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文章利用1998-2006年面板数据分析了中国省级税收竞争与环境污染之间的关系,实证结果表明:(1)地方政府在税收竞争中对污染治理采取了“骑跷跷板”策略,并存在“趋劣竞争”现象;(2)增加地方政府可支配财力有利于外部性不大的污染物的治理;(3)排污费制度对工业固体废弃物和工业废水的排放强度有一定的抑制作用,但对工业二氧化硫排放强度并未起到应有的缩减功能;(4)中央政府颁布的环境标准对促进地方环境质量改善效果甚微。
The article analyzes the relationship between provincial tax competition and environmental pollution in China by using panel data from 1998 to 2006. The empirical results show that: (1) Local governments adopt “riding seesaw” strategy in pollution control and (2) Increasing the disposable financial resources of local governments is conducive to the control of pollutants with less externalities; (3) There is a certain emission intensity of industrial sewage discharge and industrial wastewater through the system of sewage charges , But it does not reduce the intensity of industrial sulfur dioxide emissions properly. (4) The environmental standards promulgated by the central government have little effect on the improvement of local environmental quality.