James Longstreet became the scapegoat for the defeat of the battle of Gettysburg and strapped with the failure of the Confederate states to become an independent country.
  James Longstreet played a crucial role in the Civil War. He was Robert E. Lee’s hand chosen Senior Lt. General, commanding the 1st Corp of the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee held genuine affection and absolute trust in Longstreet whom he claimed to be the “The Staff in my right hand” (Goree, 1995, p. 98) after the Peninsula Campaign and “My Old War Horse” (Sorrell, 1999. p.116) after the battle of Sharpsburg. Jeffery Werts, a Longstreet biographer, claims that he was the best Corp command in the Civil War on either side of the conflict. His ability to maneuver a corps of men in a tactical situation exceeded that of any corps commander in the war (Werts, 1993. p.405). As a professional soldier, army commanders Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard, Joseph Johnston, Robert E. Lee and John Bell Hood sought Longstreet as their second-in-command. Longstreet not Stonewall Jackson was Lee’s most talented and most trusted subordinate(Piston, 1987, p.103; p. 22). At the close of the war, James Longstreet, who was always referred to as “Old Pete” was a highly respected and accomplished general?
  Longstreet’s military reputation did not come under criticism until two years following the death of Robert E. Lee. With Lee unable to dispute the controversial allegations, the public accepted them as true. The controversy revolved around a supposedly order by Robert E. Lee for Longstreet to attack the federals’ left flank of George Mead’s army at sunrise on July 2, 1863 in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. His failure to do so cost the Confederacy their victory and; therefore, the chance to become a new nation (Connelly, 1977, p.64; pp. 83-89). The allegations were brought by Jubal Early and William Pendleton; and, although the allegations were not true, people in the South not only believed the charges but also maintained their truth. The following is an attempt to untangle the web of falsification, which lead to the lowering of his status in the South and even brought into question his loyalty to the Confederacy. It would be of benefit to note his background before and after the war.
  Although born in Edgefield County, South Carolina, James Longstreet was reared several miles outside of Gainesville, Georgia. At the age of nine, he was sent to live with his uncle, Augustus Longstreet, in Augusta, Georgia. He lived and studied in Augusta until his entrance in West Point in 1837. His appointment was secured from Morgan County, Alabama where his mother resided.
  He graduated from West Point in 1842. From graduation until the Mexican War, Longstreet engaged in infantry service from Jefferson Barrack in Missouri to Corpus Christi, Texas. During the Mexican War, he along with other Civil War Generals gained valuable combat experience in tactics and strategies under actual fighting conditions. During the War, he was seriously wounded carrying the 8th infantry’s flag over the wall at Chapultepec and received two brevets for gallant and meritorious conduct at Churubusco and Molino De Rey(Robbins, 2006, p.114). His military service following the war ranged from service at Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania to outpost duty in San Antonio, Texas; Chief of Commissary for the Dept of Texas, outpost duty at Fort Bliss, Texas; Paymaster General in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and finally a tour to the outpost in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Werts, 1993, pp. 46-51).
  When the War Between the States broke out, James Longstreet did not delay in offering his services to the Confederate States of America. As the title of his memoirs From Manassas to Appomattox, point out, he commanded the First Corps of Lee’s Army from its creation in1862 until Lee surrendered on April 9, 1865. He played a decisive battle role during the Seven Days Campaign, Second Manassas, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Chickamauga, and the Wilderness. Faithful to the Confederate cause to the end, his reply to General Pendleton’s request to ask Lee to surrender was “If General Lee does not know when to surrender until I tell him, he will never know” (Longstreet, 1896, p.345).Old Pete was acknowledged a superior battlefield commander with great tactical skills even enduring the personal tragedy of the deaths of three of his children, and an accidental wounding by his own men received at the Battle of Wilderness on May 6, 1864. The wound would plague him until his death.
  Following the war, Longstreet made his family residence in New Orleans. He joined the cotton brokerage firm, formed by Edward and William Owens. In addition, he became President of The Great Southern and Western Fire and Accident Insurance Company and President of the Southern Hospital Association in New Orleans.
  In March of 1867, the Radical Republicans in control of congress passed the Reconstructive Acts that divided the former confederate states (except Tennessee) into five military districts. Each state was required to adopt a new constitution, which provided for black suffrage and citizenship. The reaction of the southerners to these requirements was fueled with animosity. The New Orleans newspaper, The Times, solicited the views of prominent citizens’ residing in the city to restore reason to the public. Longstreet was one of those citizens. In his response, published on March 18th, he strongly advocated reconciliation with the North in order to begin rebuilding the destroyed south and establishing unity for one nation.
  After much thought, Longstreet decided the most efficient way to rebuild the south and control the black vote was to join the Republican Party. The Southern people genuinely believed that a man could not be a Republican and a true son of the south. Therefore, the public reacted with an ardent and harsh disapproval to his proposal. He was vilified and considered a traitor. Longstreet became an active Republican and secured a pardon from the United States government, which restored his political rights. He actively continued his affiliation with the republican party and in 1868 endorsed Ulysses S. Grant‘s campaign for the Presidency. He attended Grant’s inauguration in March of 1869 (Sanger & Thomas, 1952, pp.49, 345, 370, 371). Few weeks later; Longstreet accepted federal government jobs passed by congress. In 1870, Governor Henry Warmouth of Louisiana appointed him General of the State Militia. By 1872, Longstreet was considered a strong republican. When Williams Kellogg became governor of Louisiana, he appointed Longstreet, Major General of the State Militia. The dissatisfaction over the Republican government resulted in riots, protests, clashes in New Orleans. To regain order, in 1874, Longstreet led mostly black militia soldiers against a protesting group called Crescent City White Leaguers. The White Leaguers consisted largely of Confederate Veterans. Following the clash, Longstreet was labeled a scalawag, publically berated and received numerous death threats.
  He had to leave the City for the safety of himself and his family. The final act that branded him a southern outcast was his conversion to the Roman Catholic religion. In a region where 99% of the populations are Protestant, the acceptance of his Catholic affiliation was just too much (Gallagher, 2004, p.128).
  The following is an attempt to ferret out the principal elements of the issue. In November a correspondent for the New York Times, William Swinton was writing a campaign history on the Army of the Potomac. He had been seeking information and opinions from ex confederate leaders who had participated in the Battle of Gettysburg. In this famous interview which became public knowledge, Longstreet criticized Lee’s assault at Gettysburg on July 3rd. As far as we know, no one had publically criticized the leadership of Robert E. Lee. While Lee was alive, not one of his officers stepped forward to debate or deny Longstreet’s criticism publically but after his death, the deformation of his military leadership began.
  The accusations against Longstreet began on January 19, 1872 at the birthday celebration of Robert E. Lee. Jubal Early was addressing the student body and guest of the now Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia. A large part of his speech focused on exonerating himself of any blame for the Gettysburg’s defeat and his failure as a Corp commander in independent command in Shenandoah Valley in 1864. His attention was then directed at excusing Lee of any fault in the Gettysburg defeat. It was not Lee that failed at Gettysburg but rather his senior subordinate who did not attack the union left flank in the early morning hours of July 2nd. Thus began Early’s campaign against Longstreet. The South would have won a great and decisive victory had Longstreet obeyed Lee’s order but which he managed to put off until 4o’clock that afternoon (Jones, 1896).
  Jubal Early had his own agenda for placing the failure on Longstreet’s shoulder. As a leading lost Cause writer, he wanted to present Robert E. Lee as the supreme military leader who could not have erred on the battlefield. A scapegoat for the lost Gettysburg’s battle had to be developed and Longstreet was the chosen one. Jubal Early became the most rebellious of all Rebels-a crude, profane “Yankee-hating” individual. His desire to vindicate the South in the nation’s eyes was tireless (Connelly & Barbara, 1982, pp.7, 10).
  The second charge against Longstreet came one year later on another R. E. Lee birthday celebration by William Pendleton. William Pendleton was a Lt. General in the Army of Northern Virginia who at one time commanded Lee’s artillery division. Before the Civil War, he was a protestant minister. Pendleton reassured the audience that Robert E Lee did not lose the battle of Gettysburg. It was Longstreet who failed to obey a direct order from Robert E. Lee to attack the union side at “sunrise” on July 2nd. Other assertions made by Pendleton were delays in attacking on July 3rd and direct insubordination to R. E. Lee that resulted in the lost. The entire blame for the failure of Gettysburg was placed squarely on Longstreet’s shoulders. I suppose Gen. Jeb Stuarts’ late arrival on the second day of battle and Gen. Ewell’s decision to not capture Cemetery and Culp’s Hill were not factors in the outcome on the famous battle. According to William Piston, many confederate veterans came to believe that it was Longstreet’s slowness at Gettysburg rather than the fleet of Yankees that captured New Orleans that best accounts for the union boundary to be pushed past the Ohio River (Piston, 1990, p.10).
  Longstreet himself proved that General Lee never ordered a sunrise attack by securing affidavits from Lee staff officers, Charles Marshall, Charles S. Venable, A.L. Long and Walter H. Taylor. Each officer submitted straightforward statements denying that Lee had planned a sunrise attack. Charles Venable referred to Pendleton as emotionally ill and stated it was a shame that the story was ever told (Longstreet, 2000, pp.58-60).
  While Longstreet demonstrated his innocents, the Southern people chose to believe the worse about his general ship because of his earlier transgressions. According to Piston, it was no coincidence that these allegations began after Lee’s death. Early and Pendleton were acutely aware that Robert E. Lee did not share their opinion of Longstreet and only Lee could have set the record straight.
  A third man to complete the major participants of the Anti-Longstreet faction was J. William Jones. Jones a confederate chaplain helped form the Chaplain’s Association of the Army of Northern Virginia, and ministered to troops who served under Robert E. Lee. When Lee died, his family designated Jones to serve as his biographer and Jones produced his first book, Personal Reminiscences, Anecdotes and Letters of Robert E. Lee. Jones was an opportunist and discovered early after the war that a close association with Robert E. Lee resulted in fame and fortune. Jones echoed the allegations made Early and Pendleton,” Longstreet lost it at Gettysburg”. Chaplain Jones would have you believe that James Longstreet was a Judas goat leading his men to the slaughterhouse. This about a man who told Robert E. Lee,” No fifteen thousand men ever arranged for battle could make a successful assault over that field”. (Longstreet, 1896, p. 345) Charles Reagan Wilson calls Jones “the evangelist of the lost Cause” and refers to him as “the single most important link between Southern religion and the Lost Cause”. (Longstreet, 1896, p. 345)
  These three men were leaders attempting to place Robert E. Lee as the glorified saint of the Lost Cause. The lost cause was a justification for the south succeeding from the union. It was a way to provide an explanation for the military catastrophe. The southern catastrophe is best described in the words of James M. McPherson.
  “By the war’s end much of the South was an economic desert. The war not only killed one-quarter of the Confederate’s white men of military age; it also killed two-fifths of the southern livestock, wrecked half of the farm machinery, ruined thousands of miles of railroad, and destroyed the principal labor system on which the southern productivity had been based. Two-thirds of assessed southern wealth vanished in the war”. (McPherson, 1988, p.818).
  In the presences of such an overwhelming lost, southerners needed an explanation that allowed them to retain a measure of pride. The lost Cause served to fulfill that need.
  Every cause demands a hero and Robert E. Lee was the perfect choice. Lee’s military genius dominated the newspaper stories and the conversations of southerners and northerners alike. Lee exercised self-discipline, self-control, possessed a superior code of duty and a faith in God that would view that of Stonewall Jacksons devotion to God. These men along with a select number of other officers were so racial and fanatical in their affection for Lee that they became known as the Lee Cult. The problem with the Cult was their insistence that Lee’s war record have no flaws. Therefore, he could not have lost the Battle of Gettysburg. Someone else must be made the scapegoat. James Longstreet was the ideal officer to blame for the defeat for reasons already discussed but highlighted below:
  He had openly criticized Lee’s battle plan at Gettysburg.
  He advocated that the North and South reconcile as quickly as possible and move on toward rebuilding the south.
  He joined the Republican Party and later became a Catholic.
  His responses to criticism were often sarcastic and egotistical. (Gallagher & Alan, 2000, pp. 128,129,132).
  James Longstreet could not have made a better target had he sat down and drawn a big bull’s eye on the back of his coat for the public to view (Gallagher, Lecture: Higher Education Center, 4 March, 2006). I believe their contempt for him was fueled by the close relationship between Lee and Longstreet. Author L. Fremantle, a captain in the Coldstream Guards and Lt. Colonel in the British army wrote in his book, Three Months in the Confederate States, “The relations between him (Lee) and Longstreet are quite touching- they are almost always together”. (Fremantle, 1991, p.249)
  Jubal Early was the most prominent member of the lost cause writers.Under his leadership, began a well-organized, concerted effort to discredit Longstreet’s military record. Through the Jubal Early, William Jones and William Pendleton letters and papers, can be traced the method these men used to present Longstreet as guilty for the confederate defeat at Gettysburg. Their successful efforts were carried out through an overflow of hundreds of articles published in the Southern Historical Society Papers, which fell under the control of the Lee Cult. Jubal Early’s used the papers as an instrument to espouse the lost cause tenants and anti-Longstreet myth. In an era when most information was secured through the printed word, the society’s paper became critical. The negative image of Longstreet in these articles was accompanied by speeches delivered at confederate reunions and larger southern city forums. The articles and speeches were reinforced by novels, poems and plays, which presented Longstreet’s evil fame in the public eye (Connelly, 1978, pp.72-75).
  William Piston argues “that as 1ong as Southern history is lived and felt as much as it is read, James Longstreet will be remembered primarily as Lee’s tarnished hero”. (Piston, 1987, p. 188) Today, many books and articles about James Longstreet have received a positive appraisal from researchers and historians who are engaging in a fresh, objective examination of Longstreet’s service. Public opinion demonstrates that James Longstreet’s image in history has changed to a more accurate view. According to William Piston, this is largely due to the work of the following four individuals (DiNardo & Albert,1998, p.219).The first was Michael Shaara who authored the book The Killer Angel about the Battle of Gettysburg. Shaara’s Longstreet was neither slow nor stubborn. He was instead competent, wise, Lee’s friend and greatest source of strength. Second was Ted Turner who produced the movie Gettysburg based on Shaara’s novel. The movie thrust James Longstreet into the forefront of the public so that the individual viewer could decide independently any blame that may have been assigned for the failure of the battle. The third person acknowledged was Garland Reynolds who founded the Longstreet Society. The Longstreet Society is a group of more than 500 members formed to honor the life of Lt.
  James Longstreet. The society is dedicated to the celebration and study of his history as a CSA Commander, his fervent dedication to the restoration of the American Union, his ideals for peace and his belief in fellowship of man (Politics from the Piedmont Porch, 2007).
  Finally, credit is attributed to Robert Thomas who began the initiative to place a monument of James Longstreet on the battlefield of Gettysburg. The monument was unveiled in July 3rd, 1998.
  As a frequent speaker on the Military Legacy of James Longstreet, I strive to obtain a measure of justice not only for his reputation but also more pointedly for the military contributions that he made to the confederacy in the Civil War. In addition, great emphasis is placed on his efforts to restore the union between the North and South following the war. I greatly respect the works of Jeffery Werths, William Piston, Thomas Connelly, Gary Gallagher, Alan Nolan, R L DiNardo, Albert Nofi and others who have demonstrated a heart for justice in the writings on James Longstreet.
  I believe Robert E. Lee would not have wanted these ruinous lies and slanderous fables to prevail against his old warhorse. Longstreet said, “I do not fear the verdict at Gettysburg. Time will set all things right. Error lives for a day. Truth is eternal”. (Longstreet, 2000, p.85) I believe God will raise knowledgeable men and women in our generation to defend his legacy and military record. A validation of these words will be realized when Civil War buffs at large becomes committed to find the ultimate Truth and this knowledge is disseminated throughout America.
  I choose to leave the final word, to Albert Nofi. “The deliberate campaign to turn an authentic hero into a villain is a sobering reminder of what can happen to the historical record when it is manipulated for personal or political purposes”. (DiNardo & Albert, 1998, pp. 23,199)
  Reference
  Connelly, T. L. (1978). The marble man: Robert E. Lee and his image in American society. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
  Connelly, T. L., & Barbara L. B. (1982). God and General Longstreet: the lost cause and southern mind. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
  DiNardo, R. L., & Albert A. N. (Eds.). (1998). James Longstreet: The Man, the Soldier, the Controversary. Cambridge: DeCapo Press.
  Fremantle, A. J. L. (1991). Three months in the southern states: April-June 1863. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press(Reprint).
  Gallagher, G.W. (2004). Robert E. Lee and his high command, the great course teaching that engage the mind, Chantilly, Virginia: The Teaching Company.
  Gallagher, G. W. (4 March, 2006). Lecture: Higher Education Center. Virginia Beach, Virginia.
  Gallagher, G.W., & Alan T. N. (Ed.). (2000). The myth of the lost cause and Civil War history. Bloomington: Indiana Press.
  Goree, T. J. (1995). Longstreet’s aide: The Civil War letters of major Thomas J. Goree. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
  Jones, J. W. (1896). The Longstreet-Gettysburg controversy who commenced it. The Richmond Virginia Dispatch, 16 Feb, 1896.
  Longstreet, H. D. (2000). Longstreet. Lee and Longstreet at High Tide, Gettysburg in the Light of the Official Records. Wilmington: Broadfoot Publishing Company.
  Longstreet, J. (1908). From Manassas to Appomattox: memoirs of the civil war in America. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company.
  McPherson, J. M. (1988). Battle cry of freedom, the Civil War era. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  Piston, W. G. (1990). Lee’s tarnished lieutenant: James Longstreet and his place in southern history. Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press.
  Politics from the Piedmont Porch. Gainesville: Lanier Center Best Western, 2007.
  Robbins, J.S. (2006). Last in their class: Custer, Pickett and the goats of West Point. New York: Encounter Books.
  Sanger, D. B., &Thomas H. (1952). James Longstreet: I. The soldier, II. The politician. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.
  Sorrell, G. M. (1999). At the right hand of Longstreet: recollections of a confederate staff soldier. Nebraska: Bison Books Publishing.
  Werts, J. D. (1994). General James Longstreet: The confederacy’s most controversial soldier: a biography. New York: Simon&Schuster.
  Wilson, C. (1980). Baptized in blood: the religion of the lost cause, 1865-1920. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
  

其他文献
榆林山林牧场境内有大量的山杏,果农在改接仁用杏(主要是大扁) 过程中,将离住地近、立地条件好的一些杏树接了兰州大接杏(皮仁两用杏) ,以便既能给仁用杏授粉又可食用。近年来,离大接杏近的仁用杏出现了果皮增厚、可以食用、果核和杏仁变小的现象。2005 年在仁用杏采收时,我们随机采取用山杏授粉的和用兰州大接杏授粉的仁用杏各5 kg ,进行分析,结果见表1 。    从表1 看出,仁用杏用皮仁两用杏授粉后
期刊
夏秋高温时期进行果树苗木的嫁接,不可忽视接穗的采集、贮运。为了避免在高温期因接穗的不当采集与贮运造成的嫁接成活率低,我们经多年实践认为在接穗采集、贮运、嫁接过程中必须做好以下几点。  1  低温采穗 接穗应在凌晨气温较低、空气湿度相对较大时进行采集。应采集生长良好、粗壮、芽体饱满和发育较充实的当年生新梢。枝条剪下后应立即摘掉叶片和上部幼嫩部分,保留叶柄或部分叶柄。每30~50根接穗捆成1 捆,捆时
期刊
近年来,在宣传扁桃品种、回复来信来电咨询以及开展示范推广过程中,我们发现有些人把扁桃与蟠桃混淆,由于扁桃名称中有一个“扁”字,而蟠桃的果实形状是扁的,所以误认为扁桃就是蟠桃。为了帮助果农对扁桃有一个明确的认识,以下列举扁桃与蟠桃的几个主要特性加以区别,以利发展扁桃生产时参考。  1  树种不同 由于扁桃在我国北方大多数地区栽培时间尚短,栽培面积也很小,生产上有不少人还没见过它,不了解它,而蟠桃人们
期刊
1  劣质花芽与夏剪的关系    1. 1  环剥对花芽质量的影响 环剥是促进富士苹果成花的有效措施,但环剥过重、过早或多次、连年环剥,均会使枝组内形成过多的花芽,且腋花芽数量过多,难以分化出质量高的顶花芽,同时腋花芽结果和坐果能力都不如顶花芽。  1. 2  扭梢、摘心对花芽质量的影响 经扭梢、摘心等措施形成的花芽,主要是靠暂时截流营养,引起局部养分积累而形成的。过多地采取扭梢和摘心等措施,在幼
期刊
黑莓与草莓两者均为浆果,草莓上市比黑莓早两个月左右,劳动高峰期正好错开;都可作为鲜食、加工果品,草莓国内外市场较为稳定,一般不会大起大落,黑莓则太过依赖国际市场,依赖冷藏加工,极易大起大落,效益高,风险大,因此二者互补性极强。2004~2007年,我们在欢墩镇进行了黑莓、草莓套作栽培试验,生产设施和相关费用投入不多但经济效益极为显著,值得推广。    1 试验园基本情况    试验园位于欢墩镇朱盂
期刊
“枣王1 号”是平度市灰埠镇东张家村张学峰从梨枣芽变中选育出的一个新品种。此品种萌芽发枝能力强,产量高,果实个大,脆甜,品质佳,晚熟。现将其主要品种特性及栽培技术要点介绍如下。    1  主要品种特性    1. 1  果实经济性状 枣王1 号果实个大,单果均重44g ,大果达120 g。成熟果果皮赭红光亮;皮薄肉脆,细嫩多汁,甘甜清香,含总糖27. 5 % , 含维生素C1078.1 mg/
期刊
自由纺锤形是目前梨树密植栽培推广的一种主要树形,其整形修剪应“放下剪子,拿起绳子”,重在生长季调节,强调撑枝、拉枝缓和树势,打开光路。同时利用环剥、环割等技术促进早成花,早结果,早见效。  1  1~3 年生树的整形 1~3 年生不结果幼树整形修剪主要任务是千方百计增加枝叶量,在1~2 年生时多进行中截,一般见到壮枝、壮芽短截,剪口芽留壮芽,迅速扩大树冠,增加营养面积。同时注意维持中干势力,培养树
期刊
In response to horror stories throughout the country concerning childhood deaths from sniffing model airplane glue, organizations around Louisiana would begin lobbying for legislation to criminalize t
期刊
果树在生长季节经常出现黄叶病,但引发果树黄叶症的原因很多,很难用一种药物全部有效防除。因此,只有区分类型,对症施药防治方可奏效。    1  病毒型黄叶    病毒型黄叶发生比较普遍,该类型黄叶的主要表现是:叶片呈深浅相间的黄色,边缘不清晰;也有的呈大小不一的鲜黄色斑块,边缘清晰;或带有条状斑,沿叶脉变黄失绿,出现较宽的带状或细密网纹;也有的沿叶脉出现黄化镶边。其防治措施主要是以预防为主: ①严禁
期刊
摘 要:研究了无核葡萄新品种“新葡4号”继代繁殖过程中不同培养基、IAA浓度及培养条件对试管苗红叶、生根及增殖倍数的影响,结果表明:选择GS培养基,不添加IAA,培养温度27.6 ℃,光照强度2 010 Lx,有利于降低试管苗的红叶发生率,提高试管苗的生根率及增殖倍数。  关键词:新葡4号;试管苗;培养条件;研究    我们在“新葡4号”葡萄组培微繁工厂化生产初期,试管苗在继代繁殖过程中出现了红
期刊